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CHAPTER I 
FROM HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE T O  INT ERNA L SECURITY 
The history of the enormous importance of Latin A merica to the 
United States could easily be traced back to 1823 ,  when Pre s ident James 
Monroe expressed ly warned the European state s against interference in 
the W e stern Hemisphere. 
The famous Monroe Doctrine of 1823 declared that the United 
States would resist all future attempts at colonization by Europ e ,  and 
res erved to itself the right to act as the protector of Latin America in 
the event of outside aggr e s s ion: 
we owe it therefore, to candor and to the amicable r e la ­
tions existing between the United States and those (European) 
powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their 
part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere 
as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . 1 
From the dec laration of that famous doctrine to the present day, 
United States foreign policy has undergone various radical change s .  A 
study of contemporary United States foreign policy makes pertinent a 
1 J .  D .  R ichardson, ed . ,  "The Monroe Doctrine , " M e s sage s and 
Papers of the Presidents, Vol. XI , p.  209,  a s  cited in The R ecord of 
A merican Diplomacy, R uhl F .  Bartlett, ed . ,  (New York: A lfred A .  
Knopf, 1 964), p .  1 8 2 .  
1 
2. 
review of the various change s that policy has undergone in the past in 
order to get a c lear picture of United Stat e s - Latin A m erican r e lations 
and also to under stand the growing importance of Latin America for 
architects of United States foreign policy. 
In 1 904, when the threat of intervention from the European powers 
seemed almost inevitable, Pre sident Theodore R oosevelt promptly set 
forth a new policy which, he hoped, would remove all future excuses for 
European intervention in the W e stern Hemisphe r e .  The "R oosevelt Cor-
ollary" , a s  it came to be known, stated: 
Chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which r e sults in a gen­
eral loosening of the ties of civilized society may in Latin A mer­
ica, as elsewhere , ultimately require intervention by some 
civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere, the adherence 
of the U . S .  to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States,  
however reluctantly, in flagrant cases  of  s uch wr ongdoing or 
impotenc e,  to the exercise of an internal police power. 2. 
This controversial  " R oosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine 
was used to justify several instanc es of United States intervention in the 
Caribbean--in Cuba in 1 898; in Panama the first intervention was in 1904. 
During 1 9 1 7 ,  and again in 1 9 1 8 ,  United States Marines were sent to Pan-
ama temporarily. The United States inte rvened in Nicaragua in 1 9 1 1; 
and in Dominican R epublic the first United States intervent·ion took place 
in 1905 ,  and from 1 9 1 6-2.4, the United States Navy ruled the troubled 
country. Haiti became the fifth United Stat e s  protectorate and United 
States Marines were sent there in 1 9 1 5 .  Furthermore, the R oosevelt 
2R uhl F .  Bartlett, �· cit . , p .  539 .  
3 
Corollary altered the Monroe Doctrine from one denying the right of 
European intervention in the A mericas to one condoning the process when 
conducted by the United State s .  W illiam Taft ' s  "Dollar Dip lornacy" was 
more of a direct military intervention, by and for the United States in 
Latin America . 
The foreign policy of President W oodrow W ilson from 19 1 3  to 
1 9 1  7 produced the most blatant, and inexcusable examples of interven­
tion in the history of United State s - Latin A me rican relations. The United 
States intervention in Mexico in 1 9 14 ,  in Haiti in 19 1 5 ,  and the Dominican 
R epublic in 1 9 1 6  were some of the prime examples of United States inter-
vent ion. 
The strong reactions in Latin A merican countries a gainst these 
high-handed actions eventually brought a s low change in the United States 
foreign policy, which began under the Hoover administration and was com­
p leted under the administration of President Franklin R oos evelt. This 
change, which was accompanied by periodic reiterations of the principles 
of the Good Neighbor policy, helped to bring about a renewal of mutual 
trust and good faith between the Latin A merican R epublics and the United 
State s .  One of the main highlights of the Good Neighbor policy was the 
United States' unequivocal abandonment of unilateral intervention in 
Latin A m erica . 
The Sev enth International Conference of Amer ican States in 1933 
approved the convention on the rights and duties of stat e s ,  which con­
tained a clause stating that "no state has the right to intervene in the 
4 
internal or external affairs of another" . 3 Only after the United States' 
acceptance of the principle of non-intervention, did Pan-Americanism 
become a complete doctrine. 
Before proceeding, it might be helpful to define Pan-Americanism 
and briefly review its role in the later United State s -Latin American 
relations . Pan-Americanism is defined a s  "the expression of the polit-
ical, cultural, socia 1, and economic solidarity of the American states" . 4 
The Pan-American movement can be divided into three phases :  5 
The. first phase ( 1 826 - 1 889) began with the Congress  of Panama, 
convened by Bolivar, who elaborated an alliance of reciprocal ass istance- -
an  early application of the principle o f  collective security. This con-
gre s s  could be considered as the birth of Pan-American movement. 
The second phase ( 1 889 - 1 948) began with the Fir st Internationa 1 
Conference of A merican States in Washington, D . C . ,  in 1889 .  The con-
ference led to the establishment of a permanent inter-American organi-
zation, the Commercial Bureau of the American R epublic s, later ( 1 9 1 0) 
designated a s  the Pan-American Union (PAU). The first inter-American 
Conference thus founded the new Pan-American organization. The third 
3The International Conference of Ame rican States,  First Supple­
ment, 1933- 1 940 ( Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, W ash­
ington, D. C .  , 1 940) , pp . 1 2 1 - 1 23 .  
4o. Carlos Sto�tzer, The Organization of American State s (New 
York: Frederick A .  Praeger Publishers ,  1965) ,  p .  3 . 
5Ibid . , pp. 5-9 .  (The following discussion of the Pan-Ame rican 
movement has been extracted from Stoetzer . )  
5 
phase was initiated with the establishment of the Organization of Ameri-
can States {OAS) in 1948, at the Ninth International Confer ence of Amer-
ican States. 
Among other important conferences held between the 1930' s and 
1 940' s ,  two special conference s  preceding the establishment of the OAS,  
worth mentioning for the purposes of  this study, are the special Inter -
American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in Mexico City in 
1945, which, by the A ct Chapultepec, extended the principle of collective 
security insofar as it included aggression with the continent itself; and 
the special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continen-
tal Peace and Security in.Rio de Janeiro ( 1 94 7), which led to the Inter-
American Treaty of .Reciprocal A s sistance, known as the .Rio Treaty. 
These conferences  of both Chapultepec and .Rio de Janeiro are cons id-
ered to be the highlights of the modern Pan-American movement. They 
laid the groundwork for the reorganization and modernization of the inter-
American system, carried out through the establishment of the present 
OAS at the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogota 
( 1948) . The principal agreement contained in the .Rio T reaty is article 
3 ,  which states: 
The high c ontracting parties agree that an arm·ed attack  by 
any state against an American state shall be considered as an 
attack against all American states .  6 
6Ibid . ,  pp. 88-89 .  
6 
The OAS ,  which is a regional political or ganization comprising 
the United States and twenty Latin American R epub lies ,  has institution-
alized the principles embodied in the Monroe Doctrine . A 11 hemispheric 
problems have been taken up since 1 948 through the machinery of the 
OAS. 
The post World War II period commenced with a change in the 
United States foreign policy coinciding with the opening of the Cold War .  
"Containment" of  Soviet Communism became the preponderant doctrine 
of American foreign policy during this period; which meant in the words 
of its author George F .  Kennan: 
• . . the Soviet pres sure against the free institutions of the 
we stern world is something that can be contained by adroit 
and vigilant application of counter-force . . .  corresponding 
to the shifts and maneuver s of Soviet policy. 7 
The echos of containment were also heard in Latin America. 
The OAS declared itself clearly against the increased efforts of the Soviet 
Union to extend Communism from its natural borders. The Bogota Con-
ference in 1 948 adopted a strong declaration against communism, which 
read: 
• • .  by its anti-democratic nature and its interventionist ten­
dency, the political activity of internationa l Communism or any 
other totalitarian doctrine is incompatible with the concept of 
American freedom. 8 
7A merican Diplomacy, 1 900-1950 ( Chicago: University of Chi­
cago, 1 9 51 ) ,  p. 120 .  (First published anonymously as "The Sources  of 
Soviet Conduct, " Foreign Affair s ,  XLV {July, 1 947), pp. 566-82 .  
8J .  Lloyd Mecham, The United States and the Inter-American 
Security (Aust in: University of T exas Press ,  1 963), p .  4·29 .  
7 
The signatories agreed to take the necessary measures to eradicate and 
prevent communist activities directed from abroad. 
The Fourth Consultation of Foreign Ministers  at Washington, on 
March-April 7, 1 9 5 1 ,  had among others the two following problems on 
the agenda: 
I. Political and military cooperation for the defense of the 
Americas;  and 
II. Strengthening of the internal security of the American R e -
public s .  9 
The Latin American c ountries agreed to develop their military capabili-
ties in support of their obligations for the collective defense under the 
R io Treaty and to strengthen their resources for support of the United 
Nations in preventing aggression in other parts of the world .  l O 
The 1 954 Caracas R e solution XCIII of the T enth Inter-American 
Conference, which was entitled the "Declaration of Solidarity for the 
Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against 
Intervention of International C ommunism" ,  was another significant mea-
sure to control the spread of communism. The key passage stated: 
That the domination or control of the political institutions 
of any American states by the international communist move­
ment, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an 
9Press R e lease, Department of State , No. 1240, December 16 ,  
1950 .  
l OFinal A ct, Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affair s (Washington: Organization of American States, April 6 ,  1 95 1 ) ,  
pp .  10- 1 1 . 
8 
extracontinental power , would constitute a threat to the sov­
erignty and political independence of the American State s ,  
endangering the peace of America , and would call for a meeting 
of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in 
accordance with existing treaties. 11  
In 19  59,  when Fide 1 Castro came to power, he shrewdly exploited 
the historical anti-American feelings among the Cuban masses in the 
name of national liberation and he announced that the Cuban revolution 
was "humanistic and non-communist" . The diplomatic rupture occurred 
during a controversy over the staff at the American embas sy in Havana . 
President Eisenhower' s answer to this was the severence of diplomatic 
relations with Cuba . 
In 1 96 1  the Cuban Foreign Minister R aul R oa charged in the Se-
curity Council that the United States was plotting an invasion of Cuba. 
During the same session the United States countercharged that Castroism 
was incompatible with hemispheric political and economic principles 
and was striving to initiate guerrilla war throughout the A merica s .  1 2  
The ill-fated Cuban invasion ( more popularly known as the Bay of Pigs 
d ebacle), which was originally planned during the Eis enhower adminis-
tration, was carried out by the Kennedy administration. In his May Day 
speech following the unsuccessful invasion, Castro declared that the 
Cuban R evolution was socialistic, later, he further declared himself a 
1 lTenth Inter-American Conference, R eport of the United States 
Department of State, Publication 5692, 1955 ,  pp. 43 -58 .  
1 2Year Book of the United Nations 1 96 1  (New York: Columbia 
University Press ,  1 963), pp. 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 .  
9 
Marxist-Leninist, and Cuba became the first communist state of the 
western hemisphere .  
Thus Cuba ·became a new threat to the security of the Latin Amer-
ican states because of Castro' s "persistent and determined effort to ex-
port his revolution to the rest of Latin America" . 1 3  Castro' s strategy 
includes: 
I.  training revolutionaries from other Latin American Countries; 
II. maintaining Cuban embas sies;  
III. voicing Cuban views in the press and on the radio; 
IV. promoting radical left movements as well as front groups 
and leftist parties that follow Fidelismo;.and 
V .  working with old communist parties and the embas s ies  of 
Russia and satellite countries ,  which handle the distribution 
of propaganda. 14 
Thus Fidelismo, as  this movement came to be known, found a 
considerable response among the various radical group s .  A s  a result 
of this Castroite guerrilla movements emerged, who viewed Fidelismo 
as the most vital and effective counteractant for the political, social, 
and economic ills of their society. Violence is looked upon by them as 
the most potent and legitimate means to change the rotting status quo. 
The Castroite revolution, which is mainly based upon internal revolt, 
subversion, and insurgency through violent guerrilla movements, became 
a serious menace to the internal security of the Latin American nation-
states .  
l 3Eawin Lleuwen:, ·The United -States and the Challenge to Security 
1n Latin America (Ohio State University Pre ss ,  1966) ,  p .  3 6 .  
14Ibid . 
1 0  
This challenge has to be met quite differently than with the con­
ventional means available for external threats .  As a result, since 1 96 1 ,  
the basis of the United States  foreign policy and security as sistance pro­
grams to the Latin Americas has changed from hemispheric defense to 
internal security. 
The main purposes of this study will be: 
I .  to document the proposition that the basis of  the United 
States foreign policy and security as sistance to Latin 
America was changed from hemispheric defense to in­
ternal security beginning in 1 96 1 ;  and to analyze the 
impacts of the United State s police assistance to Latin 
American countries; 
II. to authenticate that the United States police as sistance 
program performances ,  among other contributory fac­
tor s, have promoted rather than reduced violent radical 
forces within Latin American sub-continent . 
The United States police assistance,  as  distinguished from mili­
tary a s sistance, is the main focus of this study, and hence the year 
1961  has been selected as a turning point because of the following occur-
ences: 
(a) In January 1 96 1  diplomatic re lat ions between Cuba and the 
United States were severed. 
( b) This was followed by the April 1 7 ,  1 9 6 1 ,  Bay of Pigs fiasco.  
(c) In his May speech following the invasion, Castro announced 
1 1  
that the Cuban revolution was socialistic and on December 1 
of the same year he declared that he was Marxist- Leninist.  
(d) Since the early sixties Cuba has operated Castroite guerrilla 
warfare training schools and encouraged and p romoted radi-
cal leftist movements and other violent insur gent organiza-
tions within various Latin A me rican state s .  1 5  
(e)  In January, 1 9 6 1 ,  the United State s  accused Cuba in the 
United Nations Security Council of striving to initiate gue r ­
rilla war throughout the America s .  l 6 
Various references to incidents prior to 1 9 6 1  will be made when-
ever nec es sary because the choice of the year 1 96 1 ,  d e spite the afor e -
mentioned reasons , is also somewhat arbitrary and is used a s  a matter 
of convenience. 
Since this is a macro- study, the extensive development of gener-
alizations based on the broad app lication of the variables encountered is 
quite indispensable, but exceptions will be c learly spelled out whenever 
the general factors and variables are not applicable to all the states of 
the Latin .American subcontinent. 
l 5u . S .  Senate ,  " .A  Study Prepared at the R equest of the Subcom­
mittee on American R epublics A ffair s of the Committee on Foreign R e la­
tions , "  Insurgency in Latin.Ame rica , January 1 5, 1968,  pp.  7 - 9 .  
1 6Year Book of the United Nations, 1 9 6 1  (New York: Columbia 
Univer sity P r e s s ,  1963) ,  pp.  1 1 8 - 1 1 9 .  
CHAPTER II 
THE LATIN A M ER ICAN R EVOLUT ION 
Before the analysis of the United States foreign policy, we must 
focus our attention to the Latin American polity . A s  a starting point 
of our inquiry: a brief look at the internal politics of the Latin A m erican 
countries is quite pertinent since the root cause of instability lies the re, 
which ne cessitated the major shift in the United State s  foreign policy 
from hemispheric defense to interna 1 security. Externa 1 factors only 
serve a s  an added elem ent to the already existing internal factors and 
they together promote political instability and violence in Latin America. 
The important questions which should be raised her e  are: What 
are the nece ssities for the United State s  police ass istance to Latin A m e r ­
ica ? Who are the insur gent elem ents in the area ? W hat are the politi­
cal, social, and economic factors in Latin A me r ica, which popularized 
the insurgents and subversive £or<res ? Why have the s e  forces become 
a threat to the internal law and order and stabilities of various govern­
ments ? What role is the United States p laying in the Latin American 
revolution ? The answers to these and other re lated questions will be 
traced in this and the following chapter s .  
1 2  
13 
An Ana lytical Framework 
The study of Latin Ame rican politics has been the focus of a 
variety of conceptual frameworks which have and are being developed 
by various scholars to explain the causes of political instability and 
violence in Latin A me rica. Various appr oache s have been deve loped 
a s· the discipline attained maturity; but the quest continues in order to 
achieve more advance� and satisfactory explanations for the causes of 
political instability and violenc e .  1 7  
This write r ' s  analysis of the causal factors of political instabil-
ity in Latin America is based upon the paradigm pres ented by Kenneth 
Johnson and Ben Burnett. A c c ording to it: 
Political instability occurs when the governing institutions 
of organized society are ineffective in gratifying popular wants 
and expectations. In that sense the governments are "maxi­
mize r s "  . . • sending out str earns of satisfactions .  Failure 
of governments to gratify popular wants leads to political ali­
enation in varying degrees of intensity . A lienation in turn is 
not a fixed quality but varies acc ording to a number of causa 1 
factor s .  Political alienation may be defined a s  a deeply felt 
r e s entment toward social and governing institutions which i s  
s o  intense a s  t o  b e  manifested in happenings which contribute 
to political instability. Political instability, acc ordingly, is 
defined a s  a state of conflict between governments and ( c om­
peting) power groups which is characterized by overt acts of 
violence by supports for extreme political radicalism or by 
apathy in the face of movements which are c ommitted to ex­
treme, radical, or v iolent dis locations of status quo. Thus, 
1 7For a detailed survey of re search in Latin Ame rican area of 
study s ee J.  D .  Martz, " The Place of Latin America in the Study of 
Comparative Politic s , "  The Journal of Politic s ,  XXVIII ( February, 1966) ,  
pp.  57-80 ;  and John D .  Martz, "Political Science and Latin American 
Studies:  A Discipline in Search of a R egion, " Latin American R e s earch 
R eview, VI (Spring, 1 9 7 1 ) ,  pp . 7 3 - 9 5 .  
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political alienation i s  seen a s  a widely shared attitude­
potential and instability is viewed a s  thos e  phenomena pro­
ceeding the refrom. 1 8  
This political instability, explains Merle Kling, i s  "chronic; 
frequently accompanied by limited violenc e" ;  and the most important of 
all, "produces no basic shifts in academic, social and political policie s" . l9 
A s  an application of this theoretical concept to Latin American policy, 
this writer has developed a circular phenomena which is pres ented below. 
A civilian government, which came to power either through demo-
c ratic elections, or is there as a result of contunismo, or brought to 
power by the armed forces , comes under heavy pre s sure from the vari-
ous groups within the country. The s e  for c e s ,  a s  can be seen in the cir-
cular presentation, are: 
R eform groups (Populist forces) which are devoted to change of 
the existing status quo by bringing about a sweeping alteration in the 
basic distribution of the existing values in their soc ietie s .  They are 
basically non-violent and democratic in natur e ,  a good example of which 
is the APR.IST A movement in Peru. 
A nother f0rce for change are the extreme radical group s ,  who, 
in contrast to the populist for c e s ,  are violent, non-democratic, and in 
some cases armed with Marxist ideologies.  
1 8Kenneth F .  Johnson, ' 'Causal Factor in Latin A merican Polit­
ical Instability, " W e stern Political Quarterly, XVII (September, 1 964) , 
pp.  432 - 446.  
l 9Merle Kling, "Towards a Theory of  Power and Political Insta­
bility in Latin America, " W e stern Political Quarterly, IX (March, 1 9 5 6 ) ,  
pp.  2 1 - 3 5 .  
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The forc e s  in Latin societies opposed to both of the above are 
the remanents of traditional oligarchies whose very existence depends 
upon the r etention of status quo. 
One more force,  which is not wholly traditional in nature, but 
still is  under going a proc e s s  of transformation in the direction of change, 
reform, and modernization in a few countries is the Latin A m erican 
military as in the case of Peru. 
No matter how sincere a government ' s  intentions about social 
reforms and economic progr e s s ,  it cannot function succes sfully under 
the pres sures  applied on it by powerful antagonistic for c e s .  The forces 
for change demand drastic actions to bring about political, economic, 
and social reforms for the progr e s s  of the society. The opposing for c e s ,  
on the contrary, put ·their p r e s  sure against these demands for change. 
The government under the pres sure of the se forces face s  several 
dilemmas. If the government works to bring about the reforms it will 
become the object of the wrath of the conservative for c e s .  If it will not 
carry out the much needed sweeping change s ,  it not only faces the oppo­
sition of the populist and the radical for c e s ,  but ma ssive frustration 
will inc r ease due to the failure of the government to gratify popular de­
mands , which is  a normal function of every government. When frustra­
tion and a lienation widens, . "the support for extreme political radical­
ism" becomes one of the resultant factors.  
Growing alienation among the mas s e s ,  increasing ineffectivene s s  
of the government, widening appeal and inc r ea s ed activitie s by the radical 
1 7  
forces add up as a catalyst for instability. This s ituation provides the 
rationale for military intervention. 
Military intervention could very well be viewed a s  a product of 
a s ituation when the power of the center i s  inferior to the tasks  it is 
faced with, i . e . , when the center cannot cope with the demands and pres -
sure s stemming from the accelerating proce s s  of formation, inter ming-
ling, and consolidation of new groups within the societal structure.  
The Military, naturally, blames the civil government for its 
failur e s ,  and in return commits itself to various extrava gant promises  
for social reform and economic progres s .  The promis e s  of reforms 
bring popular support for the military junta. During this brief honey-
moon the military regime may launch "ambitious projects of e conomic 
d ev elopment" and enact " s ocial welfare measur e s " .  B ut somehow the 
regime moves away from political freedom and eventually from social 
reforms as well. They show little competence in dea ling with e cono-
mie s .  1 1 Their drive for economic independence often led to overhasty 
industrialization program s .  1 1 .ZO 
One example is the overthrow of the R ightist C olombian Presi-
dent Laureano Gomez in June, 1953 .  General Gustavo R ojas Pinilla,. 
who came to power a s  a result of a bloodle s s  coup, promised "peace, 
justice, and liberty" , and Colombians believed him. 2 1  He did work for 
20Edwin Lieuwen, A r m s  and Politics in Latin America (New 
York: Frede rick A .  Praeger, 1 9 6 1 ) ,  p p .  145-46.  
2 1 L .  Vincent Padgett and Enrique Low Murtra, " Columbia , " in 
Political Forces in Latin A me rica, ed.  by Ben G.  Burnett and Kenneth 
F .  Johnson ( Ca lifornia: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1 970) , p p .  3 1 1 -47 .  
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s ocial justice, but his regime too "degenerated into brutal, unthinking 
Caeserism. Civil liberties were violated, pres s censorship was clamped 
d own, and the administration dipped its hands into the treasury while the 
e conomy foundered, 11 and in 1 9 5 7  when he tried to pr olong his term with-
out election, mas s ive waves of indignation br ought an end to his repr e s -
sive r e gim e .  22 
Colonel Juan Domingo P eron is another example. First coming 
to power as a result of .a lengthy power struggle within the armed forces 
and after overthrowing General Pedro P .  R amir ez, he was later duly 
elected in 1 946 and came to the office of the pre sident with promises of 
economic emancipation of A r gentina . His regime wa s ,  like R ojas Pin-
illa' s ,  quite progres sive; but his later suppres sion of opposition, brutal 
m ethod s ,  and economic failure s  took him out of the office like many other 
caudilles of Latin America . 
The failure of the military to carry out sweeping reforms and 
to provide an effective and pro gr es sive government leads either to the re-
p lacement of the military junta by another civilian group, or an indef-
inite military rule as a result of a counter- coup which only m eans change 
in the uniformed rule r s ;  and this cycle repeats itself. 
Now we come to our original points of inquiry- -who are the for-
ces for change in Latin America ;  why do they want change; and who are 
2 2John D .  Martz, " Columbia: Qualified Democracy, 1 1  in Political 
Systems of Latin A m erica, ed . by Martin C . Needler {Princeton, New 
Jer sey: D .  Van Nestrand C ompany, 1 9 64) , pp. 207 - 3 1 .  
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the forces opposed to change; and what is their rationale for opposition 
to change in the Latin society ? 
A rmed Forces a s  a Transitional Force for Change 
The role that Latin American armed forces play in politics is  
of immense importance. Our analysis of their role will be limited to 
enquire whether the Latin A merican armed forces could be cons idered 
a s  a force for change in the Latin politics . 
Until the time of W orld W ar II the Latin Amer ican armed forces 
defended the status quo. 23 But the post-war period has witne s s ed a marked 
change in the role of the armed force s .  There i s  an increasing identifi-
cation of the armed forces with the cau s e s  of the populist forces by en-
couraging and cooperating with them. 
Examples of the s e  trends could be seen in the revolution led by 
Juan Peron in A rgentina in 1943; the tolerance or support of populist 
governments by the military in Peru in 1945,  in Brazil in 1950; Panama 
and Bolivia in 1952 ;  and Columbia in 1 9 53 .  The most r ecent example of 
this trend is the s o - called Na s s erite military in Peru who came to power 
as a r e sult of the ove rthrow of the civilian regime of Fernando Be launde 
in October, 19  68. 
The coup which overthrew the ineffective r e gime of Paz Estenssoro 
23u. S. Senate, Survey of the A l liance for Progr e s s ,  A Study 
Prepared at the R equest of the Subcommittee on Amer ican R epublics 
A ffair s of the Committee on Foreign R e lations, The Latin A m erican 
Military, October 9 ,  1967 ,  p. 1.  
20 
on November 4, 1.94, in Bolivia is another example of this trend. Gen­
eral R ene Barrientos, who emer ged as a strong-man of the coup, used 
a loose coalition of student s ,  worke r s ,  and young and socia lly or iented 
officers as a power bas e  during his regim e .  After the a ccidental death 
of Barr ientos on April 29 ,  1969,  his Vice P r e s ident, Luis Adolfo Siles, 
succeeded to the P r e s idency until the next presidential election which 
was to be held in 1970 .  But General A lfredo Ovando Candia toppled 
the conservative civilian regime of Siles on September 26 ,  1969 ,  and 
became another populist leftist pres ident of Bolivia . This populist trend 
in the B olivian army did not end at this point .  When General Ovando' s 
courtship with the leftist forces was over and he started moving toward 
the center,  he found him s e lf without any support and had to resign. 
Thereupon, his right wing radical army chief, General R ogelio Miranda 
moved himself to the pre sidency even though his power bas e  was very 
weak. But he was forced into a�ylum by the leftist General Juan Jose 
Tor r e s .  
This marked change in some of the Latin American military was 
the outcome of the new breed of officer s ,  who s erved as the bearers of 
this change and who inclined toward a technological approach to their 
problem s .  Their technocratic m entality demand s a planned economy and 
a more efficient political system: one which reduces the compromis e s ,  
negotiations,  and po.stponements which are characteristic of the demo-
2 1  
cratic proc e s s .  24 This new breed is largely recruited from the middle 
c la s s  "whose values are curr ently oriented toward rapid ec onomic de-
velopm ent with a minimum of state intervention" . 2 5  
A s  a result of this change the Latin A merican armed forces could 
be categorized a s  follows: 
I .  Non-Politica.l A rmed Force s�§- Five countries of Latin Amer·-
ica - - Chile, Costa R ica,  Mexico, Uruguay, and Colombia--have non-
political armed for c e s ,  since they demonstrated a remarkable degree 
of restraint from intervening in the civilian governmenta l proc e s s .  
In Costa R ica and Mexico, the armed for ces  are firmly und e r  
the civilian control.  The Mexican armed for c e s ,  which played a prom-
inent role in the revolution, s e em to have willingly accepted a subservient 
role to the leaders of peasants and '?J'.orke r s .  Chilean arm.ed force s ,  too, 
have been quiet watcher s  of the growing power of fabor and leftist polit-
ical leaders  and did not intervene in the inauguration of the first elected 
Marxist President in Latin A m erica, Salvador A llenda.  
In Colombia the armed forces have a s sumed their non-political 
role since 1 9 5 8 ,  after r e storing power to the civilian lead e r s .  B ut with 
24victor A lba, " The Stages of M ilitar ism in Latin America, " The 
R ole of Military in Underdeveloped Countrie s ,  ed. by John J .  Johnson 
(New Jer sey: Princeton Univers ity Pre s s ,  1 9 6 2 ) ,  pp.  1 6 5 - 1 8 3 .  
2 5Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Military Elite s , " in Elites in 
Latin A me r ica, ed. by Seymour Martin Lipset and A ldo Solari (New 
York: Oxford University Press ,  1 9 6 7) ,  p p .  146 - 1 8 9 .  
26The se categories have been derived from Arms and Politics 
in Latin America, op. cit. , pp.  1 5 8 - 7 1 .  
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the end o f  alternating rule between the dominant Conservative and Lib­
eral parties in 1974,  the is sue of the subservience of Colombian armed 
forces to civilian groups is a question. In U ruguay the armed forces 
have maintained its traditional apolitical role and are loyal to the czivil­
ian authority. 
II. Political A r med Force s .  - -A r gentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, 
Paraguay, Haiti, Honduras ,  Panama, El-Sa lvador, Dominican R epublic, 
and Nicaragua have political armed for ce s .  
In Paraguay, Nicaragua, Haiti, El-Salvador, and Honduras ,  the 
military has been the traditional ruler . In the Dominican R epublic, the 
armed for.ces play a dominant role a s  a s upporting or opposing force of 
the civilian group which happens to be in power. 
In Panama, the Guardia Nacional has served as a political watch­
dog. But on two occasions- -once in 1952 when Colonel R em on took over 
the government, and at another time in 1968 when A r nulfo A rias was ove r ­
thrown by the National Guard s - -the National Guard s intervened in Pana-
manian politics . 
In A r gentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru, the armed forces took 
over proclaiming that civilian groups have proved thems elves to be in­
capable of forming an effective and progr essiv e  government and do not 
de serve the chance to rule . 
And in Guatemala the army is the dominant ruling force under 
the reportedly ruthless  r egime of Colonel Carlos A rana Osorio, who 
23  
came to power in  July, 1 970 .  
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III. Transitiona 1 A rm ed Force s .  - -In Cuba, Venezuela and Ecu-
ador, the armed forces seem to be transforming themselves from polit-
ical to non-political in nature .  In these  countrie s some elements of the 
armed forces have "allied them selves with rising popular forces ,  launched 
succes sful remlutions and at least initially, backed program s of funda-
mental reform". 28 
In Cuba, the revolutionary program calls for unconditional sub-
ordination of the military to the civilian. authoritie s ,  and to this end 
plans have been announced for a complete reorganization of the armed 
forces with a view to forever separating the·m from political activitie s" . 29 
The main reason Castro could have taken such drastic mea sures  in sep-
arating the armed forces from politics ,  perhap s ,  was that the regular 
Cuban army was defeated by the Castroite band s of revolutionarie s ,  and 
surrendered cadres of the leftover Cuban army did not have any other 
alternative available other than accepting the supremacy of the Castro-
ite force s .  
But the role of the Latin A merican armed forces a s  a force for 
change has not yet become a commonly agreed on issue. Various schol-
ars tend to draw quite conflicting conclusions .  Edwin Lieuwen, whose 
27 Joseph C .  Goulden, "Guatemala: Terror in Silence, 11  The 
Nation, CCXII (March 22 ,  1 97 1 ) ,  pp. 365-68 .  
28Arms and Politics in Latin America, op. cit . , p .  1 63 .  
Z9Ibid . , p .  1 64 .  
24 
expertise on Latin American armed forces is widely recognized, is of 
the contrary opinion that the Latin armed forces are an "antidemocratic 
force' ' .  He  argues that if the military would have refrained from inter-
vention, "populist governments would probably be in power in most of 
the Latin American countries today" . As  a result of military interven-
tion, he believes ,  the process  of reform has slackened. Lieuwen' s study, 
which was prepared before the military came to power in Peru and later 
e stablished themselves as a genuine progres sive force,  further states: 
There is not a single military e"stablishment in Latin Amer­
ica today that advocates rapid social r eform. The military are 
not opposed to all social reforms but they insist that it be re -
stricted to a pace which theJ" consider consistent with the pre­servation of public order.  3 
Only a few years earlier, two other leading Latin American schol-
ars took opposing point of view. John J. Johnson and R obert A lexander 
do not share Lieuwen' s opinion. Johnson called the military' s response 
to changes in civilian government a landmark in their historica 1 develop-
ment;3 1  and R obert A lexander,  following the same line of argument 
notes that, "only in a few nations is the army still acting as a last-ditch 
defender of the economic and social status quo. In some cases it is even 
taking the side of revolutionary changes " .  32 George C .  Lodge, another 
authority on Latin America, is prudent in his conclusions: 
30The Latin American Military, op. cit . ,  p. 1 5 .  
3 1  John J .  Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press ,  1964), p. 2 54. 
32R obert J. Alexander ,  Today' s Latin A merica (New York: 
Doubleday, 1 962), p. 182 .  
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It is c lear that the armed forces of Latin America have 
some of the characteristics required of an engine of change- ­
authority, ability to communicate, acce s s  to power, the 
ability to protect, and competenc-.e. They have capacity to 
follow or at least to su:f:fort and assist the sequence of action 
necessary for change.  
A brief evaluation should be made of the new progre ss ive mili-
tary regime which came to power after toppling the civilian government 
of Fernando Belaunde on October 3, 1968 .  President Juan Velasco Al-
varado "began a sweeping land reform program that aimed at expropri-
ating all large e state s ,  whether owned by Peruvian aristocrats or fore-
ign corporations" ,  in June, 1969 .  34 The progressive and modernizing 
policies of the new military regime were quite unique in their style. 
"From the time of the proclamation of the revolutionary government of 
the Armed Forces it was clear that the government was headed by offi-
cia ls with modernizing and nationalistic purposes .  In that proclamation 
the connivance of native sectors with foreign interests which impeded 
the country' s development was denounced, e stablishing the urgency for 
structural transformations which would modify the country' s condition 
of dependence .  Yet at the same time, the new rulers invited the foreign 
investors to exploit the country' s natural resources, emphasizing the 
new administration' s recognition of international treaties and its inclina-
33George C .  Lodge, Engines of Change (New York: A lfred A .  
Knopf, 1970), p. 186 .  
34Marvin Alisky, "Peru, 1 1  in Political Forces in Latin America, 
ed . by Ben G.  Burnett and Kenneth F .  Johnson (Belmont, California: 
Wad sworth Publishing Company, 1970), pp . 373 - 398 . 
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tion to maintain itself within the "western christian system" . 35  The 
new military regime ' s  attitude towards the United State s emphasizes a 
more equal relationship, and less dependence on the United States .  The 
regime had expressed quite explicitly its independence in its dealings 
and relationship from the United States  and adopted a policy which only 
serves Peruvian national se lf interests. This policy of the new rulers  
r esulted in its " reopened negotiations . • .  with the Soviet Union and other 
Eastern European countries ,  e stablishing diplomatic relations with them, 
in order to obtain new possibilities of exchange and financing as well as 
the support by that bloc with regard to diplomatic and eventual economic 
as sault by the United State s . 1 1 36 
The riew trends of the military in Bolivia and Peru, and the per-
formance of the armed forces under the afore-discus sed category of 
apolitical armed forces, seem to indicate that Latin American armed 
forces are definitely pas sing through a transitory state and they seem 
to be gradually emerging as a force for change. 
The Forces for Change 
Church 
The traditional role of the church in Latin Ame rica was support 
for civilian authorities and the ruling clas ses  in exchange for its privi-
35 Julio Cotler, "Political Crisis and Military Populism in Peru, " 
Studies in Comparative International Development, VI ( 1 9 70) , 1 02 .  
36Ibid . , p .  1 03 .  
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lege s .  But the contemporary church felt the ever growing need for change 
and accordingly went through a process  of evolution, and "has changed 
its attitudes and tactics so as to maintain or improve its position in every 
one of the twenty republic s" .  3 7 
A ccording to one observer, the two underlying factors accounting 
for this change are that the older prelates are dying off and are being 
replaced by young radical priests for whom revolution is a moral neces -
sity; and the second one is that for the fir st time in hiS.tory the Vatican 
has placed itself squarely in support of those working for radical change 
in economic, political, and social structure. 38 
A s  a result of this growing conciousnes s  of change in Latin soci-
ety, the clergy in Latin America has transformed itself into a strong 
force; and different groups among clergies have developed their own in-
terpretations, and accordingly, have chosen their own strategies for 
action. Thus three groups of clergy c ould be identified in the contempor-
ary Latin America: 
The first group is convinced that the Latin society needs a "radi-
cal structural change11 39 to achieve social justice, and violence is the 
only course open to bring about this change. The second group shares 
the view of the first group for the d ire need for radical changes in their 
37 John J. Johnson, "The Latin American Military Elite as a Polit­
ically Competing Group in T ransitional Society . " 
38 Lodge, op. cit . , p .  1 88 .  
3 9 lb id . , p . 1 8  9 • 
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societie s ,  but they disagree from the former group on the means to 
achieve it. They are the proponents of the non-violent methods toward 
this end . The third group of c lergy, who are in minority, are quite in-
different on the problems and needs for change in Latin Ame rica. 
• · The fir st group of clergy are the focus of this study for they 
play a very significant role in societie.s .. as a force for change . This 
extremist group, which is also categorized as "People ' s  Priests" ,  draw 
their justification and legitimacy for revolutionary violence from Pope 
Paul' s 1967 encyclical, Populorum Progresso (On the Development of 
Peoples ) ,  which states: 
. • . When whole populations destitute of neces sities live 
in a state of dependence barring them from all initiatives  and 
responsibility, and from all opportunity to advance culturally 
and share in social and p olitical life, recourse  to violence, · as 
a means to right these wrongs to human dignity, is a grave 
temptation. We  know, however, that a revolutionary uprising-­
save where there is manifest, longstanding tyranny which would 
do great damage to fundamental personal rights and dangerous 
harm to the common good of the country- -produces new injus­
tices ,  throws more elements out of balance and brings out new 
disaster s .  A real evil should not be fought against at the cost 
of greater misery. We want to be clearly under stood: the cur ­
rent situation must be faced with courage , and the injustices 
linked with it must be fought against and overcome. Develop­
ment demands bold transformations ,  innovations that go deep. 
Urgent reforms should be undertaken without delay ( emphasis 
added). 4o 
Another important document which brings legality for the extrem-
ists for their course of action is the Document of Peace, which was 
framed at the Second General Conference of CELAM ( Latin American 
40Norman Gall, 1 1  Latin America: The Church Militant, 1 1  Commen­
tary, XLIX (April, 1 970) ,  pp. 25-37 .  
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Bishop ' s  Council) at Medellin, Colombia, in 1 9 68 .  The Medellin state-
ment, as  it is popularly known, declared: 
If the Christian believes in the fertility of peace for 
achieving justice, he believes also that justice is  an unavoid­
able condition for peace. He does not overlook the fact that 
Latin America finds itself in a situation of injustice that c ould 
be called institutionalized violence because the pres ent struc­
tures violate fundamental rights .  This is a situation that de­
mands wholesale, audacious, urgent, and profoundly renewing 
transformations . W e  should not be surprised if in Latin A mer­
ica what Pope Paul VI called the "temptation to violence" is  
born. One must not abuse the patience of  a people who endures 
for years a c ondition that those with a greater awarenes s  of 
human rights would hardly accept. 4 1  
Thus the radical group of clergy is committed t o  violent social 
revolution. They have witnessed the United States exploitations, and 
economic dominance, and their social c onsciousness  forced them to 
take an anti-American position, as a result of which they face the wrath 
of the oligarchy and a conservative military r egime.  But the only way 
they see  left ope� for them is to identify themselves with the de scamisades 
(shirtles s  one s) of their society "by supporting their strikes against 
such exploiting combines as Kaiser or General Motors " ,  or by accompany-
ing the " starving landless Indians of Guatemala to the fallow estates of 
United Fruit", by "sharing oppres sed' s anger, and participating in the 
rebel' s lust for social justice" , when the oppres sed form a great major -
ity of the Latin society. 42 
4 1nocument on Peace, Second General Conference of CELAM, 
Medellin, Colombia, 1968 ,  as cited by Normal Gall, £E.· cit. , p .  25 .  
42John Gerassi ,  ed. , R evolutionary Priest (New York: R andom 
House ,  1 9  7 1 ) ,  p .  7 .  
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Their frustration due to the chronic social injustices of their 
societies make them strong proponents of violent and bloody means of 
destruction of the existing order . A 1 1 manife sto", is  sued by a group 
of priests in Higuey (Dominican R epublic ) ,  reads: 
The violence ( s o  much feared) is already among us .  
When a peasant with many children, who are hungry and 
naked, without house or school, looks at his children, he 
must turn to violence; when he looks at the great extensions 
of Pangola grass ,  he must turn to violence; when he sees the 
well-tended pastures,  where the animals are better-fed than 
his own children, this peasant must turn to violence .  43 
Father Emerson Negreiros, a Brizilan priest and an advocate 
of violent strategy once reportedly told his poor parishioners: 
You should raise a goat .to give milk to your children. If 
the landlord comes to kill your goat, he is threatening the 
lives  of your children. Do not let him kill your goat; kill 
him fir st. 44 
For Negreiros ,  the landlord represents the rotting system based on 
exploitation of poor and oppressed ,  which should be dealt with equal 
force as a retalitory measure to de stroy it. 
This same zeal made the most prominent of the guerrilla priests ,  
Father Camilo Torres of Colombia proclaim: 
I took off my cas sock to be more truly a priest. The duty 
of every catholic is to be revolutionary, the duty of every revo­
lutionary is to make revolution. The catholic who is not a 
revolutionary is living in mortal sin. 45 
43From "Manifesto de los curas de Higuey, " as cited by Norman 
Gall, op .  cit . , p .  34. 
44John Geras si, The Great Fear in Latin America (New York: 
Macmillan, 1965 ) ,  p .  98 .  
45John Geras si, ed . ,  R evolutionary Priest (New York: Random 
House ,  1 97 1 ) ,  p .  1 .  
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In his last mes sage to the Colombians from the mountains, Father 
Camilo Torres further elaborated on his views .  He wrote: 
A 11 sincere revolutionarie s must realize that armed strug­
gle is the only remaining way open • . •  
From the Colombian mountains I mean to continue the 
struggle, arms in hand, until power has been won by the 
people . 46 
The extremist group of priests goe s even to the extent of cooperat-
ing with communists, as long as they share the common goal--a violent 
overthrow of the existing order. Especially after Pope John XXIII is-
sued his historical encyclical- -Pacem. in Terris, in which he recognized 
47 in Marxism "good elements worthy of approval", the extremists group 
of the radica 1 priests found a religious justification for their action of 
cooperating with communist groups . 
The movement for the cooperation between clergies and commu-
nists provided a strong justification for most of the existing regimes  in 
Latin America to crush the clergy-led movements and even to use vio-
lent means in the name of anti-communism; and the reformist priest 
suffered a major setback resulting from this strategy and governmental 
retaliation. 
Another important characteristic of the extremist group is their 
strong anti-Americanism. This group, like all other forces for change, 
tends to view the United States as the sole exploiter of Latin America, 
4 6 lb id • ' p • 4 2 6 • 
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and an ardent champion for status quo. They believe that the United 
States  is afraid of the blowing winds of change and that she views this 
force as a very serious threat to its political and economic dominance 
of Latin America. They are convinced that the United State s is aware 
that the strong currents of change along with the existing system which 
is based upon exploitation and social injustice ,  will wash the United 
States "imperialism" away. 
Salomon Bolo Hidalgo, a Peruvian priest, in his rejoinder to 
the Cardinal of Lima ' s  denunciation of him for being a communist, trai-
tor, and an advocate· of violence,  wrote: 
The main cu�prits for the convulsion are not the communists 
but Yankee imperialists and the perjurers  and pharisees who 
use religion as a puppet show • • .  48 
Though in firm agreement for the need of change and the role 
of the Latin church as a force for change, the moderage group of Latin 
reformist clergies differ from their extremist counterparts in two ma-
jor approaches: the first one is that the moderate group does not con-
done the violent m ethod s advocated by the extremists to force the change; 
and the second difference between these two groups is the extremist' s 
theme of cooperation with communists to attain the same goal- -the vio-
lent overthrow of the existing order . The moderate group does not share 
the extremist' s view that the end justifies the means . Moreover, the 
moderates view communism as a very serious threat to Christianity. 
48solomon Bolo Hidalgo, in A rauco (Chile, No. 70),  November ,  
1965, as cited in R evolutionary Priest, op. cit. , p .  14 .  
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They feel that communists will dominate the revolution in the event of 
victory and will exterminate every religion, once they get an upper hand , 
since communism views religion as an opiate for the mas se s .  The argu-
ment of the moderates against the recour se  to violence and against join-
ing the clandestine guerrilla movements is that violent m eans do not 
necessarily bring about the greatly needed changes .  Violence, on the 
other hand, will create counter -violence and this unending chain of vio-
lence and counter -violence ,  very likely, will destroy the supreme goal- -
the change. 
A brief reference should be made to Archbishop Dom Helder 
Camara of Brazil who is an internationally known figure and could be 
regarded as a chief spokesman of the moderate Latin c lergies .  Dom 
Helder Camara is an advocate of non-violent rebellion of the masses 
against the Brazilian military government. He has been the chief spokes-
man of a very small organized opposition in Brazil. A s  an arch-critic 
of political repres sion in Brazil he inspired the criticism of the Insti-
tutiona:l Act formulated by the Bishop ' s  Central Committee in February, 
1 9  69 ,  which stated: 
It permits arbitrary actions including violation of such 
basic human rights as  self-defense, legitimate expres sion 
of opinion, and the right to be informed; it threatens the 
dignity of the per son both physical and mora 1. 49 
The Latin American church, undoubtedly, has emerged as a strong force 
49Gary MacEoin, "Brazil Speciality: Threat of Tortore , " The 
National Catholic R eporter, May 29 , 1970 .  
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for change, and as a serious threat to the forces for status quo.  
Populists, Radical Leftists, Students, and Other Forces for Change 
No analysis of the forces for change in Latin America will be 
complete without at least a brief reference to the traditional oligarchy, 
which was and to a lesser extent still is the chief exponent of the status 
quo and serves as the greatest obstacle to change. 
John Kautsky, discussing the role of aristocracy in traditional 
societies (a term he loosely used to include the landed oligarchy of some 
areas) ,  notes that, aristocracy in order to function in the se closed so-
cieties ,  took on certain attributes that markedly distinguished them 
from the peasantry, which are: considerable physical mobility, ease  
of communication among them selves ,  and a level of literacy; and the 
large mas ses of peasantry were deprived of education and were kept 
disorganized and poor, so  that the increasing hopeles sness  among them 
create a sense of resignation and apathy. SO 
The Latin American oligarchy played the abovementi.oned role 
quite succes sful not only in becoming the sole privileged clas s of the 
Latin society; but their own elements in the armed forces and ecc-lesi-
astical order served them well as a physical and moral for ce ,  jealously 
guarding the interests  of the oligarchs . 
S O  John Kautsky, 1 1The Politic s  of Underdevelopment and Industri­
alization, " Political Change in Underdeveloped Countrie s: Nationalism 
and Communism (New York: John W iley and Sons, 1962) ,  pp. 1 3 -29 and 
9 0 - 1 1 9 .  
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But the limited industrialization of the Latin traditional society 
brought about the following, among other, changes: 
I. A breed of native capitalists came forth; 
II. Rapid increase in the number of the white collar employees 
in re sponse to the growing demands of industrialization for 
clerical and supervisory functions. 
III. Emergence of a large number of industrial workers to perform 
technical and menial jobs.  5 1  
The urban middle sector in Latin A me rica came' to  political prom-
inence as a result of industrialization. Presently, the role of the middle 
sector in Latin America stays on the level of polemic. John J. Johnson, 
who is a strong proponent of the role played by the middle sector for 
modernization, social justice and democracy, is of the opinion that the 
middle sector in Latin America is the vanguard of progress and social 
change.  He also observes that de spite the heterogeneity of the new mid-
dle sector, its members have the following common interests for po lit-
ica l action: 
1 .  Overwhelmingly, the new middle sector was located in 
the burgeoning urban centre s; 2 .  having a higher than average 
education themselves ,  they pushed for wider educational facili­
ties and services; 3 .  almost unanimously, the middle sector 
pinned its hope for the nation on further industrialization- -to 
such a degree, in fact, that it seemed to be a fetish with them .  
4 .  The middle sector believed that education and industrializa­
tion, as well as  social welfare and other social enrichments, 
neces sitate state intervention and that economically, for exam­
ple, the state should protect domestic enterprises from compe-
5 1 Ibid . 
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titian, amass capital, and stabilize the costs of products 
through price fixing. 5 .  More and more the middle groups 
associated with political parties because urbanization com­
monly broke the back of the family as a political unit. 6. The 
middle group pronounced an intensely aggressive form of na­
tionalism that finally ended as economic ass ertiveness and 
xenophobia. 52 
On the contrary, Caudilo Veliz, a Chilean scholar, is  quite criti-
cal of the role of the middle groups in Latin Amer ica. He writes: 
Until recently it was generally expected that Latin Ameri­
can middle clas ses  • • .  were going to behave by and large 
like their European counterparts and bring about the cultural 
and institutional changes demanded by the growth of industry. 
The rising expectations of the mass of the people, the impact 
of modern technology, the expansion of industrial activity: 
these  factors in conjunction with the self-interested and deter­
mined political activity of a forward looking, reformist, anti­
aristocratic, and generally progressive and modernizing mid­
dle clas s ,  should have been sufficient to solve the problem of 
development. But the problems have not been solved. The 
middle c lasses  have been in power for three or four decades - ­
depending on the country- -and have obviously participated in 
the general proce s s  of industrial growth but, also allowing 
for regional differences ,  they have been responsible for main­
taining or even strengthening the traditional structure and for 
leading some of the major countries into a situation of insti­
tutional stability and economic stagnation. This they have 
achieved precisely by defending their pre sent interests and 
future prospects. Far from reforming anything, they have 
become firm supporters of the establishments; they have not 
implemented s ignificant agrarian. o:r. fiscal reforms but have 
displayed remarkable energy trying to become landowners  or 
to marry their offspring into the aristocracy. 53  
Expres sing similar views Peter Nehemkis states that the middle 
52 John J .  Johnson, Political Change in Latin America (Stanford: 
Stanford University Pres s, 1958) ,  pp. 1 - 14 .  
53caudilo Veliz ,  ed . ,  Obstacles to Change in Latin America 
(New York: Oxford University Press ,  1 9 70 ) ,  p .  2 .  
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groups in Latin Ame rica "are not hell-bent for reform. They are e s -
sentially conformist. They are em otionally identified with the status 
quo. They want a bigger s lice of the pie, but they do not believe that 
ups etting the apple cart is the way to get it. 1 1 54 
W ithout getting too deeply into the polemic of the role of the Latin 
American middle sector or middle group, one can safely conc lude that 
the activities of the middle s ector have served, more or le s s ,  a s  an 
antecedent of the outgoing approach of the latter for ces  for change in 
the Latin societie s .  
Populists 
One author has defined populist forces as · �. a political movement 
which enjoys the support of the mass of the urban working c la s s  and/ or 
peasantry but which does not r esult from the autonomous or ganizational 
power of either of these two sector s .  It is also supported by non-working 
cla s s  sectors upholding an anti - status quo ideology" . 5 5  
Victor A lba, who i s  one of the foremost authoritie s on the his -
tory of labor, social and political change in Latin A m erica, observed 
that R aul Ha:ya de la Torre of Peru 1 1  formulated the doctrine (Populism), 
that with adaptations and modifications , was the bas is of populism .  The 
54Peter Nehemki s ,  Latin America: Myth or R eality (New York: 
A M entor Book, 1 9 66 ) ,  p. 2 1 0 .  
5 5Torcuate S .  Di T e lla, "Populism and R e form in Latin America, 1 1  
in Obstacles to Change in Latin America, op cit . , p .  47.  
3 8  
fundamental characteristics of populism a r e  summed up by A lba: 
. . •  contrary to Lenin' s view that imperialism is the final 
stage of. capitalism, imperialism in Latin America is the 
first stage of capitalism .  The struggle against imperialism 
is not the task of the working class alone but must unite in a 
single movem ent all the people (hence the name populism),  
starting with the pea sants and wor kers and moving up through 
the middle sector s to the industrialists. In order to establish 
democratic regime s ,  it i s  neces sary to awaken the people and 
mobilize them • • .  The struggle against imperialism should 
seek the support of ti beral and labor e lements in the United 
States and must consist, fir st of a 11, in the struggle against 
the oligarchy, without which there would be no imperialism 
and no threat to national independence from foreign inv e st-
56 ment • . .  
Elsewhere, A lba further e laborated on the characteristics of 
the populist forces  a s  " native" movement s ,  which reflect the influence 
of syndicalism and anti-imperialism, among other s .  They hoped for 
widespread support by forming a single front of several c la s s e s  (pea-
sant s ,  pr oletariat and middle group s) ;  they are anti-communist and 
democratic; they support the principle of self-deter mination of peoples 
expres sed through the electoral proc e s s .  Their view on rev olution is 
quite different from the Jacobin leftists.  They are revolutionary in the 
sense that revoltuion is conceived a s  an acce lerated evolution de stined 
to change the social structure of countried where feudal system s pre-
dominate. They are anti -imperalistic but do not incorporate their anti­
imperialism into anti-Americanis m .  57 
56victor A lba, The Latin Americans (New York: Frederick A .  
Praeger, 1 9 69),  pp.  1 5 1 -1 52 .  
57Victor A lba, "Populism and National A wareness in Latin Amer­
ica, " The University of Kansa s ,  Centre of  Latin American Studie s ,  ( June, 
1966) , p .  7 .  
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Example s of populist movements in Latin America are not rar e .  
A majority of the anti-oligarchic democratic parties of Latin Ame rica 
may be considered populist: the American R ev olutionary Popular Alli-
ance ( A P R A )  of Peru; the Democratic A ction Party ( A D) in Venezuela; 
the National R evolutionary Movem ent (MNR ) of Bolivia; Febrerismo in 
Paraguay; the Dominican R evolutionary Party ( P R D) of the Dominican 
R epublic; the National Liberation Party (P LN) of Costa R ica; the Auten-
tic e s  and Ortodoxos in Cuba (before 1 9 59);  the Instititional R evolutionary 
Party (PRI) of Mexico; and, in some degree, the Christian Democratic 
Movement. 5 8  
R adical Left 
A nother force for change, which has been the major threat to 
internal law and order within the Latin American countries ·and a major 
sour c e  of concern for the United States is the R adical Left. Due to its 
activitie s ,  the United States Public Safety pr ogram in Latin America 
was instituted. 
The se forc e s  in Lieuwen' s wor d s  "are extremely hostile to the 
United States,  and they would in all probability e liminate United States 
military programs, expropriate United State s  j.nve·stments and adopt an 
anti-United States foreign policy stance if they emerged triumphant" . 59 
58 The Latin Americans, op. cit. , p .  1 5 2 .  
59 The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin 
A m erica, op cit . , p .  49 . 
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This force mainly comprised of: 
(a) pro-Rus sian orthodox Communist parties 
(b) schis matic communist parties which follow Chine se ideology 
of violent revolutionary struggle, and 
(c)  Castroite National Liberation Movements advocating violent 
overthrow of the existing orde r ,  which they believe is the 
root cause of all the ills and injustic e s  of their societi e s .  
Some of the organizations which come in the Castroite National 
Liberation movements in some countrie s of Latin Ame rica are: 
Venezuela. - - The Venezuelan Communist Party (Partido Com.., 
munista de Venezuela PCV) which adopted violence terrorism and guer-
rilla warfare during 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 2 ,  but later abandoned it. 
Movem ent of the R evolutionary Left (Movimiento de la lzquierda 
R evolucionario - - MIR) is Ca str oite in natur e .  
The PCV in 1 9 6 1  joined the MIR and other leftist radical elements 
to form the National Liber.ation Front (FLN- -Fronte de Liberacion Nacio-
nal) which was the political arm of the A rmed Forces of National Libera-
tion (Fuerzas A rmadas de Liberacion Nacional - - F A LN).  60 
Colombia. - -The two guerrilla or ganizations in Colombia are: 
the R evolutionary A rmed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas R evolu-
cionarias de Colombia - - FAR C) and the Nationa 1 Liberation A rmy (Ejer-
cito de Liberacion Nacional - - ELN) . A terrorist or ganization, The 
6°Kevin Delvin, 1 1 The Permanent R evolutionism of Fidel Castro, " 
Problems of Communism, XVII ( January, February, 1 968) , pp.  1 - 1 1 .  
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Worker Student and Peasant Movem ent (Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil 
y Campesinos - - MOEC } .  6 1  
Guatemala. - - The R evolutionary Movem ent of November 1 3  (MR - 1 3} 
is one of the guerrilla mov ements in Guatemala, under ·the leadership of 
Marco A ntonio Yon So sa. This or ganization is  a strong supporter of the 
Chinese revolution and the armed struggle road to socialism. 6 2  
Peru. - -In. Peru MIR (the Movem ent of the R evolutionary Left} 
came into existence a s  a splinter group from the A PR A ,  and started 
various guerrilla activities of subversion and terrorism. 
Nicaragua. --National Sandinista d e  Liberecion Nacional - - FSLN 
or FLN, which was formed in 1 9 6  7, is a Castroite guerrilla organization 
in Niragua. 
Uruguay. - -Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN} or more 
popularly known as Uruguayan Tupamaros are the most publicized guer-
rillas in Latin America. 
Brazil. - -The guerrilla movem ent in Brazil is on the increase 
due to the oppre ssive policies of the military junta, as will be discussed later. 
An increased number of students and priests have been joining them as 
a result of their frustration and dis gruntlem ent with the existing state 
of affairs in Brazil. 
6 1I . L . A . . 1 6  nsurgency 1n ahn mer1ca, op. cit. , p .  • 
62 James Petras,  " R evolution and Guerrilla Movem ents in Latin 
America: Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Peru, 1 1  Latin A m erica 
R eform or R evolution (Greenwich, Conn. : Fawcett Publications, 1 9 68) , 
pp.  329-69.  
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Students 
Latin American students are in the mainstream of the most ardent 
struggle to bring about radical structural changes in their society. 
Luis A lberto Sanchez , R ector of San Marcos Unive r s ity in Lima 
(Peru) has described Latin A m erican students this way: 
. a Latin American student • . •  i s ,  above and beyond 
everything, a young per son who is dis satisfied with the society 
in which he lives . • .  with the means available to him for 
achieving his objectives . . .  he will be dominated by the feel­
ing of protest against the injustice that he feels binds him, and 
he will be carried away by the impulse to rebel against the 
powers that block the way to what he thinks are his ultimate 
goal. 6 3  
Thus, in contemporary Latin American politics ,  students form 
a strong anti-status quo for c e .  This basic drive also has several under-
currents, which have become the chief characteristics of  the student 
movement s ,  and these are: "a longing for a sense of national purpose, 
a vision of the futur e ,  a sense of legitimacy and independnec e ,  libera-
tion from what is seen a s  the heavy hand of the United State s  material-
ism, honesty in politics" . 64 
Lodge has identified and categorized several student groups ac-
cording to  their ideological leanings . These are: r ight -wing activists 
and nee-fascist; anarchists; Marxis·t s ,  undefined leftists and Fidelistas; 
63 Luis Sanchez, " The Univer sity in Latin America: Part IV, 
as it Looks Today, " America s ,  XIV (F ebruary, 1962) ,  p. 1 6 .  
64 Lodge, op. cit. , p. 236.  
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Soviet Communi·sts ;  Peking Communists.  But the student movement,  
a s  a whole, is polarized between two groups:  one group is comprised 
of those who favor Christian Democracy and its relatively peaceful meth-
od s ,  and the second group advocates radical change by adopting violent 
and speedy m ethod s .  6 5  
Organized Labor 
The working c la s s  grew along with the increased industrializa-
tion. The laborer who lives in the city came in contact with " channe ls 
to literacy, broader consumption, political influence and or ganization 
for s e lf defense. 1 1 66 Burnett and Johnson e laborating on the p sychologi-
cal effects on the newly arrived urban worke r s  wrote: 
Even though he is on the fringe of such opportunities,  the 
new arrival to the urban wor king c la s s  is at least introduced 
to a conception of the better life, a hope of gaining it, and a 
rapidly increas ing inter e st in the political proc e s s  by which 
he might achieve it. Thus if few workers actually advance to 
a very superior economic position a s  a result of migrating to 
the city, they do contribute to an ever- larger perc entage of 
the total population that is not only potentially alienated but 
also more and more politica lly activated. A s  members of 
trade unions, which the new urban workers would not have 
normally known in the rural s etting, they are manipulated 
in countle s s  ways in a struggle with the traditional order.  
Union ranks are  gr eatly augmented for political ends by ca­
joling and dec eiving unorganized worke r s ,  who are frequently 
gullible and who can often be easily moved to participate in 
demonstrations and street violenc e .  Extremists who wish to 
incite labor have learned that several cups of aguardiente or 
66Frank Bonilla, Continuity and Change in Latin A m erica, as 
cited by Burnett and Johnson, op. cit. , p. 1 5 .  
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mezeal can buy servic e s  of many idle bodies for an afternoon 
protest and riot. The frequency of such incidents increases 
with the everwidening bas e  of  frustrations that grows because 
of the urban labor pool' s inability to secure adequate employ­
ment and material reward. 67 
This mobilization of labor force by the unions , though exploita -
tive in nature at this stage, will politicize them, stimulate and incite 
in them a craving for change. 
But the observation made above is not s o  simple as it appears 
to be. Goldrich, P latt, and Schulle r ,  in a joint article, " T he Political 
Integratian of l..;ow.e�·- C la s s  Urban Settlements in Chile and Peru", made 
a general st:itement on the issue of politicization this way: 
Politicization may be a discontinuous proce s s ,  contrary 
to the pr evailing theory. A high level of politicization may 
not be established des pite an important demand -·making ex­
perience'.  One such experience may not establish the psy­
chological basis for continuing demand-making. Further ­
more, the general case retarding the Latin American urban 
lower c la s s  i s  one where alternative s olutions to serious 
problems are not defined and this retards politicization. 
Consequently, me eting an important demand concerning 
housing and urban services,  for example, does not nec e s ­
sarily trigger a chain of additional demand s which would 
overwhelm governmental capacity in transitional societie s .  68 
On the contrary this writer believes that while politicization 
may be a discontinuous proce s s ,  a s  far a s  Latin American urban labor 
is concerned it i s  definitely not a discontinuous proces s .  Demand -making 
67Burnett and Johnson, op. cit . , p .  1 5 .  
68Daniel Goldrich, Raymond B .  Pratt, and C . R .  Schuller, "The 
Political Integration of Lower- C la s s  Urban Settlement in Chile and Peru, " 
in Mas s e s  in Latin A m erica , ed . by Irving Louis Horowitz {New York: 
Oxford Univ er sity Pre s s , 1970) ,  pp. 1 7 5 - 2 1 2 .  
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may not establish the psychological basis for continuing demand-making, 
but one has to consider the nature of the demands mad e .  For example 
demand-making in one society for the amenities of life, if fulfilled, may 
or may not lead to the demand s for better amenities or luxuries of life. 
But the demands for the basic nec e s s ities and requirement s  of life, 
for a better living and wor king conditions , and /or increased wage s ,  _ 
c ould be continuous in nature and could provide a psychological basis 
for continuing demand-making. 
R obert A lexander,  discus sing the cau s e s· for politicization of 
Latin Ame rican organized labor, supports this writer' s view. He ob-
served: 
The low level of economic developm ent of Latin America 
countrie s contr ibuted to the politicization of their labor move­
ments, and also tended to influence both the type of political 
group which dominated the labor movement in its early yea r s ,  
and the subsequent changes in the political control. 69 
The labor movem ent in Latin America attained more and more 
sophistication and political maturity and their conce.rns no longer remain 
limited to the "bread and butter" issue s .  A s  again noted by R obert A lex-
ander: 
It has sought to obtain extensive social and labor legis lation 
to protect its members and then organizations . In fact, it has 
gone beyond this: it has attempted to bring about a basic change 
in the structure of the Latin American societi e s .  Thus, it has 
sought to bring about agrarian reform, to transfer the land from 
the traditional aristocracy to those who work it, and thereby to 
69R obert A lexand er,  Organized Labor in Latin America (New 
York: The Free Pre s s ,  1965) ,  p .  1 5 .  
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de stroy the basis of power of the oligarchy as well as 
create potential markets for the industries in which the 
trade unionists were employed. It has supported industrial­
ization so as to gain more jobs for its members and to make 
possible incr eas e s  in their level of living. 7o 
Victor A lba writing about the challenges faced by the labor move-
m ents in Latin America noted: 
Its new challenges: the need to struggle against both the 
traditional dictatorships and militaristic damagogue s ,  who 
were trying to attract the wor kers;  the wish to participate in 
decisions regarding industrialization, so that the wor kers should 
receive the largest possible share of its benefit s ,  accelerated 
urbanization, which was changing great masses of peasants into 
members of the working c la s s ;  . . •  the need to be free of all 
direct or indirect governmental control, and to have unions 
independent of political parties . . . 7 1 
Thus politicization of the urban workers in Latin America has 
been and is a continuous proc es s ,  whose interest include s  a variety of 
demand s - -from bread and butter to the more sophisticated demands for 
the politico-socio-economic changes within their societie s .  
T o  sum up, ideologically the forces for change in Latin A merica 
are divided in various group s .  Though they have their own prescr iptions 
and strategies to bring about the much. needed change in their societies,  
they have the following chief characteristics: 
I. They are extremely nationalistic in natur e;  
II. they advocate radical socio-economic changes in their so:-
cieties; 
70Ibid . , pp. 8 - 9 .  
7 1 The Latin Americans, op. cit . , p p .  149 - 1 5 0 .  
47 
III. they are anti-imperialistic in nature (populists want more 
advantageous ec onomic relations with the United State s  and 
leftists are anti-American and view the United State s econ-
omic and political dominance of their societies as "imperi­
alism");  
IV. they share a zeal for national and economic self-assertion 
and are for the economic progr e s s ,  social justice and mod­
ernization of their societie s .  
CHAPTER III 
INT ERNA L  SECUR IT Y AND POLICE A SSISTANCE: 
SOME KEY STAT EMENTS 
After a brief analysis of the Latin A merican polity· we should 
turn our attention to the radical changes in the foreign policy of the 
United State·s and in the emphasis of the United State s  foreign security 
a s s istance programs for Latin America since 1 9 6 1 ,  a s  stated in the 
fir st hypothe sis.  A s  a first step toward this we will documentize some 
important official statem ent s, and a few academic citations . 
President Kennedy' s mes sage to Congres s on March 2 8 ,  1 9 6 1 ,  
opened up a new horizon for the changed emphasis:  
The free world' s se'curity can be endangered not only by a 
nuclear attack but also by being slowly nibbled away at the 
periphery, regard less  of our strategic power, by force of 
subv er sion, infiltration, intimidation, indirect or non-overt 
aggres sion, internal revolution, lunatic blackmail, guerrilla 
warfare or a series of limited war s .  72 
Again in his report to the Congr e s s  for Fiscal Year 1962,  Presi-
dent Kennedy expressed his increas ed concern over the rising threats 
to the internal security of Latin A m erican countrie s .  For the first time 
he advocated the increasing need to change the emphasis of United States 
72President John F .  Kennedy, "Foreign Aid Mes sage , " Congr e s ­
s ional R ecord, March 2 2 ,  1 9 6 1 ,  p .  4470. 
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security a s sistance to Latin America in order to tackle this problem 
effe ctively: 
By 1 9 6 1  . . . the c onditions which governed the foreign 
aid program during the 1 9 50'  s had changed substantially • • •  
The need for large scale assistance had been reduced while 
there had been a decrease in 9vert communist aggres sion, 
the da.nger of internal subversion had increased. A new ap­
proach to the problem of communism was requir ed . 73 
Former Secr etary of State Edwin Martin, discus sing the United 
States strategy in dealing with the problem of communist  subversion 
in Latin A m erica, said that direct attac k on this problem has been 
launched in two ways: one was to is olate Cuba from the hemisphere and 
discr edit the image of the Cuban r evolution in the hemisphere; and the 
other was to improve the internal s ecurity capabilities of the countries 
concerned. 74 
The same empha sis on the internal security problems of insur-
gency were str e s sed by former Defense Secretary R obert McNamara 
before the House Subcommittee on A ppropriations for 1964.  Explaining 
the changed rationale behind the United States s ecurity a s sistance to 
Latin America in 1 960,  McNamara said that when the United State s  be-
came convinced that there was no threat of s ignificant overt aggr es sion 
to the subcontinent, the 11 emphasis shifted to internal security capabili-
ties" to use against Castro- communist subversion or covert aggr e s s ion 
73R eport to the Congr e s s  on the Foreign A s sistance Program 
for Fiscal Year 1 9 62 , p. 3 .  
74Departm ent of State Bulletin, March 1 1 ,  1 9 6 3 ,  p .  347. 
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and to civic action projects designed to contribute to economic and so-
cial development, and limited a s s istance was also provided for such 
activities as harbor defens e ,  coastal patrol and surveillanc e .  7 5  
The Johnson administration continued t o  emphasize internal se-
curity as the main basis of United State s  security a s s istance to  Latin 
A merica, clearly spelling out three basic ends for the United State s  
security a s s istance: 
To maintain security against communist and other threats of 
violence and the movement of armaments and men c land e s ­
tinely across land, sea, and airborders for subv ersive pur­
pos e s .  
T o  expand the use of military forces on civic action projects 
us eful to the populace at all lev e l s .  
T o  contr ibute t o  the defense of the adjacent coastal areas of 
the Caribbean sea, and the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, with 
primary emphasis on surveillanc e ,  intercept, patrol, harbor 
defense. 76 
In agreement with the officially stated policy position, Edwin 
· Lieuwen, a noted authority on Latin Amer ican armed for c e s ,  wrote: 
Since 1 9 6 1 ,  the basis for military aid to Latin A m erica 
has been shifted from hemispheric defense to internal secur-
ity and the protection of coasts against external aggr e s s ion 
to internal defense against Castro- communist subver sion and 
guerrilla warfare.  This new emphasis upon counter- insurgency 
has reflected in a sharp shift in the training equipment of-
fered by the United States to Latin America' s armed for c e s .  7 7  
7 5Prpposed·: Mutual :D.efens;e and A s s istance Program s for Fis­
cal Y ear 1 9 64 (Summary presentation to Congre s s ) ,  p .  6 0 .  
76The Foreign A s s istance Program (Annua l R eport to the Con­
gre s s  for F.iscal Year 1 9 64) , p. 3 5 .  
7 7  The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin. Amer­
ica, op. cit . , p .  1 6 .  
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W illard Barber, a former State Departm ent official, who served 
in various posts in Latin America; and C .  Neale R onning, a specialist 
in Latin American politic s ,  in justifying the changed emphasis of United 
State s  foreign policy wrote: 
A s  the danger of an armed attack from the out s ide became 
less  and le s s  likely, the threat of communist subversion (in 
Latin America) became more and more fixed in the minds of 
United States foreign policy maker s .  By the early 1960' s ,  the 
proce s s  of revis ing the original emphasis was well under way. 78 
The aforementioned citations support the hypothe s is that the em-
phasis of United State s  foreign policy and security assistance has been 
changed from hemispheric defense to interna 1 s ecurity. The next step 
will be to analyze the United State s  police a s s istance programs to Latin 
A m erica, which were the result of the changed emphasis of United State s  
secur ity a s s i stanc e .  
The descriptions and workings o f  United State s  police a s sistance 
which will be pres ented in the following pages are drawn from official 
statements about the objectives  and performance of the police assistance 
p rogram s .  The reader should b e  aware that he is reading the officially 
stated rationale and official statements about the effectivene s s  of the se 
programs in Latin America. The gaps between the stated goals and 
actual performance of the se programs will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter. 
78W illard F. Barber and C. Neale R onning, Internal Security 
and Military Power ( Columbus: Ohio State University Pre s s ,  1 966) . 
pp. 30 - 3 1 .  
52 
Police A s s istance Pr9grams for Latin A merica: 
Origins and R ationale 
The rationale behind the shift to internal security was to provide 
the law and order neces sary for the A lliance for Progr e s s  to succeed. 79 
The growing threats to law and orde r ,  and the increasing activities of 
the insurgency forc e s  within the Latin A m erican countrie s ,  re sulted in 
the establishment of programs for police a s sistanc e .  The aim was to 
train the Latin American police as a counterinsurgency force to deal 
with rural a s  well as urban insurgency, sabotage and all other forms 
of subver sion quic kly and efficiently. The various threats to stability 
and internal order of the Latin American countries are discus sed in an 
earlier chapter . 
David Bell, former Administrator of the Agency for International 
Development (AID ) ,  defined counterinsurgency a s  "the . term used to 
describe efforts to prevent the overthrow of the e stablished governments 
by s ubversiv e  aggr e s s ion which may be aided or a s sisted by outside 
powe r s " .  8 0  
A State Department memorandum, is sued in November ,  1 9 6 2 ,  
was the starting point of United Stat e s  police a s s istance and training 
programs to Latin America. This memorandum declared that AID "vests 
79The Latin American Military, op. c it . , p .  2 3 .  
80 U . S . , Congr e s s ,  Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Appropriations, Foreign A s s istance and Appropriations for 1 9 6 7 ,  
Hearings ,  89th Cong . , 2nd s e s s . , 1 966,  p .  1 6 0 .  
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the Office of Public Safety with the primary responsibility and authority 
for Public Safety Programs and giv es that office a series of powers 
and responsibilitie s  which will enable it to act rapidly, vigorously and 
effectively • 
sion in A ID " .  8 1  
powers greater than any other technical office or divi-
Thus AID established the office of Public Safety (OPS), which 
provide s  police a s sistance to Latin America, beside various other under -
developed countries of the world; and it also had devised the Public Safety 
Program, under which assistance in the form of technical advice,  train-
ing, and equipment to the police force was provided .  The theory behind 
this a s si stance was that police c onstitute the first line of defense against 
subversion and terrorism, and that a s sistance to civil .. police forces both 
str engthens the host country' s capacity to deal with subv ersive aggr e s -
sion and its ability to provide law and order. 
David B e ll d e scribed two chief objective s  of Public Safety Program: 
1 .  Str engthening the capability of civil police and para­
military forces to enforce the law and maintain public order 
with minimum use of physical force, and to counter commu­
nist-inspired or exploited subv ersion and insurgency; and 
2 .  Encouraging the deve lopment of responsible and humane 
police administration and judicial procedure to improve the 
effectiveness of civil police, and para -military for c e s ,  and 
enable them to become more closely integrated into the com ­
munity. 82 
8 1 Taken from an undated article by Holmes A lexander, " The 
Inside Story of Venezuela . "  
82u . S. , Congr e s s ,  Senate, Subcommittee of. the Committee on 
Appr opriations, Foreign A s sistance and A ppropriations for 1 9 6 5 ,  Hear­
ings ,  8 8th Cong. , 2nd sess . ,  1 9 6 5 ,  p .  72 . (Hereinafter cited as Fore­
ign A s sistance Hearings , 1 9 65 . )  
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B e ll as serted that the United State s  has very great interest s  in 
the cr eation and maintenance of an atmosphere of law and order und er 
humane civil concepts and control, and in countering communist efforts 
in form s .  The function o f  the AID Public Safety Programs was to meet 
the r e sponsibilities of the police of the und erdeveloped nations and to 
promote and protect United States interests . 
From the economic point of view the police operations were r e -
garded by the supporters o f  Public Safety Program as cheaper and more 
efficient. They were seen a s  frequently better-trained and we 11- equipped 
than the military to deal with minor forms of violence, conspiracy and 
s ubversion, since they are: 
(a) closer to the focal points of unrest; 
(b) more acceptable than the army as keepe r s  of order over 
long periods of time; and 
(c)  they are the most sensitive point of contact between govern-
ment and populace. 
In providing police a s s istance, OPS notes that most countries 
have a unified "civil security service" , which " in addition to r e gular 
police, includes paramilitary forces s uch a s  gendarmories ,  constabu-
laries and civil guards which p er form police functions and have a s  their 
primary mission maintaining internal security" . 83 According to the 
OPS - - individual Public Safety Program s ,  while varying from country 
8 31 1AID A s s istance to Civil Security Forc e s ,  1 1  OPS P r e s s  R e ­
lea se,  February 1 1 ,  1 9 7 0 .  
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to country, are focussed in general on developing balance within the 
civil security forces,  that is:  
A capability for r egular police operations, with an investi­
gative capability for detecting and identifying cr iminals 
and/ or subver sive individuals and organizations and neu­
tralizing their activitie s ,  and with a qLpability for- :control­
ling militant activities ranging from demonstrations, dis­
orde r s ,  or. riot through sma 1 1 - sea le guerrilla operations . 
84 
Police A s sistance Programs and Operations, 1 9 6 1 - 1 9 7 1  
The AID Public Safety Program i s  advised and as sisted by an inter-
agency police group with repre sentativ e s  from the Departments of D e -
fense, Justic e,  State, Treasury, and other agencie s .  The specialists 
on tax administration from Internal Service; on police administration 
from the FBI and the State Police Services and c ity police service from 
the United State s  are a s signed to train the police officials of Latin A m eri-
can and other underdeveloped countrie s of A s ia and A frica. This way 
the program is able to draw upon the extraordinary r e sources  and capa-
bilities of the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 
Border Patrol, the Secret Service, and B ureaus oI Narcotics and Cus-
toms, and the police and security services of the United State s  military 
e stablishment. 8 5  
The operational structure was instituted a s  far back a s  in Sep-
8 5This and balance of the following pres entation is excerpted from 
David Bell' s testimony from Foreign A s sistance Hearings ,  1 9 6 5 ,  pp.  
7 2 - 7 5 .  
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tember, 1 9 6 1 ,  when President Kennedy had instructed the A gency for 
International Deve lopm ent to set up a police academy: for the Latin 
American countrie s .  Later, in 1 9 6 2 ,  the Inter -Amer ican Police A c a -
demy was e stablished a t  Fort Davis in the Panama Canal zone. This 
academy was later transferred to Washington in order to open the A ca -
demy to police office r s  from the other countrie s o f  A s ia and Africa; and 
was reorganized a s  the International Police Academy. The bulk of train-
ing is conducted in the United States principally through IP A and Inter-
American Police A cademy in Washington, D .  C .  
The training programs of foreign police offic er s have been cen-
tralized and placed firmly under the contr ol of the United States govern-
ment. This training includ e s  instructions in the concepts and principles 
of police organization; administration; basic police operations; investi-
gative techniques including scientific and technical aids, police instruc-
tion, training and internal security subj ect s .  
The course of instruction at IPA i s  divided into three major 
branche s: 
Po lice Management 
(a) Organization, 
(b) Command and Staff relationships,  
( c) Public relations 
Police Operations 
(a) Criminalistic s ,  
(b) Communications , 
( c )  Border Control, 
(d)  Intelligence 
5 7  
Internal ·Security 
(a) R iot Control Formations, 
(b) Chemical Munitions,  
( c) Terrorist Counter-measures.  8 6  
For a detailed presentation of the list o f  curriculum, see  A p -
pendix I .  
AID a s s istance t o  foreign police is  a carefully balanced program 
of technical advice, training and equipment. Public Safety does not in-
elude costly complicated weapons and other items; it is r e latively inex-
pensive. The Public Safety Program is always preceded by an on-the-
scene study by qualified technicians to determine requirement s ,  and 
there is  constant evaluation of progress once undertaken. Programs 
are initiated and continued only after inter-agency consultations .  
David B e ll, descr ibing the efficiency of the Public Safety Pro-
gram, said: 
The Public Safety Program has deve loped and utilized 
methods to deliver to threatened countries,  in a matter of 
days, urgently needed as sistance inc luding equipment, train­
ing, and technical advice. 87 
For instanc e,  when the governm ent of Venezuela, headed by 
President R aul Betancourt in 1 9 62 came under heavy pres sure from 
guerrillas of the A rmed Forc e s  of the National Liberation ( F A LN) , John 
Kennedy launched a crash program to upgrade the Caracas police. A c -
cording to Peter T .  Chew: 
8 61 1 Curriculum, 11 IPA R eview, January, 1967,  a s  reported in 
NACLA News letter,  July-August, 1 9 7 1 ,  V ,  p .  9 .  
8 7F · A . t H . . 1 9 6 5  74 ore1gn 8 8 1S ance ear1ngs ,  , p .  . 
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In May 1 9 62 John " Jake" Longan, a s low-talking, fast­
thinking Oklahoman, flew secretly to and set up an advisory 
group • • •  Longan' s m en worked with city policemen, tea
.
ch­
ing such fundamentals as how to approach a suspicious car on 
foot and how to still a sniper in a building without harming r e s i­
dent s .  They persuaded Venezuelan police to favor the old­
fashioned shot - gun and showed how shotguns firing buckshot 
and gas grenade s ,  could be effectively u s ed against terrorists 
• 
. . They also demonstrated how to bounce bird shot off the 
pavem ent for effective nonlethal riot control.  8 8  
OPS advisors were also brought in the Dominica! R epublic after 
the 1 9 6 5  insurrection. Thousand s of Dominican police received training 
in riot-control techniques from an A merican team that included several 
former police Department. 89 
F r om a brief account of the AID Public Safety Programs in six-
teen Latin American countrie s ,  which is pres ented in Appendix II; the 
following main characteristics of the se programs appear to be: 
(a) they provide rank and file policemen:training; 
(b) they also aim to provide training to senior police officials and 
specialists; 
( c) they establish a highly sophisticated communication system; 
r e cord maintenance of the population by is suing identification 
card s ;  a s cientific r ecord of crimina ls and sabeteur s ,  mob con-
t:rol and patrol technique s,  to m ention a few components;  
(d)  they are aimed at increasing the capabilities of rural as well  
88Peter T .  Chew, "America' s Global Peace Officer s , "  The Ki­
wanis Magazine, April, 1969,  p. 24. 
89Michael T .  Klare, " U . S .  Police A s sistance Programs in Latin 
America, " NA CLA News letter, May-June, 1 9 7 0 ,  p .  2 9 .  
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as urban police forces in dea ling with, and in controlling the 
rural and urban insurgent elements. 
Analysis of United States Security A s s istance from 1962 - 1 9 7 2  
In order t o  demonstrate the inc r easing importance o f  Police 
a s sistance program s ,  which were included in the larger frame of s e -
curity as sistance, a n  examination of the appropriations from 1962 to 
1972 will be mad e .  The analysis will indicate an overall increase in 
emphasis on police a s sistance rather than year by year increase dur -
ing sixties.  Another point worth mentioning is that, separate figures 
of the amount alloted for Public Safety as sistance year by year have 
been itemized.  B ut sometim e s ,  from the available data, it is difficult 
to isolate public appropriations from larger s ecurity a s s istance appro-
priations, in which Public Safety a s s istance is included. 
The A lliance for Progr e s s  Security a s sistance for fiscal years 
1 9 62 and 1963  (as shown in the table be low) shows the incr easing impor-
tanc e of security assistance which includes Public Safety a s s istance.  
A s  noted in Table I,  only four Latin A m erican countr ies - -·namely, Bra-
zil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru- - had received security a s s i stance in 1962.  
But this number was doubled, and in the fiscal year 1963  the number of 
aid recipients increased to thirteen. The amount alloted specifically 
for Public Safety for fiscal year 1963  for Latin America was $ 7 ,  0 5 0 ,  000 . 90 
90 The Foreign A s s istance Program (Annual R eport to the Con­
gress for Fiscal Year 1963) ,  p. 3 0 .  
60 
Table I 
U . S .  Military A s sistance to Latin America for 
A lliance for Progr e s s  
Security 
A r gentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa R ica 
Fiscal Years 1 9 62 and 1 9 6 3  
( In thousands 
Fiscal Year 
1 962 
- - - - -
- - - - -
2 , 200 
860 
- - - - -
- - - - -
Dominican R epublic - - - - -
Ecuador 
El- Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
1 ,  500 
- - - - -
-
- -
- -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- -
- -
-
- - - - -
1 ,  1 3 5  
- - - - -
- - - - -
of dollars) 
Fiscal Year 
1 9 6 3  
- - - - -
1 , 8 1 7  
2 ,  1 5 6  
2 , 0 1 9  
1 ,  488 
- - - - -
596 
3 2 3  
534 
8 6 3  
84 
59 
- - - - -
840 
2 ,  794 
546 
- - - - -
[Figures include p ublic Safety program a s sistanc e ,  but there is 
no breakdown in the s e  figures to differentiate between military and police 
a s s istance 'J 
Source: Foreign A s sistance and R elated A gencie s ,  A ppr opriations for 
1 9 66,  Hearing s ,  Subcommittee of the Committee on A ppropria­
tions, House of R epres entatives ,  89th Cong. , 1 st s e  s s .  , p .  304.  
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For Fiscal Year 1 9 64, grant military a s sistance totalling $ 6 8 .  7 
million was provided to nineteen Latin American countrie s .  The am ount 
provided for Public Safety for Fiscal Year 1 964 was $5,  600,  0 0 0 .  9 l  
The reason for this considerably lower amount for 1 9 64, appears to be 
due to the lower amounts alloted for Bolivia from $ 1 ,  8 1 7  in 1 9 6 3  to $469 
in 1 9 64; Peru from $2,  794 in 1 9 6 3  to $ 1 ,  263 in 1 964; Dominican R epublic 
from $596 in 1963  to $64 (in thousands)  in 1 9 64; El-Salvador from $ 5 34 
in 1 9 6 3  to $225 in 1 9 64; Guatemala from $863 to $ 5 54 in 1 964; Honduras 
from $84 (in thousands) in 1 9 6 3  to $20 (in thousand s) in 1 9 64; no aid was 
alloted for Nicaragua in 1964 ( s e e  Table II) . Table III shows Public ap-
propriations for 1 9 64 on a c ountry by country basi s .  
Another pos sible reason could be that countries such a s  Brazil, 
Bolivia and Peru had a good start in 1 9 6 3  and they could be given lesser 
aid for a while without hurting the working of  the program the r e .  In the 
meantime new programs were started in Costa R ica, Venezuela, El-Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama . 
In Fiscal Year 1 9 6 5  military grant a s sistance totalling $ 7 3 .  3 
million was provided to Latin America. This $ 7 3 .  3 million was divided 
between $44. 8 million for defense articles and $28. 5 million for defense 
servic e s ,  including $ 1 2 .  3 million fro training and $ 6 .  6 million for sup-
ply operation. 92 (Table IV) 
9 lForeign A s s istance Program (Annual R eport to the Congr e s s  
for Fiscal Year 1 9 64),  p .  5 0 .  
92Foreign A s s istance Program (Annual R e port to the Congr e s s  
for Fiscal Year 1 9 6 5 ) ,  p .  1 3 .  
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Table II 
U . S .  Military A s sistance to Latin America 
A lliance for Pr�gr es s 
Security 
A r gentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa R ica 
Dominican R epublic 
Ecuador 
El-Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
for Fiscal Year 1 964 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Fiscal Year 1 9 64 
306  
469 
2 ,  1 6 8  
1 , 376 
1 , 732 
230 
64 
647 
2 2 5  
5 54 
2 0  
2 
1 , 344 
1 , 263 
470 
23 
Source: Foreign A s s istance A ppropriations for 1966,  op.  cit. , p .  304.  
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Table III 
List of Latin A m erican Countrie s Ha:ving 
Public Safety Program and the Money 
Appropriated for it for Fiscal Year 1 9 64 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Bolivia 284 
Brazil 1 , 098 
Chile 1 6 3  
Colombia 347 
Costa R ica 60 
Dominican R epublic 60 
Ecuador 2 7 1  
El-Salvador 1 3 4  
Guatemala 1 2 8  
Honduras 1 3 7  
Panama 1 0 7  
Peru 639 
Venezuela 3 1 0  
Source: Foreign A s s istance Hearing, 1 9 6 5 ,  p .  73 . 
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Table IV 
U . S .  Military A s sistance to Latin A m erica for 
A rgentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa R ica 
Dominican R epublic 
Ecuador 
El- Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Fiscal Year 1965  
(In thousand s of  dollars) 
1 , 064 
338  
2 , 42 5  
429 
537 
44 
1 0 3  
8 8 3  
8 5  
1 7 1  
19 1 
l 
1 7  
670 
2 , 2 7 6  
260  
64 
Source: Foreign A s sistance A ppropriations for 19 66,  op cit. , p .  304. 
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The major portion of the 1 9 6 5  program was allocated to meet 
internal security need s .  Civic action projects, which were part of the 
Public Safety program, were undertaken by the military; and the amount 
supplied for Public Safety for that year is $ 5 .  2 million. Sev enty-four 
American advisors and Public Safety specialists were s ent by this pro-
gram to Latin A me rica. 9 3  
The amount allocated t o  the military a s s i stance for Fis'Cal Y.ear 
1 966 was $ 7 7 .  3 million; out of which 5 6 .  6 per cent ( i . e . , $44 million) 
was to maintain internal security. 94 The amount provided for Public 
Safety was $ 3 .  9 million and eighty-two United State s  Public Safety ad-
visors were sent to Latin American countrie s .  9 5  For a detailed alloca-
tion, see  Table V .  
In the Fiscal Year 1967 military a s s istanc'e continued to empha-
size the strengthening of the indigenous forces capable of maintaining 
internal security against threats of violence and subversion, and of deal-
ing effectively with guerrilla warfare and the c landestine movement of 
men ·and armaments across land, sea,  and air borders  for s ubversive 
purpo s e s .  The military a s sistance for Latin Amer ican for Fiscal Y ear 
9 3 lb id . , pp.  3 6 - 3 7 .  
94 U . S . , Congr e s s ,  Senate,  Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriati:ons, Foreign A s sistance and Appropriations for 1 9 66; - -Hear ­
ings ,  8 9th Cong . , 1 st s e s s . , 1 9 6 5 ,  p .  224.  
9 5The Foreign A s s istance Program (A nnual R eport to the Con­
gress,  Fiscal Y ear 1966),  p. 38 . 
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Table V 
U .  S o  Security A s sistance Program 
Latin America 
A r gentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa R ica 
Dominican R epublic 
Ecuador 
El-Sa lvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
for Fiscal Year 1 966 
. (In thousands of dollars) 
530 
1 14 
1 , 9 6 1  
634 
696 
122 
104 
65  
343 
7 1  
2 0  
2 2  
576 
2 , 8 7 1  
1 0 3  
59 
Source: Statement of Vice Admiral Heinz, U . S . Navy, Director of 
Military ass istanc e,  Foreign A s sistance A ppropriations for 
1 967,  89th Cong . , 2nd ses s . , p .  6 1 8 .  
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1 9 6  7 amounts to $ 74. 9 million. 9 6  Of this $42 . 2 million or 64 per cent 
was devoted to str engthening internal security ( s ee Table VI) with em-
phasis on communications ,  mobility, and counterinsurgency training; 
and ninety- s ix United States Public Safety advisors were sent to Latin 
America. 9 7  Table VI shows internal security appropriations under 
various categories for Fiscal Year 1 9 6  7 .  
The military assistance for Fiscal Year 1968 was $45.  5 million 
for eighteen Latin A m erican countries;  out of which $ 1 3  million were to 
be spent in training and $ 3 2 .  5 million for equipment and service s .  98 
The amount to be spent on Public Safety in particular was $34. 7 million, 
and ninety United State s  Public Safety advisor s were sent. 9 9  (See Table VI) 
The amount allocated for Fis:cal_ Year' 1 9 69 for Public Safety was 
$ 3 .  5 million; lOO and for Fiscal Year 1 9 70 it was lower than that of the 
preceding year, $209 million, but it was primarily aimed at improving 
the internal security capabilities of Latin American C ountrie s .  Table VII 
9 6u .  S . , Congr e s s ,  Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Foreign A s sistance and A ppropriations for 1 9 6 7 ,  Hear­
ings ,  89th Cong. , 2nd s e s s . , 1966,  p .  6 .  
9 7The Foreign A s sistance Program (A nnual R e port to the Con­
g r e s s ,  Fiscal Year 1 967),  pp.  5 6 - 5 7 .  
9 8u .  S . , Congr e s s ,  Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Foreign A s sistance and A ppropriations for 1968,  Hear­
ings ,  90th Cong. , 1 st s e s s . , 1 967,  p .  3 3 2 .  
99 The Foreign A s s istance Program (A nnual R eport to the Con­
gres s ,  Fiscal Y ear 1 968),  pp.  50 - 5 1 .  
l OO The Foreign A s s istance Program (A nnual R eport to the Con­
gre s s ,  Fiscal Year 1 969),  p. 46.  
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Table VI 
U . S. Military A s sistance to Latin America 
(In millions of dollars) 
Fiscal Year 1 9 6 7  Fiscal Year 1 9 68 
(proposed) 
Grants: 
Internal Security 42 . 2  34. 7 
Supply Operations 7 . 9  5 .  1 
Civil A ction 4 . 2 3 . 9  
Maritime Defense 1 .  5 1 .  8 
Training 1 3 . 3  1 3 . 0  
Total 5 5 . 8 4 5 . 5 
Sales: 
Cr edit Sales 2 9 . 6 3 7 . 5 
Cash Sales 1 2 . 9 1 5 . 0  
Total 42 . 5  52. 5 
Source:  Survey of the A lliance for Progr e s s ,  o p .  cit. , p .  2 5 .  
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shows a marked decrease in the Public Safety appropriations from 1970 
to 1972,  the reason for which will be discussed a little later.  This dra s ­
tic cut in Public Safety a s s istance t o  Latin A m erica seems to be due 
to the widened scope of the United State s  security a s sistance by the Nixon 
administration, which resulted in the considerable importance of many 
other under-dev e loped countries of A s ia and Africa; Latin A merica alone 
did not remain to be the focal point of the United State s  security assistanc e .  
F r om the quantitative data on security a s sistance to Latin A m er ­
ica, it is clear that there is not only a definite shift in the United States 
foreign policy from hemispheric defense to internal secur ity and that 
there has been a positive shift in the emphasis of security a s sistance to 
Latin American countries since 1 9 6 1 ;  but also that the United State s  em­
phasis on internal security has been constantly increasing. 
The year 1969 had brought an important change as far as the 
United State s as sistance to Latin America is concerned. The increased 
emphasis of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations on the importance 
of s ecurity assistance in Latin A m erica s e emed to be fading away with 
the Nixon administration. 
The " Nixon Doctrine" had not only promised an increas ing in­
volvement of the inte rnal forces of the countrie s of the third world for 
their particular governmental stability and t o  face the internal threats 
of violence and insurgency; but at the same time it promised United 
States military and economic assistance to counter the threafs of both 
external and internal communism. It also dee la red that the United 
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Table VII 
Summary of Public Safety Programs by Country 
from Fiscal Year 1970  to 1 972 
(In thousand s of dollars) 
F . Y .  1 9 70 F . Y .  1 9 7 1  F . Y . 1972  
Actual Estimated Proposed 
B olivia 209 143  1 1 5  
Brazil 6 1 4  370 1 74 
Chile 1 0 6  1 7  
Colombia 2 6 7  260 340 
Costa R ica 230 200 1 9 8  
Dominican R epublic 386  378  370  
Ecuador 1 5 3  142 1 3 5  
El- Salvador 8 3  6 4  5 6  
Guatemala 1 ,  129 3 7 7  3 7 7  
Guyana 149  146 99 
Honduras 1 0 7  1 2 1  1 7 1  
Jamaica 75 70 9 6  
Nicaragua 1 1 8  9 1  
Panama 1 3 1  1 64 2 0 3  
Peru 27 
Uruguay 2 8 5  624 225  
Venezuela 284 1 8 6  200 
Sub Total 4 , 2 3 5  3 , 380  2 , 8 50 
Source: AID' s Office of Public Safety (OPS), budget requests to Congr e s s  
t o  cover operations in Latin A m erica. for Fiscal Y ear 1 9 7 2 .  
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State s  will refrain from active involvement of A merican forces abroad. 
Thus the Nixon Doctr ine brought a major change in the direction of the 
U nited States security a s sistance policy. The three principles of the 
Doctrine, which are the major e lements of that change are: 
I .  The United States will keep all its treaty commitment s .  
2 .  The United States shall provide a shield if a nuclear 
power threatens the freedom of a nation .. allied with us or 
of a nation who se s urvival we consider vital to our security 
and the se curity of the region a s  a whole. 
3 .  In cases involving other types of aggres sion, we shall 
furnish military and economic assistance when requested 
and as appropriated. But we shall look to the nation di­
rectly threatened to a s s ume the primary r e sponsibility of 
providing the manpower for its defense.  I 0 I 
On another occasion, Pre sident Nixon declared: 
The nations of each part of the world should a s sume the 
primary r e sponsibility for their own well-being; and they 
themselves should determine the terms of well-being. 1 0 2  
From this statement, like the Nixon Doctrine, it seems quite 
evident that the Nixon administration considers security a s sistance to 
the countries of the unde rdeveloped wor ld very e s s ential. A lthough the 
emphasis on internal security remains, one can conclude that: 
On account of the widened scope of the United State s  security 
a s sistance by the Nixon administration, which resulted in the consider -
able importance of many other underdeveloped countr ies of A sia and 
l O lu . s . ,  Congr e s s ,  Senate, Committee on Foreign R e lations, 
_Fo_r_e__.i g ... n_M_i_l_it_a_r_y&--.S_a_le_s_A_c_t_1_9_7_0_-_7_1_, ___ He_a_r_i_n ..... g ._s , 9 2nd Cong. , 2nd s e s  s . , 
1 9 6 9 ,  ( Te stimony of David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defens e) ,  p .  6 .  
l O Z!bid . 
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A frica; Latin America no longer remained to be the only focal point 
of United States security a s s i stanc e .  
Another major foreign policy shift which was introduced by the 
Kennedy administration and was in progre s s  under Johnson but br ought 
about in full swing by the Nixon administration is the marked r eduction 
in grant security assistance and an increa s ed United States weapon sales 
to Latin A merica and other underdeveloped countries.  De scribing this 
strategy of the administration, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, during 
testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee for Appropri-
ations for 1 9 7 1 ,  said: 
The basic policy of decreasing direct United State s  mili­
tary involvement cannot be succes sful unle s s  we provide our 
friends and allie s ,  whether through grand aid or credit sale s ,  
with the material assistance nec e s sary to a s  sure the most 
effective possible contribution by the manpower they are 
willing and able to commit to their own and common defense. 
Many of them simply do not command the r e sour ces  or tech­
nical capabilitie s to a s s um e  greater responsibility for their 
own defense without such a s sistanc e .  The challenging a s ­
pect of our policy can, therefor e ,  best be achieved when 
each partner does its share and contributes what it best can 
to the common effort. In the majority of the cases this means 
indigenous manpower organized into properly equipped and 
well-trained armed forces with the help of material, training, 
technology, and specialized s kills furnished by the United 
States through the military a s s istance program or a s  Foreign 
military sales ( emphasis added) . 1 0 3  
In accordance to the changed basic promises ,  the Nixon Doctrine 
required an adequately funded sec urity a s s istance program to enable 
!Q�u.  S . ,  C ongr e s s ,  House, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Foreign A s sistance and R e  lated Appropriations for 
1 9 7 1 ,  Hearings ,  9 1 st Cong . , 2nd ses s . , 1970,  p .  307.  
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the United States :  
to  str engthen the slef defense capabilities of the friends 
and allie s while at the same time fostering local initiative 
and self re liance ;  
t o  make pos s ible the reduction o f  the United States forces  
oversea s  in certain areas, without a reduction in allies, se­
curity; and raise the thr e shold of direct United State s  involve­
ment; 
to provide on a s e lective bas i s ,  technical advic e ,  training, 
material and financial a s s istance for internal security in 
s ituations where such aid is important to the United States 
security and where the local government has demonstrated 
its ability to respond constructively to the as pirations of its 
people. 104 
On the basis of this rationale President Nixon in 1 9 7 1  sought 
approval for the largest Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program in the 
United States '  history: $ 5 1 0  million in credits and loan guarantees was 
requested from the Congr e s s  to help finance total arms purchases  e s -
timated at $ 2 .  1 5  billion- - a  700 per c ent increase over the p r e - 1 9 6 1  
average of $300  million a year and twice the average rate during the 
1960' s . 1 05 
Naturally the shift in United States foreign policy from reduced 
grant a s s istance to increased arms sale s has r e sulted in the growing 
res entments from various ruling circles of the Latin American subcon-
tinent. Governor Nels on R ockefeller in his report discus sing this con-
cern observed that many countries of Latin Ame rica "have been puzzled 
104u . s . ,  Congre s s ,  House, Committee on Foreign A ffair s ,  Fore­
ign A s s istance Act of 1 9 7 1 ,  Hearings ,  92nd Cong . , 1 st se s s . ,  1 9 7 1 ,  
( T estimony of John N .  Irving II ,  Under Secr etary of State) ,  pp.  2 - 3 .  
I 0 5"Arms Now Pay Later: United Stat e s  Arms Sales t o  the Third 
World , " NA C LA ' s  Latin America and Empire R eport, VI ( January, 1 9 72) , 
p .  4 .  
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by the reduction in United States military a s s is tance grants in view of 
the growing intensity of the subv ersive activities they face" . 1 06 Citing 
the dec lining amount of grant a s sistance $ 2 1 .  4 million (proposed} for 
1 9 70 a s  against $80.  7 million in Fiscal Year 1966,  R oc kefeller recom-
mends the United State s  to reverse  the recent downward trend in grants 
for a s s isting the training of security forces for the other hemisphere 
countrie s .  l 0 7  
The following graph shows a remarkable decline in the United 
State s  grant military a s s istance from Fiscal Year 1966  to 1 9 7 0 .  
The changed patterns of the United States security a s sistanc e ,  
brought about by the Nixon administration, made the nec e s s ity of organi-
zationa 1 changes quite imperativ e .  To fulfill the changed premises  of 
security a s s i stanc e ,  and for the purposes  of or ganizational change s ,  
the Foreign A s s istance A c t  of 1 9 7 1  was introduced. This A ct, in an 
effort to str engthen the planning and coordination of all security as sis-
tanc e ,  pulled together the following components of security a s s istance: 
(a} Military Grants; 
(b} Fore ign Military C redits; 
(c }  Economic Supporting A s s istance and Public Safety Program. 1 0 8  
The internal security a s s istance ( Foreign A s sistance A ct of 1 9 7 1 }  
also incorporates other recommendations , which are: 
l 0 6R ockefeller R eport on Americas (Chica go: Quadrangle Book s ,  
1 9 69 } ,  p .  60 . 
1 0 7  
lb id. , p .  6 3 . 
108Foreign A s sistance Act of 1 9 7 1 ,  op . cit. , p .  5 .  
Figure 1 .  Dec line in U . S .  Military Grants to Latin America 
Source: Foreign Military Sales Pre sented to Congr e s s ,  as cited in The R ockefeller R eport 
on the Am ericas, op . c it . , p .  64. 
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1 .  It provid e s  for a high-level coordinator in the Depart­
m ent of State to carry out the Department' s respons ibility 
for policy direction of the program and to a s s ur e  that mili­
tary as sistance and re lated supporting a s sistance will be 
considered together in security planning. 
2 .  It lays the basis for shifting military as sistance from 
grant to a loan basis by providing authority for s oft a s  well 
as commercial lending terms . This will help the United 
States to as sure that r e cipient countries make their deci­
sions on security expenditure s  with full r ec ognition of com­
p eting development and other lxrl:getary requirements within 
the total resources  available. (emphasis added) 
3 .  It should make for a more healthy relationship as well a s  
a more effective program. 109  
The propo s ed new or ganization through this act i s  expected to 
tackle the following basic problems re garding se curity a s s istance:" 
Is the proposed level of defense expenditure s  by allied 
and friendly countrie s reas onable in terms of their security 
objectives ? 
W hat is the likely impact of such expenditur e s  on their 
economy and what portion of such expenditure should the 
United States support ? 
What degree of force modernization is  required ? 1 1 0 
The Department of Defense will, as at pres ent ,  administer the 
grant military aid and foreign military sales programs but und er the 
continuing guidance of Department of State. 
The new organizational structur e ,  and the advantages of the 
l 09u . s . ,  Congr e s s ,  Senate, Committee on Foreign R e lations, 
Foreign A s s istance Legis lation for 1 9 7 2 ,  Hearings, 92nd Cong . , 1 st 
s e s s ,  1 9 7 1 ,  p .  1 5 5 .  
l l OThe balance of this and the following discussion i s  prepared 
from the hearings on the For eign A s sistance A ct of 1 9 7 1 ,  op. cit. The 
testimonies of various experts and government officials have been ex­
tensively used. For further details see  the documents cited above. 
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integrative approach of the new legis lation will facilitate the proper 
mix of military and economic components of security a s s istance and 
a fuller ,  more explicit consideration of economic factors in the formu-
lation of military a s sistance program s .  In implementing the new pro-
gram, the administrator will be guided by the following precepts: 
The emphasis is on selectivity in the use of the s e  pro­
grams and in United State s  involvement. This will be ac­
complished through close day-to-day policy supervision and 
control which will be exercised by the Secretary of State 
through the new Security A s s istance Coordinator. 
Emphasis on strengthening the self r eliance of the recipi­
ent. The ultimate purpose is to make r ecipients capable of 
defending themselv e s  in local c onflicts that do not involve 
other major powers.  
A more equal partne rship. At this transfer of responsi­
bilitie s  and cost progr e s s e s ,  judgments will increasingly sub­
stitute for those of the United Stat e s .  A s  the local r e s ources  
take the place of Unites States resour c e s ,  the countries con­
cerned will have to weigh and appraise crttically their own 
security requirem ents in r elation to other pres sing social 
and economic needs competing for the same limited resourc e s . 
The United States'  goal will be to reduce the dependence of the 
recipients on her and to cr eate new incentives for recipient 
countrie s to reexamine their security need s .  1 1 1  
In spite of the changes and broader approach toward the security 
a s si stance under the Nixon administration, the United States still puts 
the same emphasis on internal security; and the Latin American coun-
trie s still receive United State s  security a s s istance for Public Safety 
Program s .  
Total OPS expenditure s  in the fifteen Latin American countrie s 
reached an e stimated $39 million by July 1 ,  1 970 ( outlays in individual 
1 1 1Ibid . ,  p .  6 .  
78 
countries ranged from the $ 1  to 2 million spent in Bolivia, Co sta R ica, 
El-Salvador, Guyana, Hondura s ,  Uruguay, and Venezuela, to $ 3 to 4 
million subsidies to Colombia, the Dominican R epublic, Ecuador, Pana-
ma, and Peru. The leading beneficiary of the Public Safety Program 
in Latin A m erica was Brazil, which received $ 7 .  5 million in OPS funds 
by the middle of 1 9 7 0 . 1 1 2  A s  of January, 1970 , 3 5 0 0  office r s  of com-
miss ioned status had graduated from the International Police Academy. 1 1 3  
Following is Table VIII which shows the United States Police 
A s sistance 1 1 4 to Latin Am erica from 1 9 6 1  to 1 9 69 .  
The total OPS expenditur e s  in Latin A m erica from the year 1 9 5 6  
through the 1 970'  s are shown in Table IX and the proposed appropriations 
for Fiscal Year 1 9 7 1  are also included. 
The number of Latin American police personnel trained within 
the United State s  and the Latin A me r ican countries during the year s 
1 9 6 7 - 1 9 69 is shown in Table X .  A ls o  included in the table is the num -
ber of United State s  Public Safety advisors involved in the Public Safety 
Program s .  
AID had requested $26 million in police a s s istance for Fiscal 
1 1 2Michael T .  Klare, "Policing the Empire , "  Commonweal, 
XCII (September 1 8 ,  1970) ,  p. 456.  
1 1 3u . s . , Department of State ,  AID, Office of Public Safety, 
Program Guide Public Safety Training (Washington, D . C . ,  1 9 6 8) . 
1 14Includes commodities delivered ( e . g . , R adio equipment, 
anti-riot ga s ,  small arm s ,  patrol vehic le s) ,  training in the United States 
and other countries and in-c ountry training provided by United States 
Public Safety Advis ors.  
Table VIII 
Police A s sistance - Worldwide 1 9 6 1 -69 by Fiscal Year -
( Thousands of dollars) 
R e gioz;i. and Country 1 9 6 1  1962 1963 1 964 1 9 6 5  1 966 1 9 6 7  
LATIN AMERICA, Total 2 , 5 1 8  2 , 886 7 , 9 5 1  4, 486 5 , 448 7, 087  5 , 306 
A r gentina - 1 5 2 6  4 1  47 -
B olivia 1 5 5  339 4 1 3  286 104 1 3  62 
Brazil 7 1 8  596 1 ,  2 9 2  1 , 098 774 754 699 
Chile - 206 449 2 8 3  459 435  290  
Colombia 1 6  - 1 , 607 340 8 1 8  1 ,  799 503  
Costa R ica - - 1 65 60 1 4 1  1 8 2  2 3 3  
Dominican R epublic - - 440 44 9 7  569 769 
Ecuador 142 374 1 ,  1 1 7  270 307 340 247 
El-Salvador 325 1 0 5  3 6 6  1 6 8  1 8 3  2 2 0  1 8 7  
Guatemala 3 1 9  77 1 66 1 2 8  270 249 644 
Guyana - - - 44 1 2  552  98  
Honduras 8 3  6 1  104 1 3 7  300 1 2  7 1 1 9  
Jamaica - - - - - - 1 66 
Mexico 500 - - - 245 - -
Panama 1 60 2 7  569 77 1 2 5  1 3 7  1 4 1  
Peru 46 2 2 6  466 639 737 1 , 060 529 
Uruguay - 3 - 1 1  2 8 8  1 6 0  1 8 8  
Venezuela - 27 263 338 459 425 4 3 1  
Other Countries 24 558  - - - - -
R e gional 30 266' 529 537 88 1 8  -
1 9 6 8  1969 
4 , 037 3 , 9 3 1  
- -
109  1 1 7  
623  862 
75 68 
341  299  
239  2 1 5  
762 435  
2 2 3  199  
1 73 99 
2 1 8  4 1 1  
84 1 6 5  
99 1 5 8  
1 9 7  8 8  
- -
1 0 3  1 2 8  
280 1 3 2  
1 5 8  224 
3 5 3  3 3 1  
- -
- -
Total 
6 1 - 62 
43, 630 
120 
1 , 598 
7, 4 1 6  
2 , 2 6 5  
5, 723  
1 ,  2 3 5  
3,  1 1 6  
3 , 2 1 9  
1 ,  8 2 6  
2 , 48 2  
9 5 5  
1 ,  1 8 8  
4 5 1  
745 
1 , 46 7  
4,  1 1 5  
1 , 032  
2 , 6 2 7  
5 8 2  
1 ,  468 
Sour ce: U . S. A gency for International Development, Statistics and R eport Division, Operation R eports, 
Data as of 30 June 19 6 1 ,  30 June 1 9 6 2 ,  30 June 1 9 6 3 ,  30 June 1 9 64,  30 June 1965,  30 June 1966,  
3 0  June 1967,  30 June 1968,  and 30 June 1969.  
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Table IX 
AID Public Safety Pr ogram Expenditures  in Latin America, 1956- 1 9 70 
Program 
initiated 
Country: FY: 
Bolivia 1 956 
Brazil 1 959 
Chile 1963 
Colombia 1 963 
Costa R ica 1 963 
Dominican R epublic 1962 
Ecuador 1962 
El-Salvador 1961  
Guyana 1966 
Honduras 1960 
Jamaica 1967 
Panama 1959 
Peru 1 962 
Uruguay 1 962 
Venezuela 1 963 
T otals 
(Amounts in thousands of dollars) 
(FY = Fiscal Year) 
Expenditure s  Estimated 
through expenditure s  
6/30/69: in FY 1970: 
1 , 900 1 18 
6 , 830 732 
1 ,  571 90 
4 , 350 2 1 7  
985 240 
2 , 583 470 
3 , 290 186 
1 , 825  87  
7 1 1 3 1 1  
1 , 074 167 
272 1 72 
3 , 059 383 
3 ,  528 1 1 4  
869 230 
2 , 3 1 8  285 
35 , 165  3, 802 
Estimated 
expenditure s  
thru 6/30 /70: 
2 , 0 1 8  
7 , 562 
1 , 66 1  
4, 567 
1 , 225 
3 , 053 
3 , 476 
I .  9 12  
1 ,  022 
1 , 24 1  
444 
3 , 442 
3 , 642 
1 , 099 
2 , 603 
38 , 967 
FY 197 1  
R eguest: 
1 43 
456 
71 
240 
200 
423 
134 
86 
232 
1 65  
70 
1 35  
0 
200 
2 10 
2 ,  765 
Source: U . S .  A gency for International Deve lopment, Program and Project Data Pres entations to the 
Congr e s s  for Fiscal Year 1971 . (Does not include data for countries where OPS program 
terminated prior to FY 1 970 . )  
00 
0 
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Table X 
Training of Latin Amer ican Police P e r s onnel in the 
United State s  and in Latin American C ountT ies 
Per sonnel Per sonnel Public 
trained in trained in Safety 
the U . S. Latin A m e r - Advisor s 
1 96 7 - 69 ican countries a s  of 
R egion and Country 1 9 6 7 - 69 3 0  June 68 
LATIN AMERIC A ,  total 1 ' 1 3  5 4 9 0  
A r gentina 3 3  
Bolivia 1 4  3 
Brazil 224 1 7  
Chile 30 l 
Colombia 89 7 
Costa R ica 64 4 
Dominican R epublic 6 6  1 1 5  
Ecuador 3 0  6 
El-Salvador 34 4 
Guatemala 1 0 5  2 2 
Guyana 3 3  2 
Honduras 29 2 
Jamaica 3 1  2 
Nicaragua 3 5  2 
Panama 5 1  1 3 
Paraguay 8 
Peru 3 6  9 
Uruguay 43 3 
Venezuela 1 72 1 0  
Other /R e giona l 7 
Source: U . S . A gency for International Deve lopment, Statistics and R e ­
ports Division, Operations R eport, Data a s  of 3 0  June 1 9 6 8 ,  
30 June 1 9 69 . 
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Year 1 9 7 2 .  l l 5 The new emphasis is r eported to be on the moderniza-
tion of the police forces in anti- s ubvers ion techniques to deal with ur -
ban guerrillas ,  especially in Latin A m erican countr ies.  For details 
of the amount a lloted to the various countrie s in Latin America, see 
Table VII on page 70.  A s ignificant change is that from Fiscal Year 
1 9 7 2 ,  the Public Safety Programs are being reduced in thirteen Latin 
American countries; terminated in Peru and Chile, because of their 
criticism of the role of the United States a s s istanc e program s ;  and in-
creased in Colombia, Jamaica, Honduras,  and Panama. 
The future of the United State s  Safety Program appears to be 
quite pes simistic because the program has been unde r  strong criticism 
from within the United States and in various Latin American c.ountries.  
Lately serious questions have been raised about the wisdom of a s s i s -
tance to certain repres sive regim e s ,  l l 6  and two large recipients of 
police a s s istanc e - -Guatemala and Dominican R epublic- -have been criti-
cized as the violators of human right s by the OAS. 1 1 7  
The United State s decision to end a $200,  000 a year police train-
ing program in Brazil 1 1 8  is an indication that the total police a s s i stance 
1 1 5Tad Szulc, "United State s  Plans to Increase AID to Foreign 
Police to Help Fight Subversion, " The New York Times,  June 14,  1 97 1 .  
1 1 6Dan Griffin, " Senator Church A s sails United State s  Aid to 
Brazil Polic e , " The Wa shington Post, July 2 5 ,  1 9 7 1 .  
1 1  71 1United States to End Police A s sistance to Brazil, " The Wash­
ington Post, July 1 5 , 1 9 7 1 . 
l l 8st. Louis Post Dispatch, August 8 ,  1 9 7 1 .  
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to the fifteen Latin American countries will be eventually discarded. 
B ut the possibility that the United States might continue its involvement 
in the form of FMS cr edit and I or cash sale s  of the weapons to increase 
the capabilities of counterinsurgency forces in Latin America cannot 
be ruled out. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAMS: 
AN A NA LY SIS OF POLIT ICA L  R EPR ESSION AND 
T HE R OLE OF T HE UNITED STA T ES IN B R A ZIL 
A fter an under standing of the underlying objective s  and function­
ing of the public safety program in Latin A merica, an analysis of the 
actual performance of the se programs becomes quite neces sary. Since 
it is quite impos sible to study the performance of public safety programs 
in all the twenty states of the s ubcontinent, a case study is the most ad ­
visable and prudent technique available because: 
(a) The case study will help us identify the gaps between the 
states objectives and actual p erformance of the United State s  
police a s s istance to the Latin American subcontinent in gen­
eral.  
(b) The case study will enable us to enquire into the positive 
and negative impacts of the United Stat e s  police assistance 
to the subcontinent. 
Brazil has been selected a s  a case study for the performance of 
public safety programs for the following reasons: 
84 
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I )  Brazil i s  the largest country of the subcontinent in terms of 
area, population, and has been the largest recipient of the 
United States public safety as sistanc e .  
2)  The rec ent reports of the police brutalities in Brazir and tor -
turings of political prisoners raises serious questions about 
the role played by the United States public safety program 
in Brazil in particula r .  
3) The excessive violence and increased activities of radical 
guerrilla movements in Latin Ame rican countrie s in general 
bring up serious doubts about the effectivene s s  and the nece s ­
sity of the continued public safety programs in Latin America. 
The point of inquiry here is what is the role played by the United 
States public safety program in the increas ing police brutalitie s in Bra­
zil?  In other word s ,  if the emphasis of the United States police training 
is on the minimum u s e  of force in Brazil and elsewhe r e  in Latin A m e r -
ica, why are Brazilian police reportedly so inclined towards torture and 
brutality in dealing with political prisoners and accused s aboteur s ?  
If United State s  police a s sistance r ea l ly focuses on better civil­
police relations ,  and promotes social justice, why are the United State s  
trained Brazilian police reportedly involved in the orderly elim ination 
of politically dis sent and of oppositional forc e s ?  
Before we probe these question s ,  it is quite ne ces sary to study 
the United States public safety program in Brazil in considerable detail. 
The public safety program was started in Brazil late in 1959 at 
8 6  
the request of the Brazilian government. The basic goals for the pro:-
gram were: to establish a federal police organization at Bras ilia, to 
deal with the interim problems of police dev elopment in key states in 
the cou.ntry; and to help Brazil modernize its police operations by ex-
panding and improving police tra ining and central information servic e .  
The program also attempted to provide coordination between the to-be 
e stablished federal police and individual state police for c e s . 1 1 9  
During the period from 1 960 -69 public safety a s sistance was 
tailored to the particular requirements of the police forces of various 
states of Brazil. In September ,  1 9 6 8 ,  the main thrust of the United 
States a s s istance was to be with the federal police rather than both fed-
eral and state police forces . The r eason was that the federal police 
were expected to as sume an increasing res pons ibility in the training 
and technical services for its elf a s  well as for state police for c e s .  An-
other rationale under lying this new emphasis was to_ provide for the de-
velopment of appropriate police institutions which would re sult in a r e -
d uction in the numb er of United Stat es public safety advisors stationed 
in Brazil. By 1972 this number will be reduced to four . Table XI pro-
vides details conce rning the numbers of Brazilian officers  trained for 
l l9u. s . ,  Congr e s s ,  Senate, Subcommittee on W e stern Hemi s ­
phere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign R e'lation.s,  United States 
Policies and Programs in Brazil, Hearings ,  92nd Cong . , 1 st sess . ,  
1 97 1 ,  p .  3 .  (The substance of the following information has been ex­
tracted from the te stimony of Theodore D .  Brown, Chief Public Safety 
Advisor, U . S . AID, Brazil. ) 
Table XI 
Public Safety Program Participant T raine e s ,  Brazil 
1 .  International American Police 
Academy (Panama) ( general 
course) . 
. 
. . 
. 
. . . . . 
. 
2 .  General course . . 
. . 
. 
. . 
3 .  Senior course . . 
. . . 
. . 
. 
4 .  Police executives  . 
. . 
. . . 
5 .  Communications . . 
. . . 
. . 
6.  R iot control (IAPA) . 
. 
. 
. 
. 
7 .  Motor transport . 
. 
. 
. . 
. 
. 
8 .  Criminalistics . . . . . 
. 
. 
9 .  Traffic . . . 
. 
. . 
. 
. . . . 
1 0 .  FBI National Academy . . . 
. 
1 1 .  Misce llaneous .  . 
. 
. . . 
. 
. 
Total. . . 
. 
. . . . . . 
. 
1963 
46 
- -
- -
1 
- -
7 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
54 
1964 
- -
4 
1 
1 
- -
8 
- -
- -
- -
-
-
6 
20 
Fiscal year- -
1965 1 966 1 967 1968 
- -
42 
- -
10  
1 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
1 
54 
- -
54 
- -
1 0  
1 
- -
- -
1 
- -
1 
- -
67 
- -
74 
- -
- -
1 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
75 
- -
52 
1 
1 3  
1 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
-
-
67 
Source: United States Policies and Programs in Brazil. 
1 969 
- -
73 
1 
6 
- -
- -
- -
2 
1 
- -
- -
83 
1970 Totals 
- -
69 
10 
1 7  
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
1 
1 
98  
4 6  
368 
1 3  
58 
4 
1 5  
0 
3 
1 
2 
8 
5 1 8  
CX> 
-.J 
88 
various cour s e s  from 1 963 t o  1 970 .  Table XII provid e s  the number 
of Brazilian officers  who have specialized in various cour s e s  of public 
safety programs during 1963- 1970 .  
Table XIII provides details concerning police office r s  who have 
been trained from the various states in Brazil. Table XIV furnishe s 
the actual dollar funding from Fiscal Years 1962 - 1 970 for the public 
safety program. The funding in-elud e s  the salaries and allowance s  of 
the public safety advisors a s s igned to the program, costs of training 
Brazilian police officers  in the United States,  and the commodities pro­
vided to achieve specific project objectiv e s .  
The total Braz ilian police forces  a r e  reported to be 2 7 1 ,  000 and 
is comprised of non-uniformed federal police numbering 38 ,  000,  uni­
formed Federal District Police numbering 6 ,  500 ,  uniformed state 
military police numbering 1 76 ,  000,  and 84, 000 non-uniformed State 
Civil Police. l ZO 
Let us focus our attention on the reported police brutalities in 
Brazil. European and A m erican newspapers lately have published nu­
merous reports and articles alleging the wid e spread and excessive appli­
cation of torture by the Brazilian police and military to exterminate the 
r emaining v e stiges of opposing political forces in order to gain a com­
plete s ubjugation of the Brazilian society. Some citation of various 
reports of torture is felt neces sary for the sake of docum entation. 
1 2 0ibid . 
Table XII 
Public Safety Program General Cour se Specialization Phase:>!c 
!APA (General Course No. 3 ,  4 ,  5) :  
1 .  Firearm s .  . . . . . . . . 
2 .  Inv e stigations . . . . 
. 
. . 
3 .  Counterintelligence . . . . 
4 .  Hand ling explosives . . . . 
5 .  Instructor methods . 
. 
. . 
(Declined special training) . 
T otal . . . . . . . . . 
IPA: 
1 .  Crim /'se curity inv e st . . . 
2 .  Instructor methods . . 
. 
. 
3 .  Patro 1 operations • . . . . 
4 .  R iot control. 
. 
. . . . 
. 
. 
5 .  Traffic . . . . . . . . . . 
6 .  Border /Customs control • . 
7 .  Narcotics 
. 
. 
. . . . . . 
8 .  R e cord s /identification . . 
. 
9 .  Firearm s .  . . . . . 
. . 
. 
1 0 .  Crime Lab Admin. 
. . 
. . 
Total . . . 
. 
. . . . . 
1963 
4 
2 
5 
3 
- -
14 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
1 964 
7 
8 
2 
2 
2 
1 
22 
- -
4 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
4 
1 9 65 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
22 
9 
2 
- -
- -
8 
- -
- -
- -
1 
42 
Fiscal year 
1 966 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
1 3  
2 0  
12 
. 7 
- -
2 
- -
- -
- -
- -
54 
1967 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
20 
40 
9 
2 
1 
2 
- -
- -
- -
- -
74 
1 968 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
1 2  
1 5  
1 3  
6 
3 
1 
- -
2 
- -
- -
52 
1 9 69 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
1 7  
1 4  
1 6  
4 
1 5  
- -
7 
- -
- -
- -
73 
1 9 70 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
28 
4 
1 6  
3 
3 
4 
5 
3 
3 
- -
69 
Totals 
1 1  
1 0  
7 
5 
2 
1 
36 
1 1 2  
1 0 6  
6 8  
2 2  
2 2  
1 7  
1 2  
5 
3 
1 
368 
*Not e - - Each member of the general cour se is given 4 weeks of add itional training in a specia l  func -
tional area consistent with the needs of the respective country and the attainment of project 
goals. Specialization was offe red only to IAPA general c our s e  Nos . 3 ,  4, and 5 but was not 
offe red to general cour s e  Nos . 1 and 2 ( 1 0  participants) . 
00 
'° 
T able XIII 
Public Safety Participant Program, l;>y State and by Funding Year 
States 
Acre 
A lageas 
Amazonas 
Bahia 
Ceara 
Es pirito Santo 
Federa 1 District 
Federal police 
Goias 
Guanabara 
Maranhao 
Mato Gr osso 
Minas Garais 
Para 
Paraiba 
Parana 
Pernambuco 
Piaui 
R io de Janeiro 
R io Grande do Norte 
R io Grande do Sul 
Santa Catarina 
Sao Paulo 
Sergipe 
Tota 1 . . . . ' . 
Grand Total • . . 
1 9 59 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
4 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
4 
. 
. 
1 9 60 
. 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
4 
- -
- -
1 
- -
- -
- -
1 
- -
- -
- -
1 
- -
1 
- -
8 
. 
. 
1 96 1  
- -
- -
- -
- -
-
-
- -
2 
-
-
1 
- -
- -
1 
- -
-
-
- -
4 
- -
-
-
- -
-
-
-
-
4 
- -
1 2  
. . 
. 
1 962 
- -
- -
- -
-
-
- -
4 
3 
- -
1 
- -
- -
6 
- -
- -
3 
4 
- -
-
-
- -
- -
- -
5 
-
-
26 
. . 
1 963 
. 
- -
- -
- -
-
-
- -
9 
1 
1 
7 
- -
- -
24 
- -
- -
5 
1 
- -
- -
- -
- -
2 
12 
- -
62 
. . 
Fiscal year- -
1 964 
- -
-
-
2 
- -
- -
- -
- -
5 
--
--
- -
1 
- -
- -
9 
- -
- -
- -
- -
2 
2 
6 
- -
27 
. . . 
1 9 6 5  
- -
- -
5 
- -
- -
2 
5 
3 
6 
- -
- -
9 
- -
- -
1 
1 
-
-
8 
- -
1 3  
5 
6 
- -
64 
. . 
1 966 
. 
- -
- -
5 
- -
- -
3 
5 
8 
8 
- -
- -
4 
- -
- -
4 
8 
-
-
7 
- -
6 
4 
5 
- -
67 
. . 
Source: United States Policies and Programs in Brazil. 
1 967 
- -
-
-
7 
5 
- -
3 
2 
6 
6 
- -
-
-
5 
- -
-
-
6 
6 
- -
4 
- -
8 
8 
9 
- -
75 
. 
. 
. 
1 968 
6 
- -
3 
5 
- -
3 
1 
3 
4 
- -
- -
1 
- -
5 
2 
3 
6 
3 
- -
3 
3 
1 
7 
59 
. 
. 
1969  
4 
4 
7 
5 
5 
5 
1 0  
6 
3 
5 
1 
6 
6 
8 
8 
1 0  
6 
8 
6 
8 
9 
1 0  
6 
146 
. 
. . 
1 970 
3 
1 
-
-
4 
1 7  
3 
- -
2 
1 
1 
2 
- -
2 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
- -
- -
45 
. 
. . 
1 9 7 1  
2 
2 
2 
4 
1 3  
3 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
46 
. 
1 972 
- -
. 641  
....!) 
0 
Table XIV 
Brazil Public Safety Funding, 1962 Through June 30,  1970  
(Dollar amounts in thousand s) 
Total Technicians Participants Commodities Other Costs 
Through fiscal year- -
1 962�( $ 1 , 287 504 76 . .  660 47 
1963 648 334 4 1  1 63 1 1 0  
1 964 1 ,  1 59 4 1 0  59 6 1 8  72 
1965  1 , 076 469 70 50 1  36 '° """" 
1 966 972 443 1 1 5 376 38 
1967  639 374 124  129  12  
1 968 567 367 94 103 3 
1 969 482 248 132  1 0 1  1 
1970 727 308 198 2 1 9  2 
T otal expenditures 7 , 557 3 , 457 909 2 , 870 321  
*Yearly figure s  not available. 
Source: United States Policies and Programs in Brazil. 
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The international Commi s sion of Juri sts,  whose headquarters 
are in Geneva and is a non-gove rnmental organization having consultative 
status with the UNESCO have published various r eports on the political 
repr e ssion in Brazil by the police. One of the s e  reports states that there 
is a civil war in Brazil and the principal organs of Brazilian government 
are accused of political repre s s ion. The report contains a detailed list 
of various kind s of oppositional forces to the m ilitar.y regime and also 
carries a detailed list of various te chniques of torture inflicted by the 
B · 1 ·  l . 1 2 1  raz1 ian po ic e .  
A report published in the Wa shington Post makes the usual denials 
of the government of Brazil (that the reports of police torture and brutal-
ities are over exaggeration and fabrication of the facts) more dubious. 
A ccording to this report the gov ernment of Brazil (herein will be referred 
to as GOB) has refused to let the Inter-American Commis sion on Human 
R ight s ,  an organ of AOS, enter into the country to investigate the charges 
that political prisoners are being tortured there.  1 22 Another report pub-
lished by the International Commission of Democ ratic Jurists adds more 
weight to the authenticity of the reports of torture and terror in Brazil. 
This report which was published in November ,  1 9 6 9 ,  entitled Brazil ' 69: 
1 2 1 1 1R eport on Police R epres sion and Tortures Inflicted Upon 
Political Opponents and Prisoners in Brazil, " CIDOC, Geneva 7 0 - 0 7 - 2 2 ,  
Doc. 70/230.  A lso refer to "Ill-treatm ent of Political Prisoners in Bra­
zil, " CIDOC, Geneva 7 0 - 0 7 - 24, Doc.  70/232.  " Prison Tr eatment in 
Brazil, " CIDOC, Geneva 7 0 - 0 7 - 24, Doc . 70/ 2 3 1 .  
122Dan Griiffin, A "  Tortures  ·in Brazil ·i. eak Out.iDe:spite R ebu££ 'Qf: 
OAS Pr:o'be,, 1 1  W·ashinSt'on Post, · March 4 ,  1 9 7. l .  
93 
T orture and R epression, charged the military government of Brazil with 
torturing political prisone r s .  The publication, however,  was largely d e -
voted to an analysis o f  how the new, loosely defined National Security law 
(decr eed in September, 1969) transfor ms almost any act of opposition to 
the pre sent governm ent into a crime against the "national security" of 
Brazil. It also reproduced several important documents and letters con-
taining the names of about one hund red student s ,  profes sionals, and clergy-
men; and also gives a brief desc ription of the tortur e s  inflicted upon each. 1 23  
In the same article R alph della Cava cited a widely publicized dos sier on 
torture which was submitted to Pope Paul V I  at the end of 1 969 and was 
endorsed for its re liability by s ixty pr ominent European intellectuals and 
religious leader s .  The dos sier was entitled " Livre Noir: Terreur et 
Torture au Brasil, " and contained eleven separate documents; two worth 
mentioning concerned the murder of Father Antonio Henrique Pereira 
Neto in May, 1969 . Father Neto was a northea stern priest much admired 
among university students who was a s sasinated by r eportedly army-con-
doned right wing terrorists .  A nother document was a public protest is -
sued in July, 1969, by thirty -eight priests in Belo Horizonte against "the 
physical and moral outrages" continuously c ommitted against imprisoned 
priests and laymen since December, 1 968. 
European and Amer ican clergy also joined with the Braz ilian 
clergy in their vehement condemnation of reported Brazilian tortur e .  
1 2 3  R a lph della Cava, " T orture in Brazil, " Commonweal, XCII 
(A pril 24,  1 970) , p .  1 3 5 . 
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The Department of International A ffairs of the United State s  Catholic Con-
ference denounced the " r eported campaign of widespread imprisonment, 
detention, thr eats, haras sment, and even torture" of Brazilians 124 and 
Brazilian clergy are the strongest critics of the repres sive activists of 
their gove rnment . 
A s  a final citation of the reports of political oppres sion in Bra-
zil,  the New York T imes states that the Education Minister of B razil, 
Jarbas Pas sarinho had acknowledged the use of torture in Brazilian jails 
and said, "to deny that torture had been used in Brazilian jails would be 
untrue , "  but added that it wasn't true to say there was a systematic policy 
of torture .  1 2 5  This report is more s ignificant because this was the first 
admiss ion of the use of torture by a member of the Braz ilian government. 
It is quite evident at this point that tortur e has been a weapon 
of the military rulers in Brazil; so let us addr e s s  ourselves to an analy-
sis of the utility of political repres sion in Brazil. 
A Conceptual Analysis of Political 
R epres sion in Brazil 
Our analysis of political repr ession in Brazil will be limited to 
the developments subsequent to the overthrow of the Goulart regime, and 
this will be pursued within the following conceptual frameowrk chalked 
out by this writer: 
124The National Catholic R eporter, June 5 ,  1 9 7 0 .  
1 2 5New York T im e s ,  December 4, 1 9 7 0 .  
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I. Formation of a rightist military r e gime after a succes sful 
military coup. 
II. Struggle between the moderate rightists ( " s oft:;- liners")  and 
ultra rightists ("hard-liners") and a "coup within a coup" 
which re sulted in the victory of the "hard- liner s 1 1 • 
III. Effective measure s by the victorious hard-liners to strengthen 
their grip on the government and to eliminate mas s ive oppo­
s ition and protesting elements to their regimes such a s :  
a) government by decree;  passage o f  various executive de­
crees to  decl are political opposition an act of  treason, 
protest against the military regime as an act of subver­
sion punishable by severe p enaltie s .  
b) attempts to bring about institutional changes like clos ing 
down of legis lature or such radical changes in the judi­
ciary that its existence becomes merely symbolic; the 
complete transformation of the educational proc e s s  and 
institutions into a school of the ideology of the ruling 
clique, and this is usually accomplished by the frequent 
c losing down of educational instutitions ,  mas s ive arr e st 
and constant hara s sm ent of the stud ent s ,  termination of 
the servic es and arrests of the anti-regime profe s so r s ,  
control o f  syllabi o f  studie s ,  banning o f  political discus­
sion, or a s s embly within the campus e s ;  complete control 
and monopoly of mass communication through censor ship 
9 6  
o f  news and banning of the critical newspap e r s .  
c) a n  exhibition of force which will transform the society 
into a garrison state; the rationale behind this is to ere-
ate a psychological feeling of  terror , helplessness ,  and 
depres sion among the masses so that they refrain from 
opposition, resistanc e ,  or demonstration against the 
regime . 
IV. Thus the deve lopment of a systematic elimination of politi-
cal oppos ition by the oppres sive regime whose chief targets 
are: 
a) anti-regime elements of the upper and middle clas s e s ,  
b )  intellectuals,  
c) student s .  
Before w e  proceed further, let us define terror . Thomas Perry 
Thornton d efined terror a s  a " s ymbolic act designed to influence political 
behavior by extra normal means, entailing the use or threat of violenc e , 111 2 6  
and c la s s ifies terror a s ,  1 1  enforcem ent terror and agitational terror,  1 1 
the first being "terror (or counter terror) launched by those in power,  1 1  
and the latter,  "terrorist acts by those aspiring t o  powe r . "  1 2  7 The d if-
ference between the two types  of terror according to Thornton is  that 
1 2 6Thornas Perry Thornton, " T error a s  a Weapon of Political 
Agitation, 11 in Internal War: Problems and Approache s ,  ed.  by Harry 
Eckstein (New York: Free P r e s s ,  1 9 64) , pp. 7 1 - 9 5 .  
1 2  7 Ibid . , p. 72 . 
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the former i s  terror perpetrated by incumbents in power a s  a n  extreme 
means of enforcing their author ity (thus name enforcement terror) ; and 
the latter is applied by insurgents out of power with a view to provoking 
certain reactions from the incumbents or an otherwise apathetic popula ­
tion. 1 2 8  
During our ana lysis of political repression in Brazil, we will 
only deal with "enforcement terror", as defined by Thornton. 
The vast majority of the Brazilians applauded the surprisingly 
quick collapse of what i s  more popularly known a s  the leftist regime of 
president Joao Goulart in 1 9 64, and the people expected the military to 
follow the historical tradition by working for the restoration of civ:ilian 
rule. However, the failure of military to do so led to the general disgrunt­
lement and frustration against the military. The military takeover, among 
other factor s ,  was the result of the long standing conflict between the popu­
list politicians , who were busy mobilizing new mass voter s on the one side, 
and the old oligarchy and military on the other. " The nature of the con-
flict of military and oligarchy with the populist politicians was quite dif-
ferent in natur e .  
The oligar chy was afraid that populists,  due to their liberal ideas 
and modern approache s ,  might radicalize the methods of government by 
dis carding the traditional technique s of compromise and conciliation; and 
the military was convinced that no civilian sub-gr oup is capable of solving 
1 2 8Ibid . 
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the political, social, and economic problems of Brazilian society; and 
this conviction made them determined against the delivering of ·govern-
ment to civilians this time. 
Besides this ,  the Brazilian military had become a prey to the 
internal squabbling and c onfliCts from within. Jordan M .  Young had iden-
tified three basic groups within the Brazilian army striving to control 
the government. The first is composed of hard- line men who feel that 
the civilian political groups are "absolutely and incontrovertibJy corrupt. 1 1 129 
This group is mainly comprised of young c olonels, " strategically situa-
ted in the army system of command, who have been ideologically influ-
enced and led by Carlos Lacerda before he shifted to oppose the military 
regime . . •  1 1 1 30  This group has disregarded the more liberal policies 
of the soft-liners .  
Soft-liners ,  according to  Young, are ,  "at the opposite end of the 
pole . 1 1 They are of the opinion that the army should play a more historic 
role of the jealous guardians of the constitut ion and status quo, and when-
ever the status quo is jeopardized by the liberal or radical civilian popu-
list groups, the army should react for constitutionalism and traditional 
order and retire to the barracks . 
129  Jordan M. Young, "Brazil, 1 1  Political Forces in Latin Amer-
ica, op .  cit . , pp . 557-595 .  
130He lio Jaguaribe, "Political Strategies of National Develop­
ment in Brazil, " in Latin American R adicalism, ed. by Irving Louis Horo­
witz, Josue de Castro and John Gerassi  (New York: Vintage Books, a 
division of Random House, 1969) .  pp. 390-439. 
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The third group, as  differentiated by Young, is "oscillating be-
tween these  two groups, "  which has "tried to steer a middle course  be-
tween the opposing tendencies of the military. " Many of these men are 
quite conscious of the " shortcomings of military solutions for complex 
economic and social problems , " and are of the view that these matters 
could be dealt with more effectively by the civilian experts and bureau� 
crats; hence they should be left along to tackle them. 1 3 1  
The moderates , a s  expected, were inclined to play the "traditional 
role as  the guardians of the political equilibrium, 1 1 1 3 1  after the 1 969 coup, 
the hard- liners gained an upper hand having a majority over the moderate s .  
For a better understanding of events leading to the reign of ter-
ror, we will begin our analysis from 1966 when Costa e Silva was e lected 
president by the Congr ess ,  and Brazilians listened patiently when he prom-
ised to "humanize" the government and bureaucracy, and declared a war 
on inflation. Though the economic conditions were improved by 1968 ,  
the political performance of the government deteriorated. 
The first major event was the Institutional A ct which was passed 
arbitrarily, ignoring the congressional version of the emergency act, by 
the thi:ee military ministers under the acting president Mazilli. It began 
by stating that the constitution of 1946 and the state constitutions were to 
1 3 1  Jordan M.  Young, ££.· cit . , p .  578 . 
132 Thomas E. Skidmore, "The Military in Poser , "  Political 
Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations, ed. by R ichard R .  Fagen 
and Wayne A .  Cornelius, Jr . (Englewood €liffs, New Jer sey: Prentice 
Hall; 1970} ,  pp. 1 87 - 1 92 .  
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re-unite in force, subject to modifications included in the articles of  the 
Institutional Act. The new powers granted to the executive included the 
following: 
1 .  The power to submit constitutiona 1 amendments to the con-
gress which would have only thirty days in which to consider 
the proposals, and need only approve them by a majority vote 
rather than the two-thirds vote required in the 1946 constitu-
tion; the president was also given exclusive power to propose 
expenditure bills to congres s  and Congress  was denied the 
right to increase expenditures on any bills proposed by the 
president. The president was also given the power to declare 
a state of siege or to prolong such a state of siege for a maxi-
mum of thirty days without congressional approval. 
2. The executive was given sweeping powers to suppress  the po-
litical rights of political undesirables for ten years .  This 
included the right to cancel the mandates of members of state, 
municipal, or federal legislature s .  There was also an article 
suspending for six months the constitutional guarantees of 
job security in the civil service .  1 33 
The Institutional Act cancelled specifically the Ineligibility Clause 
in the constitution, thus making e ligible for election military officers on 
active duty. 1 34 The s econd Institutional Act was is sued in October ,  1965,  
l 33Sk"d i more, op. cit. , p. 1 89 .  
1 34Ibid. 
' · 
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"restoring many of the special ( executive) powers that had expired under 
the fir st Institutional A ct . "  1 3  5 Some other characteristics of the Second 
Institutional A ct were: the political parties were to be dissolved; the 
presidential election of 1966 as well as the gubernatoral elections would 
be indirect (by the congress for the president and by the legislatures for 
governors) and the president regained the r ight, on his own discretion, 
to remove the political rights of those Brazilians considered to be a threat 
to the security of the government. There were many other provisions to 
the new Instituti.anal A ct, including an increase in the member ship of the 
Supreme Court from eleven to sixteen; the additional judges were to be 
appointed by the president. This packing of court was a re sponse to the 
court' s repeated rulings in favor of the liberation of political prisoners .  1 3 6  
The military regime was making steady progress  towards com­
plete political control. The major stroke came in December, 1968 ,  when 
the military dictatorship transformed itself into a reign of terror . The 
fusion of ultra-rightists and moderate rightists fell apart and led to a coup 
within a coup. The government of Costa e Silve yielded to the mounting 
pressure from the hard-liners to crack down on its. political opponents .  
The crisis resulted when Congress  refused to permit one of its 
members to be arrested, tried in the Supreme Court, and stripped of his 
political rights for ten years .  The indicted member was (the well- known 
1 3 5Ibid . , p .  192 .  
1 36Ibid . 
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journalist and then Congressman) Marcio Moreira A lves ,  who during a 
speech from the chamber floor, asked his countrymen to boycott indepen­
dence day military parades to express their disapproval of the military 
regime. A lves was the chief parliamentary critic of the military clique 
behind president Costa e Silva. In 1 9 6 7  he write a book entitled Tortures 
and the Tortured which dealt w ith the brutalities that the military rulers 
were using to deal with their political opponents .  The military junta had 
its eye on A lves for a considerable period of time and they were waiting 
for an appropriate excuse to arrest him. A lves provided them that long­
waited excuse when he as sailed the military rulers as the "nest of tor-
turer s . "  
The event was titilized by the military to justify their action, 
which they were about to take anyway. The generals knew of the hostili­
ties around them from much of the R oman Catholic clergy, the pres s ,  
the students ,  and some businessmen. When the C ongr ess tried to defy 
them, they retaliated not only with the Congress ,  but also with other sources 
of opposition and elements of hostility by arre sting a number of politicians 
and journalists, and by instituting excessive press censorship, and most 
important of all by enforcing the Fifth Institutional A ct .  This act provided 
full dictatorial powers to the president in "defense of the necessary inter­
est of the nation. " l37 It also gave the executive the right to close Con­
gress rule by decree, to cancel the political rights of any person, declare 
1 3  7 Ibid . 
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a state of siege, dismiss public officials , waive writs of habeas corpus, 
and permit the seizure of assets of those who illegally enriched them­
selves .  The executive, of course ,  was final authority to determine the 
legality of anyone ' s  wealth. The content of the Fifth Institutional A ct is 
provided in A,ppendix III. The greatest targets of the military regime' s 
repression are students and the educational institutions . The students are 
a threat to the absolutist regime because as a group they are one of the 
chief proponents of civil liberties and democracy. Their demands and 
efforts to promote the se ends have been very frequently met with violence 
from the government such a s  by forcibly obstructing and then outlawing 
the National Union of Students .  The penalty for students' strikes or other 
prohibited activities is  the los s  of all credits to date, plus suspension 
from school for thr ee years .  A professor looses his right to teach or 
hold any public job for five year s .  Especially during the first half of 
1 9 6 8 ,  thousands of students were sent to jail when they marched in sev­
eral cities and demanded an end to the dictatorship. The increased popu­
lar support for student demands was met with increased police repres­
sion. Services of several hundred profes sors were also terminated under 
this provision. This action and constant surveillance of profe ssor s  and 
student activitie s has a very strong negative impact on the student activi­
ties and on the university education itself. 
Another section of the government was a decree-law of the "Civic­
Education program . "  This law made civic education a required subject 
for all students in all levels from kindergarten to post-graduate studie s .  
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The official texts ,  printed and distributed by the Ministry of Education, 
are a mixture of praise for the regime ,  .s lander of the previous liberal-
democratic system, and appeals to primitive symbols of patriotism; such 
as the national anthem and flag. Every mention of the military stresses  
its right to guide the country, its selfles sness,  and its heroism. This 
measure of political control of education, along with the constant purges 
of students and teachers and the banning of " subversive" books is intended 
to produce docile generations for the future . 1 38  
The Brazilian clergy were equally repr.e ssed by the military 
regime.  The Brazilian clergy traditionally was considerably cooperative 
with any government, military, or civilian which guaranteed political 
stability and was anti-communist:. However, for the last several year s 
a remarkable radicalization appeared within the rank and file of Brazilian 
clergy, which often took shape as an identification with the groups demand-
ing radical justice and civil liberties .  
A lves has identified four ways in which the Brazilian clergy has 
organized itself against the military dictatorship . The first one is the 
non-violent group which follows Archbishop Helder Camara, who preaches 
"violence of the peaceful. " His movement which is formed for "irresist-
able moral pre s sure, " is being resisted quite successfully by the govern-
ment. Not only Camara' s words are barred, but protest meetings and 
marches are most violently repres sed. A second group is comprised 
l38Marcio Moriera A lves ,  "Brazil: What T error is Like , " The 
Nation, CCXII (March 1 5 ,  1 9 7 1 ,  pp .  337-41 . 
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of those who believe that teaching people to recognize the society and 
the world in which they live is the best way to transform both. Since 
teaching peasants and slum dwellers  is regarded as an activity almost 
as subversive as attacking a barracks, many of the exponents of the writ-
ten word end up in jail. The third group consists of young clergy and 
laymen who believe that the only way to oust the military is  by force ,  
but they refuse to choose one of the resistance organizations preferring 
to help several. This help m eans giving sanctuary to revolutionarie s ,  
smuggling them out of the country, and providing transport, food , and 
meeting places for illegal groups such as National Student Union. Finally, 
the fourth group makes a clear cut option for one of the resistance organi-
zations , following the example of Camillo Torres ,  the Colombian guer-
rilla priest killed in 1966 . 1 39  
' 
Military rulers are afraid of the clerical involvement, sympathy, 
and most of all, identification with the cause of the civil populist leaders ,  
leftist students ,  and intellectuals; and their increased call for accelerated 
efforts to eliminate the social injustices  and military authoritarian rule. 
Another reason for the military' s fear of the activist churchmen is that 
the church is well e stablished and well organized on all levels of the so.:. 
ciety and its appeal is far reaching. The result of its effectivene s s  came 
out in the form of widespread condemnation by various church organiza-
tions in Europe and North America against the oppres sion of the military 
139Marcio Moriera A lves ,  "Brazil: A Country Where Christians 
Are Outlaws , "  Catholic World, CCXII {November, 1970 ) ,  pp. 65-68 .  
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junta and various message s sent to  the Pope by Brazilian and foreign 
clergies and church organizations asking him to help put an end to the 
atrocities committed by the regime . In dealing with activist clergies 
the military regime proved to be ruthless ;  the reports of inhuman torture 
of Brazilian priests and deportation of foreign activist clergies are the 
living examples of this. 
For the masses , Brazilian politic s became an arena for a con-
stant struggle between the ultra-rights and the radical lefts .  The ultra­
rights comprised of various ultra- conservative elements organized into 
a number of secret para-military and quasi-religious group s to eliminate 
what its members view as dangerous threats from the left. The radical 
left, on its part, mainly consists of students ,  populist leader s ,  intellec­
tuals, and a considerable number of reformist clergy. 
Most notorious of the rightist group is the Communist Hunting 
Command, whose slogan is reported to be, "For every dead democrat 
we will kill five communist s .  1 1 140  The same news item reports that the 
ultra-rightists have in fact gained a sympathetic ear in the highest mili­
tary and governm ent circles .  Pre sident Costa e Silva' s  wife during the 
end of 1 9 68 signed a petition asking Pope Paul IV to take measures in 
cleaning Brazilian church of leftists. The police too seem to be inter­
ested in arre sting only leftists while appearing to ignore r ightist terror­
ists. 
140 Newsweek, December 9, 1 9 6 8 ,  p. 5 1 .  
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The Death Squad, according to Brown, chief United States 
safety advis.or in Brazil, is alleged to be "a group of irresponsible po-
lice that have taken the law into their own hands ,  · • . .  and felt that it 
was their duty to take direct action and not bother recourse to the courts .  1 1 1 4 1  
Another report quotes Nelson Fonseca, chief criminal judge of Sao Paulo 
telling newsmen, " The members of the death squad are policemen . . .  
and everyone knows it. 1 1 142 Another report discus sing the activitie s of 
the death squad says ,  1 1 
• • •  it has been unofficially estimated that the 
vigilante groups (death squads) have killed 500 to 1 ,  000 people . . .  in 
the six years . . .  None of the inve stigations carried out by the police 
have been completed or made public . . .  " 1 43 
Operacao Bandeirantes (OB) is another rightist terrorist group 
which was established in Sao Paulo in mid- 1 969 as  a pilot project to co-
ordinate military and police efforts to combat terrorist activities accord -
ing to one report which, further elaborating on OB, says, " The various 
security agencies represented in OB include representatives of the local 
army, A i-n Force, and Navy intelligence sections of the local state and 
federal police organizations. The coordinator is the army intelligence 
repre sentative in Sao Paulo. 1 1 l44 
1 4 1B . 45 rown, ££.· cit . , p .  . 
1 42The Miami Herald, July 24, 1970 . 
143The New York Times ,  July 2 1 ,  1970 . 
144B · 43 rown, ££.· cit. , p .  . 
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Membership in these  groups i s  drawn mainly from local police 
officials, and the rightist civilian element which channels its indignation 
over the populist middle c lass  politicians , whom they only consider as 
radicals. These ultra-rightist sprwrg up during mid - 1968 when popular 
resentment against the more moderate regime of Costa e Silva found great-
est expression. 
From the abov·e study it is quite clear that Brazilian Military 
junta came to power in 1964 with the intention of staying indefinitely. 
The Institutional .A cts passed by the dictator ship, the institutional changes ,  
monopoly of means of c ommunication and especially the measures  taken 
to control the whole system of education are not the measures taken by 
a regime whose existence is temporary. Brazil seems to be experiencing 
a long military rule, which is deepening and strnegthening its roots , and 
which apparently has the complete support of the United State s .  
The R ole of the United States 
Pe.lice ..As sistance Program 
The increased strength, seemingly permanent stability, and 
increased torture in Brazil raises an important point of investigation: 
What is the role of United States police assistance in providing stability 
to the regime and to the training of the Brazilian police which has been 
the regime' s main tool for torture and political repres sion ? Further -
more, if a s  claimed by David Bell and other s ,  the emphasis of the United 
States Puhtic Safety Programs is on the minimum use of force, why are 
the Brazilian police employing torture ?  
109 
The response of the United States officials to this issue is con-
fusingly strange. A s  noted earlier, David Bell has emphasized that the 
objectives of the United States public safety program were to train the 
foreign police in techniques of effectiv e control, among other things ,  by 
minimum use of force .  Theodore Brown, chief public safety advisor in 
Brazil, also played the same tune while testifying before a Subcommittee 
on W e stern Hemisphere Affair s .  145 Brown also said that Brazilian po-
lice advocate humane methods "through training at their academy, through 
their inservi:c:e training, and through mobile training courses .  1 1 146 
Brown told the subcommittee that he thinks the United States 
public safety programs have been succes sful in achieving their objectives 
of the use of minimum force and humane methods .  To  the widespread 
reports of violence and inhuman treatments of political prisoners ,  Brown 
said, "within any organization there is always the possibility that there 
might be isolated cases of unnecessary use of force,  Mr. Chairman. 
That is pos sible in any country. 1 1 1 4  7 Br own' s statement, which was vig-
orously que stioned by Senator Church, called the reports of police tor -
ture in Brazil unproved allegations. Never once was he willing to accept 
that violence has been used excessively. 1 48 
145 Brown, �· cit. , p .  1 8 .  
146rbid. 
147Ibid. 
148For further details see United States Policies and Programs 
in Brazil, op. cit. , pp. 1 8 -20 .  
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W illiam M .  R ountree, United States A m  bas sad or to Brazil, stated 
during his testimony, "the general public reaction in Brazil (to the United 
States public safety system) has not been adver se . " 149 At a later point 
he further said, " There has not to my knowledge been any strong adverse 
reaction to this Public Safety program, although there has been some, 
including criticism of it, in propaganda appearing abroad. 1 1 1 5 0  R ountree 
called the numerous reports of excessive torture by Brazilian police, 
1 1 propaganda. " 
The r esponses of the United States  officials is one of either con­
niving with or overlooking the existing political realities in Brazil. From 
their statements it is quite evident that by calling the reports of torture 
in Brazil,. "isolated cases of use of force, ' a llegations ' ,  and propaganda, "  
they are trying to neutralize or liquidate th;e American public opinion 
against the political oppression. 
Dan Mitrione: A Study in Violence 
The violent death of Dan Mitrione, a United States  advisor to 
Uruguyan police, at the hand s of Uruguyan Tupamaro guerrillas, not only 
raises  serious questions about the role of the United States  public safety 
programs in the states south of R io Grande, but it also increases doubts 
about the credibility of United St�tes official claims that public safety 
programs are well- received in Brazil or in any other country of Latin 
149Ibid . ,  p .  280.  
l SOibid . ,  p .  28 1 . 
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America and they are succes sful in their objectives of minimum use of 
force or inhuman method s .  
Dan Mitrione was the police chief of R ichmond, Indiana . Later 
he became a public safety advisor to Brazilian police and spent most of 
his time in R io de Janeiro and Belo Hori�onte, the areas where police 
brutalitie s  add torture were the highest. In 1 969 ,  he was sent to Uruguay, 
because he supposedly was an expert on the operations of Tupamaro guer-
rilla s .  Mitrione became the chief United States public safety advisor to 
Uruguayan police .  While in Uruguay, he  was kidnapped by the Tupamaros,  
and held as ransom for the release of about 1 50 political prisoners held 
by the Uruguayan 'government. The refusal of the government of Uruguay 
to fulfill the Tupamaros' demands resulted in the execution of Mitrione 
at the hands of the Tupamaros . 
Commenting on Mitrione' s involvement in police torture,  the 
left-wing NACLA wrote, "one of the best examples of OPS connection with 
torture and other forms of brutal repression in Latin America is  Dan 
Mitrione . 1 1 1 5 1  
An interview published in Journal do Brazil was reported in New 
York Times ,  which charged Mitrione' s direct connections with the tor-
ture activities .  The former chief of Uruguayan Secret Police, A lejandro 
Otero, who worked with Mitrione, accused him of having employed violent 
l 5 l"OPS and Torture: Mitrione Style, 1 1 NACLA Newsletter, V 
(July-August, 1 97 1 ) ,  p .  8 .  
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methods of oppression and torture against the captured Tupamaros. 1 52  
He also added that his disagreement with Mitrione' s violent strategy re-
sulted in his replacement.  He felt that before Mitrione made violent 
methods a daily routine, Tupamaros used violence only a s  a last resort; 
but the later increased violence by Tupamaros, according to him, was 
a direct response to the method s practiced by Mitrione. 1 5 3  
R eferring to A lejandro Otero' s statement, Father Louis Colon-
nese,  Director of the Division of Latin America of the United States 
Catholic Conference, called for an investigation into the possibility that 
the United States is "exporting torture" to Latin America, and he hoped 
that the quest into the murder "will be done from the p erspective of caus e 
and effect rather than isolated acts of violence • • .  " 154  
Father Colonnese further added that Mitrione' s presence in Belo 
Harizonte and R io de Janeiro, Brazil, the areas with extremely high in-
stances of alleged torture .of political prisoners by Brazilian secret po-
lice and military, forces one �'to speculate concerning the United States 
government possible complicity in such tortur e s . "  1 55  Those excerpts of 
Father Colonnese' s interview in which he explored the evidence of the 
above allegations is provided in Appendix IV . 
1 52New York Times ,  August 1 5 ,  1970 .  
1 531 1 Uruguay: Dead lock, " Latin America,  IV (August 2 1 ,  1 970) , 
p .  2 72 .  
1 54National Catholic R eporter, September 4, 1970 ,  p .  3 .  
1 551 1The Case of Dan Mitrione, 1 1 Worldreview, XIII (October, 
1970) , p. 1 8 .  
1 1 3  
Mitrione' s alleged use of torture and United States  complicity in 
police brutalities invoked a storm of criticism and the United States  Catho-
lie Conference ,  of which Father Colonnese  was director, was the main 
source of criticism. When this barrage of criticism led to Senate inves-
tigation, United States Catholic Conference supplied data on torture in 
Brazil to Senators Church and Proxmire ,  who were investigating the United 
States  police a ssistance to Bra·zil and elsewhere in Latin America. Com-
menting on the performance .of the public safety program in Latin A mer-
ica, Jame s T .  Cotter, information director of Latin America Bureau of 
United States Catholic Conf�rence, in a letter to Worldview, wrote, "we 
pointed out the Mitrione case because it illustrates that in the minds of 
many Latin Americans, United States  police advisors are considered 
part of the local police �pparatus which uses torture to suppre s s  not only 
terrorism, but also legitimate dis s ent. These United States  police ad-
visors are popularly thought by many Latin Americans to be involved in 
the financial support, implementations and even teaching of torture meth-
ods . 1 1 1 56 
In the same letter ,  Cotter published an interview with R omeo 
Perez, an editor of a Christian Democratic newspaper in Montevideo, 
Uruguay, where Mitrione was executed. This interview reveals some 
information vital for our purposes,  and is quoted verbatim: 
The general reaction in Uruguay to the killing of United 
States  police advisor Dan Mitrione was one of indifference . 
. 1 5 6  James T .  Cotter ,  "The Mitrione Cas e ,  1 1 a letter to World-
view, XIV (September, 1 9 7 1 ) ,  pp. 1 9 -20 .  
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Even the most unaware of our citizens suspect that Mi­
trione was advising our police in the methods of torture 
which have become their new pattern of interrogation in. 
recent year s .  Because of this ,  Mitrione was a little-liked 
figure ,  and his killing by Tupamaros did not produce that 
same negative public opinion which would have resulted if . 
s omeone else had been killed. . • Because of the function 
Mitrione was fulfilling in our country, he was looked upon 
as an expres sion of United States  support of our repres sive 
po lie e organization and an example of United States  inter -
vention in Uruguayan internal affair s .  He is believed to be 
responsible for introducing methods of torture to Uruguayan 
police. 1 57 
From the above discussion we can conclude that: 
1 )  The A ID Public Safety program has apparently failed in its 
officially stated purpose of humanizing police method s in coun-
tries such as Brazil, Uruguay, th e Dominican Republic, Gua-
temala, and Haiti, which are the worst examples of use of 
inhumane method s .  
2 )  The image of the United States,  because of its ass istance to  
the Latin A merican police, has suffered considerable damage 
in Latin America. 
3) The United States Public Safety advisors seem to be involved 
in. and seemingly a party of police brutalitie s .  
4) Increased police brutalities have r esulted in the increased 
violence from the Clande stine organizations in certain Latin 
American countries. 
1 57rbid. , p. 20.  
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The New York T im e s  reported a unique example of the United 
State s  image among the B razilian student s .  Comments by a Brazilian 
politician were made regarding the 1 968 police occupation of the Univer-
sity of  Brasilia. He is reported as having said, " Those kid s are never 
going to forget that the police who used c lubs on some of them were wear-
ing equipment that still had USA stencilled on it. 1 1 1 5 8  It is highly unlikely 
that in a society like Brazil, where the masses are yearning for social 
justice and democracy, and are ruthle s sly suppr e ssed by foreign trained 
and foreign-armed police, that the foreign government will be well-regarded 
by the masses or that the public safety programs which str engthen the 
police will be well received. 
Journalist Gary MacEoin, commenting on Brazilians1 reaction 
about the United States support to the military regime, notes that they 
are convinced that the Brazilian regime is a puppet of the United State s  
and incapable of unsupported survival. A s  an example of this ,  the Bra-
zilians cite the incr ease in AID progr e s s  from $ 1 5  million in 1964 to $ 1 8 7  
million in 1 970 while AID programs elsewhere were being started. They 
also point out the increased efficiency in Brazil government at every level, 
from "tax gathering to torture, 1 1  as conclusive evidence of the omnipresent 
American knowhow. 1 59 
A nother observer notes that the over -indulgence of the United 
1 58New York Time s ,  April 6 ,  19 7 1 .  
l 59Gary MacEoin, " Brazil Specialty: Threat of Tortur e ,  1 1 The 
National Catholic R eporter, May 2 9 ,  1 9 7 0 .  
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State s  in too wide a sector of Brazilian affairs produced an anti-American 
backlash in Brazil. He also is of the opinion that the U nited States identi-
fication with the ruling military clique and the A m erican penchant for 
material exhibitionism alienated the Brazilian mas s e s . 1 6 0  
· The C ongr e s s ional hearings on the various aspects of the United 
State s  police a s s istance programs in Brazil; innumerable protests by 
various re ligious and humanitarian organizations in Europe, Latin Amer-
ica and in the United States against the inhuman treatment of  political 
prisone r s  and police brutalities in Brazil, seem to be the reason for r e -
ported termination o f  the United State s  police a s sistance t o  Brazil; although 
the official reason for this policy change , given by the chief of Public 
Safety advisor for Brazil, Theodore Brown, was that Brazilian police 
will be 1 1  sufficiently we ll-trained by the end of 19721 1 •  1 6 1  
1 60nom Bonafede ,  "Washington Backs the Pooh Bahs , "  The Na­
tion, CCVIII (May 26,  1 969) , pp.  663-666.  
1 6 1 u · d S P 1.  . d P . B · 1  ·t n1te tates o ic1es an rograms in raz1 , op. c1 • 
CHAPTER V 
THE UNITED STA T ES AND LATIN 
AMERICAN R EVOLUTION 
R evolution. and R eaction 
A fter a brief pres entation of the internal forces of change in 
Latin America we should analyze the United States '  role in the Latin 
American r evolution. 
This writer intends to examine this problem und er the light of 
his two contentions, which are: 
I .  The internal for ces  of change have viewed the United State s  
a s  one of the major obstacles to the changes they are dedi-
cated to bring about in their society. The United Stat e s ,  through 
her economic dominance ,  military support, and police a s s i s ­
tance to the existing regimes of various Latin A m erican coun-
trie s has further strengthened their opinion that the United 
States is one of the major supporters of status quo in Latin 
America.  A s  a res ult of this some elem ents of the forc e s  
for change , disappointed with the existing government s ,  and 
frustrated due to their inability to bring about the much needed 
1 1 7  
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changes in their society turned to v io lent me ans to overthrow 
the existing regim e s ,  and some of them went to the extent of 
even cooperating with the communist forc e s  to achieve com­
monly-shared goals . 
The governments in power,  a s  a retaliatory measure, 
armed with the United State s  police training and a s s i stance, 
have been ruthlessly suppressing the se forces in the name 
of anti-communism. These violent measur e s  for change, 
which in turn are being suppres sed violently, have resulted 
in an unending chain of violence and counter-violence; and 
violence, which originally was adopted a s  the last measure 
to bring about sweeping changes in their society by the s e  
for c e s ,  has become a customary and permanent tool of anti­
status quo forc e s .  
II. The second contention i s  that the Castroite doctrine, which 
le gitimizes the violent insurgency measure of overthrowing 
of the status quo has been viewed by the United State s  as a 
main threat to Latin American stability and has provided strong 
justifications for continued United States military a s sistance 
to Latin America, which has been used by the governments 
in power to control insurgency and internal violence of the 
forces for change .  
In this light, we can analyze the role of the United States foreign 
policy in terms of interaction of the United States and the Latin govern-
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ments in power on one side, and the forces for change on the other . 
Patterns of the United State s  Dominance 
The United State s  and Latin A merican regimes have been a s s o ­
ciated with each other i n  a symbiotic r elationship at the expense of Latin 
A m erican economic progr e s s ,  s e lf-sufficiency and modernization. There 
are several patterns of the United State s  dominance in Latin America.  
T o  start with, the patterns of United States economic dominance in the 
subcontinent will be analyzed. 
From the several patterns of United States economic dominance 
in Latin America, a great majority could be used to make very convincing 
case of the United Stat e s  economic dominance ,  but some of them are quite 
controver sial in nature in the s e ns e  that no c lear - cut argument of United 
States " exploitation" of Latin A me r ican economy can be mad e .  
One such i s  sue i s  the i s  sue of international trade. However,  it 
is very hard to make a strong case for United Stat es economic dominance 
w ithout going into various complexities of international trade such as 
terms of trade, change in exchange rates and international transfer pay­
ments, etc . ;  and even then clear- cut conclusions cannot be drawn con­
cerning United State s  economic dominance without raising some other 
technical que stions which affect the authenticity of those conclusions . 
The long term trend in the terms of trade between the developed 
and underdeveloped countr ies has been one of the most controver sia 1 i s ­
sue s .  (Terms of trade is defined a s  "the terms of exchange between the 
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goods bought and sold . )  The economists are sharply divided on this i s -
sue. The point of difference is the q.uestion that- -regarding the terms of 
trade who i s  the long-term benefactor between the producers of raw ma-
terials and the producers  of manufactured good s ?  There are two opposing 
views on this issue. 
The c la s sical economists believe that the terms of trade would 
shift in the long run in favor · of primary products and against manufa c -
tur e r s ,  because primary products a r e  subject t o  dim inishing returns 
whereas manufactur ers  are subject to increasing returns . W ith inc reased 
factor supp lies but unchanged technology, this meant that production fr on-
tiers were moving out more rapidly along the axis for manufactur ers  
than a long the axis for primary product s .  On the supply side the growth 
of inputs has an anti-trade bias in the less  developed countries and pro-
trade bias in the more developed countrie s .  The net effect of the pro-
duction change would be, therefor e ,  a reduction in the prit e s  of manu-
factur e s  and an increase in the prices of primary products .  The c lassi-
cal  view ignored the demand effect of growth. 1 6 2  
A contemporary group o f  prominent economists argued that the 
terms of trade have actually deteriorated for the poor countrie s rather 
than improved. 1 6 3  Dr.  R aul Prebisch, a Latin A mer ican economist and 
Secretary of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Deve lopment 
l 6 2M .  O. Clement, R ichard L. Pfister, and Kenneth J .  R othwell, 
Theoretical Issues in International Economics (Bo ston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1 9 67) , p .  1 59 .  
1 6 3Ibid . 
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(UNCTAD) observed that prices for the raw materials which the under­
developed countries sell to the developed one s ,  have fallen 12  per  cent 
since 1 9 5 7 ,  while the prices of manufactured goods, sold by the indus­
trial countrie s to the non-industrial, have risen during the same time. 
The result has been a 1 6  per c ent dec line in the balance of trade of the 
poor nations in ten yea r s .  This m eant that the payments received by 
them for their products have fallen 1 6  per cent in terms of what they must 
pay for their purcha s e s  abroad. In ten yea r s  this has caused a drop of 
more than $ 1: 3 billion in the earnings rec eived by the underdeveloped na­
tions for their export, 1 64 Thus according to this ar gument greater quan­
tities of agricultural and mineral raw materials were exchanged for le s s e r  
finished good s .  
Whatever may be the outcome of this ar gument, one thing which 
is quite clear is that a s  a whole the terms of trade worked quite favorably 
for the developed and unfavorably for Latin A m erican countries and made 
deep -rooted impacts on their economies and development. One signifi­
cant re sult is that: 
(a) the United States and the western European countried remain 
major profiteers by buying cheap raw materials and se lling 
high priced finished goods to Latin A merica. 
For example, the "value of world exports of manufactured 
articles increased at the rate of 8 .  1 per cent annually from 
1 64Annual R eport 1 9 68 ADELA ; investment Co.  S . A . ,  pp.  42-44. 
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1 9 5 5  to  1968  a s  compared with a rate: of 3 .  1 per  cent for 
c ommoditie s ,  or some two and a half times faster than the 
rate increase of commodity imports. T r ade in manufactured 
goods appear s ,  therefore, to be the way in which to obtain 
rapid inc r eases  in export goods and foreign exchange. l 6 5  
(b) the industrialized societies were able to provide more jobs 
for a greater sector of their populace,  and were able to . 
rais e their standard of living; 
( c )  the und erdeveloped Latin America became a promising mar-
ket for finished good s ,  and as a result of thi s ,  economically 
more dependent. 
From the point of view of the Latin societies this phenomena pos-
s e s s ed various negative impacts: 
(a) The proc e s s  of industrialization of the Latin societies be-
came very slow; 
(b) s ince they we r e  the produc ers  of raw materia ls , they earned 
le s s ,  while their r e sources continued to be controlled from 
abr oad (the price fluctuations of raw materials in the world 
market was controlled by the industrially advanced societie s) ;  
( c)  their economic progr e s s  became stagnant and their standard 
of living remained lowest. 
1 6 5W illiam O. Dougla s ,  Holocaust or Hemispheric Co-op: Cros s ­
Curr ents in Latin America (New York: R andom Hou s e ,  1 9 7 1 ) ,  p .  1 3 L  
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A ccording to the Pearson R eport, Latin American industry has 
not yet contributed s ignificantly to the expansion of export earning, and 
an overwhelming share of export is still made up of primary products, 
usually with unstable world prices: 
Latin A m erican Merchandise 
export during 1 9 65-66 
Tropical food stuffs 
( sugar, coffee, cocoa, bananas) 
Temperate zone food and fibre 
(cotton, meat, c e reals,  and wool) 
· Petroleum 
Other mineral products 
( copper, iron or e, lead, zinc, tin) 
Other primary products 
Non-primary products 
Percentage of export 
earnings in 1 9 6 5  
2 1  per cent 
2 1  per cent 
2 6  per c ent 
1 1  per cent 
1 0  per cent 
1 6  per cent 
Petroleum, coffee and cooper accounted for nearly half of Latin Amer-
ican export earnings in 1 9 6 5 .  Half of the countrie s depend on a single 
product for more than half of export rec eipts ( e . g. , oil in Venezuela, 
copper in Chile, coffee in Ecuador) ,  a lthough there has been some pro-
gre s s  in diversifying export s .  1 6 6  
Even this export i s  not looked upon by the industrialized soci-
eties with much appreciation or encouragement. The Pear s on R eport 
discus sing the " increased open or dis guised import re strictions" applied 
1 66Partne r s  in Development, R eport of the Commiss ion on Inte r ­
national Developm ent (New York: Praeger Publisher s ,  1969),  p .  242. 
1 24 
by the developed countries on the exports of the Latin A m erican coun-
tries, observed: 
Few economic policies are as harmful to Latin A meri­
can growth hopes as those which single out new and prom ­
ising Latin American exports for r e �trictions in the United 
States market. R ecent examples include limitations on 
United States import of Latin American meat, textiles,  
tomatoe s ,  strawberrie s ,  and s oluble coffee, European 
discrimination against Latin American exports,  high dom e s ­
tic taxes on ce rtain primary products, and 1 1  sanitary" con­
trols ai'S'Q frustrate the achievem ent of higher export growth 
rate s .  167  
The measures have further decreased the already low rate of 
inc r ea s e  in Latin American export s .  A ccording to one report: Latin 
America has little share in the expansion of world trade. Thus from 
1 9 5 5  to 1968,  while m er chandise exports from developed nations in-
creased on a compound annual basis by 8 .  1 per cent, exports from 
Latin American countries on the same basis rose by only 3 .  6 per cent. 
Consequently, Latin American share of world trade fell from 8 .  9 per 
c ent in 1 9 5 5  to 5.  7 per cent in 1968 (trade of socialist countrie s excluded) . 
While the price index of exports from deve loped areas to Latin Amer-
ica during the same period rose from 1 0 0  to 106 points, the price index 
of exports from Latin America to developed nations declined during that 
period from 1 0 0  to 9 6  point s .  The terms of trade (that i s ,  the export 
price index of Latin American countries to developed nations) dec lined 
consequentially from 1 0 0  to 9 1 .  1 6 8  
1 67Ibid . , p .  257.  
1 68w illiam 0 .  Douglas, ££.· " Cit. 
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The composition of exports of Latin American countries shows 
the preponderance of primary commodities- -food, agr icultural raw 
materials,  tobac co, beverage s ,  mineral oil and fuel. A lthough manu­
facture s  including refined ores have been the most dynamic ele ment of 
world export s ,  they accounted in 1967  for only 1 4 .  8 per c ent of the ex­
ports of Latin Ame rican countries.  l 69 
This phenomena of Latin American economic dependence on the 
United States and other western European countrie s  does not end at this 
point. Another pattern of the United Sta:tes economic dominance in Latin 
America are the large United States investment s ,  especially the large 
amounts of capital inve stment of the big United States corporations and 
the res ultant large sums of profits they gain, which is a net capital drain 
on Latin American economics.  The amounts of profits made by the pri­
vate enterprises are a closely guarded secret, and even the declared 
pr ofits are questionable for its authenticity. However, it is quite ob­
vious that profits are the main factor for the large investments made by 
the United States private busine s s  interests in the politically unstable 
Latin America. But the investment figur es could be safely used for 
documentation. Some examples of the 'Uhited State s  investments and 
percenta ges of private investments are cited be low. 
The amount of direct United States investment in Latin America 
in 1958  was $229 million; in 1 9 5 9 ,  $ 2 1 8  million; in 1 9 6 0 ,  $ 9 5  million; 
1 69Ibid . ,  pp. 1 3 1 - 1 32 .  
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in 1 9 6 1 ,  $ 1 4 1  million, in 1 9 62 ,  $ 1 59 million, and in 1 9 64, $ 1 56 million. 1 7 0  
T otal United States a s sets and investments in 1 9 6 5  amounted to 
$ 1 8 ,  207 billion; the majority of these inv e stments and assets,  which 
were owned by private investments, were $ 1 4 ,  387 billion, or 79 per cent 
1 7 1  
of the tota 1 United States a s  sets and investment s .  
T otal United States a s  sets and inve stments in 1 96 6  was $ 1 9 ,  387 
billi'.on, and private investm ents amounted to $ 1 5 ,  1 8 3  billion, or approxi­
mately 78 per cent. 1 7 2  
Total United States as sets and inv e stments in 1 967 were $ 2 0 ,  748 
billion and private inv estments were $ 1 6 ,  1 72 billion or approximately 
78 per cent. 1 7 3 
Another report cites further intere sting figures on the United 
State s  private investments in Latin America. According to this report 
the total United States as sets and investments amounted to $20 billion; 
about one half of this am ount is the result of direct private investment. 
About 1 2  per c ent or 1 2 .  billion dollars of the United State s  private in-
vestment is in "trade"; 32 per cent in "manufacturing" and 2 9  per cent 
in "Petroleum", which is:. about six billion dollar s in petroleum and man-
ufacturing combined; 6 per cent or over half a billion in public utilitie s ;  
1 70Peter Nehemkis,  op. cit. , p .  228.  
1 7 1 survey of Current Busine s s ,  XLVI (September, 1 966) ,  p .  40 . 
1 72survey of Current Busine s s ,  XLVII (Septembe r ,  1 9 67) , p .  40 . 
173survey of Current Busine s s ,  XLVIU ( October, 1 968) ,  p .  2 0 .  
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1 .  2 billion or 1 2  per cent in " mining and smelting" , and about a billion 
or 9 per c ent in " others" . 1 74 
Naturally these large amounts of private capital investments 
are bound to bring about quite impr essive outputs in favor of the United 
States big corporations at the expense of Latin A merican economy. Thus 
of the total Latin American exports o f  manufactured goods in 1 966,  the 
exports of United States affiliates represented about 4 1  per cent. Fur-
thermore, the annual export of the manufactured products by United 
States affiliates increa s ed by $ 5 8 5  million between 1 9 5 7  and 1 9 66 ,  while 
such exports by all other producers combined increased by only $ 3 1 9  
million or 5 1  per cent. l 75 
Senator Frank Church has also pres ented some more interesting 
figures as a further evidence of the deep United States penetration of 
Latin American ec onomy with an immense outlay of private investment. 
A c cording to the data pres ented by Senator Church, by the end 
of 1 9 6 8 ,  American business interests had nearly $ 1 3  billion invested in 
Latin A me r ican countries and in the Caribbean, nearly three fourths of 
which was concentrated in minerals , petroleum, and manufacturing in-
dustrie s .  A nother study by the Council for Latin A m erica, a United 
States busine s s  group, which was cited by Senator Church, r eports that 
1 74Emil L.  Nelson and Frederick Cutler, " International Invest ­
ment Position of the United States i n  1 9 66 , " Survey of Current Busine s s ,  
XLVI (October,  1966) ,  pp.  1 9 - 3 2 .  
1 7 5  Dougla s ,  �· cit . , p .  1 2 6 .  
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in 1966,  the total sale s by all United States affiliates in Latin Ame rica 
amounted to 1 3 .  7 per cent of the aggregate gross domestic product of 
all the countries of the region. 1 7 6  
One more study done by the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America e stimated the flow of private inve stment to Latin 
A m erica in the period 1 9 6 0 - 1 966 at $ 2 .  8 billion while the repatTiation 
of profits and income amounted of 8 .  3 billion. In other word s ,  over 
this period foreign investment caused a net los s  of $785 million a year 
in Latin America' s balance of payment s .  
Private capital investm ent in Latin America took an upper hand 
even in the economic a s s istance programs under A l liance for Progr e s s .  
T o  under stand this, the a llocation of various types of funds under A lli-
ance for Progr e s s  will be examined . The A l liance for Progr e s s  called 
for a program of foreign inve stment in Latin A m er ica of twenty billion 
d 11 Th f th f d t b th f 11 . 1 77 o ars a yea r .  e sources  o e s e  un s were o e e o owing: 
U . S .  export-import Band credits $4.  0 billion 
U . S. Private investments $ 3 .  0 billion 
Total Commercial and Private U . S . Funds $7.  0 billion 
Internationa 1 agencie s ,  plus European private capital $ 7 .  5 billion 
1 76Frank Church, "Toward a New Policy for Latin America, " Latin 
America and the United States in the 1 9 70 ' s ,  ed . by R ichard B .  Gray 
(Itoska, Illinois:  F .  E. Peacock Publishe r s ,  1 9 7 1 ) ,  pp.  3 3 9 - 3 5 2 .  
1 77Hernan Echavarria, "A lliance for Progr es s , "  Socio-Economic 
Change in Latin America, ed. by. A lberto Martinez Fredra (Wa shing­
ton: The Catholic Univer sity of America Press�  1:9 70),  pp. 3 - 7 .  
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U . S. credits for social fund $ 2 .  5 billion 
U . S. technica 1 aid $ . 75 billion 
Total U . S. Financial aid $ 5 .  0 billion 
U . S . Food Aid $ 1 .  5 billion 
Grand Total $ 2 0 .  0 billion 
From the above figures it is quite c lear that the greater part of 
this program, that i s ,  1 4 .  5 billion dolla r s ,  were to be private invest-
m ent and commercial cr edits, from the United State s  and from other 
countrie s .  In ten years the United States aid was to b e  only billion dol-
lar s ,  that is four hundred million dollars a year .  l 78 
Thus the patterns of United State s  economic dominance in Latin 
A merica could be differ entiated a s :  
(a) purchase of cheap raw materials from Latin A me r ican coun-
tried and se lling expensive finished goods to thes e  countries;  
(b) keeping their export of finished goods to a minimum by pas s -
ing import restrictions laws and by raising the tariff within 
the United States;  
( c) the investment of United States capital in Latin A m erica, 
e specially the capital by the United State s - owned corpora-
tions. 
Though higher levels of pr oductivity will be achieved because of their 
1 78H E h . 't ernan c avarr1a, op. c1 . 
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capital and technological advancement, the economy influenced by for e-
ign based corporations or multinational corporations becomes charac-
terized by chronic underemp loyment and unemployment. James Petras, 
a scholar of leftist leanings discus sing: this, points out that the decis iori 
of large foreign-owned companies re garding pr oduction are made with 
the aim of increasing the profits of the company as a whole, not to serve 
the interests of the country in which the br anch of the p lant is located. 
Be sid e s ,  the dep endent government gets only a small fraction of the 
total value added in the production and sale s of the raw materials ex-
tracted by the giant United State s  corporations integrated into the United 
States industrial economy. 1 79 Thus the foreign- owned corporations 
not only ignore the economic needs of the dependent country, but they 
also affect the indigenous ec onomic sectors which are concentrating on 
the productions of finished good s ,  by their vast resource s ,  capital and 
technological superiority. 
These factors have very strong negative impacts on the relations 
between the Latin American governments and the governed. The coop-
eration between the United State s  busines s interests and Latin A m erican 
governments results into strong res entments within the Latin American 
societie s .  The economic subservience of the Latin governments to the 
United States capital and its interests deprived them of the independence 
of action which sovereign governments enjoy within their own boundarie s .  
1 79James Petras, Politics and Social Structure in Latin Amer ica 
(New York: Monthly R eview Pres s ,  1 9 70) ,  pp. 23 1 - 32 .  
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This means that these governments could not carry out the independ ent 
economic policies like nationalization of the United States-owned business 
or an introduction of sweeping economic reforms which would dra stically 
affect the ever growing profits of the United States big corporations or 
multi-national corporations .  
When the ruling groups loose their independence of action, they 
become fearful of the various reform force s ,  even the genuine one s ,  of 
their societies .  The demands for change from the forces for change 
and the inability of the Latin governments to take effective actions create 
a fee ling of alienation and a general distrust within a society. The gov-
ernments on their part become more dependent on the United State s  for 
its support, which means that they have to carry out the policies fav or -
able to the United States busine s s  interests . This symbiotic relation-
ship between the United States and the Latin· governments is evident from 
the testimony of General R obert W .  Porter, Jr . , United States Army 
Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command: 
The inability of governments to attain a s ufficient rate 
of economic deve lopment to meet social pr es s ur e � ,  together 
with high population growth and the continuing migration to 
the cities ,  will continue to generate more serious problem s .  
The urban areas will become even more the centre s of power, 
and their masses will become more sus ceptible to damagogic 
agitation and communist exploitation. The communist move­
m ent can be expected to become more aggres sive, concentrat­
ing more attention on labor, students and urban slum s .  When 
added to the already serious s ituation, this increas ing urban 
threat will create a ser ious internal security problem for the 
governments of Latin America. l80  
l80u . s . ,  C ongr e s s ,  House, Committee on Foreign A ffair s ,  The 
Foreign A s sistance Act of 1 9 6 7, Hearings , 89th Cong . , 2nd s e s s . ,  f9"t>7 ,  
p .  5 38 . 
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Current T rend s of the United States Economic Policies 
The Nixon administration' s lack of emphasis concerning Latin 
A me r ican security a s sistance has been discussed earlier. This lack 
of accentuation is clearly seen regarding economic matters also.  
Nixon made his political com eback with an approach which was 
quite favorable to United States big busine s s ,  a s  has always been the 
policy of every potential presidential candidate .  He said in 1968  that 
foreign aid c ould only be fruitful if "the A me r ican private enterprise 
system for development is adopted in the poor nations . It is not just 
s e ed s  and fertilizer the hungry countrie s need . It is a system of inc en­
tives and rewards of prices and market s .  1 1 1 8  l 
Some major foreign policy adjustments of the Nixon administra­
tion could be observed a s :  
( a )  -Cutbacks in United States foreign aid program s .  The ration­
ale behind it was that other developed countries who were 
financed by the United States during the post-war period 
should pay their share for the a s s istance of the underdevel­
oped countries. 
(b) His inaugural add r e s s  was marked with an absence of any 
specific statement concerning the Latin A m erican progle m s .  
This was a c lear indication that the Nixon administration 
feels that Latin America is no longer a focal point of United 
1 8 1New York Time s ,  September 1 3 ,  1968.  
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States foreign polic y .  
( c )  The Nixon administration did not invoke the Hickenlooper 
amendment when Peru expropriated the Internationa l Petro-
leum Company (IPC);  1 82 and, surprisingly enough, the Nixon 
administration did not react s ignificantly when Marxist Presi-
dent :Allende was e lected in Chile. 
(d) The continuation of foreign aid and recognition to all the 
military regimes which came to power in Latin America, 
which was a marked d eviation from the policies of the A lli-
ance for Progr e s s .  
On October 3 1 ,  1 9 6 9 ,  President Nixon made his fir st major policy 
speech on Latin America. His speech began with an indirect criticism 
of the A lliance for Progr e s s .  Two of his policy statements worth men-
tioning were: 
a firm commitment to continued United States a s sistance 
for hemisphere deve lopment; and 
a belief that the principal future pattern of this a s sistance 
must be US support for Latin American initiativ e s ,  and 
this can best be achieved on a multilateral basis within the 
Inter-Ame r ican system. 183  
That i s ,  such aid would no longer be subj ect to  United States short -term 
182For a detailed version of this, see R ichard Goodwin' s " Letter 
from Peru, " The New Yorker, (May 1 7 ,  1 969) ,  pp . 4 1 - 1 09 .  
l 8 3Richard M .  Nixon, '.'Action for Progr e s s  for the Americas, 1 1  
Latin America and the United States in the 1 9 70 ' s ,  op . cit . , pp . 2 62 - 2 6 9 .  
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interests . 
On Latin American trade matter s ,  Pres ident Nixon promised 
that the United States,  among other s ,  will take the following major steps: 
to lead a vigorous effort to reduce the non-tariff barriers 
to trade maintained by nearly all industrialized countrie s 
against products of particula·r inte r e st to Latin American 
and other developing countrie s ;  
to support the establishment, within the Inter - A merican 
system, of regular procedures for advance consultation on 
all trade matter s • • •  before decisions affecting its mem­
bers are taken, not after; 
in world trade forums for liberalized tariff preferences 
for all developing countrie s including Latin America . 1 84 
One major change declared by Pre s ident Nixon was that "loan 
dollars sent to Latin America und er AID be freed to allow purcha s e s  
not only here,  but anywhere in Latin America . 1 1 1 8 5  This new policy 
still barred the Latin American countrie s from buying from European 
or A s ian countrie s ,  and they are still forced to spend their dollars in 
purchasing from the United States monopoly; since no other Latin A m e r -
ican country could provide competent prices against the United States 
good s as the industrialized countrie s of western Europe or Japan could . 
Overall, the economic policies of the Nixon administration are a 
c ontinuation of the old one s .  Latin A m erican economi es remain greatly 
dependent upon the United States economy, United States private invest-
ments, and above all, on the United States big busine s s ,  which still 
carries a dominant influence on the United States foreign policy in the 
184Ibid . , p .  265 .  
1 8 5Ibid . , p .  266 . 
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countries south of the R io Grand e .  
Anothe.r important asp ect of the United States foreign policy in 
Latin America is the long- standing c ontroversy th.at the United State s  
foreign policy is d ictated by the United States busine s s  and military 
interests .  This statement probably is too strong in its pres ent frame 
of reference, but it is qi.Lite prudent to say that the United State s  foreign 
policy seems to be guided or influenced �y a complex of military and 
business inte rests which is controlled by the United States busine s s  and 
military e lit e s .  Former Secretary of State Dean R us k  admitted that 
the United States corporations dictated United State s  State Department 
policy and are s ubstantially benefited by it. He observed: 11 A number 
of them (United States corporations) would prefer to s e ll out their utility 
holdings and then reinvest in indu,strie s in the same country that has 
acce s s  to fre e  mar ket 1 1 1 8 6  
A r guing on the same line, Horowitz wrote: 
United States foreign policy toward Latin A merica is not 
a simple one-to- one relationship, but often filtered through 
a grid of Soviet and Chine se aspirations on the one hand, and 
its own internal entrepreneurial aspirations on the other.  
What occurs is a conflict at the level of policy making between 
military sectors which believe in the need to respons always 
and everywhere to socialist and communist threats; State 
Department sectors which tend to advocate a benign approach 
based upon tolerance and respect for sovere ignties as long a s  
busine s s  interests are not menaced, and Department o f  De­
fense or ientations which view intervention a s  a s ubtle matter 
based on generating civic action and counter-insurgency pro-
1 8 6John Hickey, "The First Year: Busine s s ,  1 1  Inter - A m erican 
Ec onomic A ffair s ,  XVI (Summer, 1 9 62),  p .  50, as cited in Political 
and Social Structure in Latin A merica, p .  240.  
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gram s .  In shor t, the complexities of world order make the 
various formulators of the US policy toward Latin America 
either substantially or downright s e lf-contradictory. 1 8 7  
Later in the same article he made a very significant observa-
tion by noting that the aim of every American president from T r uman 
to Eisenhower to Kennedy to Johnson, and finally Nixon has been the 
same: to abolish Latin American dependency on non-American produc-
ers and to establish Latin American dependence upon the United Stat e s .  188 
Tim othy F. Harding views the motivations of the United State s  
foreign policy toward Latin A merica a s  one to gain more control and 
influence on the subcontinent. A s  a res ult of this policy, he sees  the 
role of the Pentagon a s  more d ominant than that of the State Department: 
A n  important new tr end in US control over Latin A m erica 
is the control exercised over Latin American nations by the 
Pentagon through the local Latin A merican military, com­
pletely by-pas sing the State Department. This was apparently 
the case in the Dominican R epublic where the US military 
mission encouraged the overthrow of Bosch while the State 
Department supported him. The US counter-insurgency 
forces have directed anti-gµerrilla operations in Venezuela 
and Colombia and have prepared 1 1  contingency p lans1 1  to deal 
with instability in nearly every country in Latin A merica. 189 
One more intere sting aspect of the contempor.ary United States 
foreign policy could be observed in the various types of United States 
1 8 7Irving Louis Horowitz, 1 1 United States ' Policy' in Latin Amer­
ica, 1 1  New Politics,  IX (Spring, 1970) ,  p .  7 6 .  
1 8 9 Timothy F .  Harding, 1 ' The New Imperialism in Latin Ameri­
ca: A C ritique of Conor Cruise 01Brien, R eadings in U . S .  Imperialism 
(Boston, Mas s . :  Porter Sargent Publisher, 1 9 7 1 ) ,  p .  1 9 .  
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intervention in Latin America- -varying from direct military interven-
tion to political and diplomatic manipulations- -which have been used 
in contemporary politics even when all types of interventions are often 
condemned under the various declared and undeclared princip les and 
policies, and under the various doctrines and statutes of international 
law. The current examples of various types of United States interven-
tions, a s  presented by James Petra s ,  bring forth a very imp ortant the-
sis- -that United States intervention still remains to be the one greatest 
threat to Latin A m erican sovereignty. The examples of the se interven-
tions are: 
Types of Intervention 
Direct military intervention 
Indirect military intervention 
Direct economic intervention 
Ec onomic manipulation ( loans , 
c r edits, debts, payments, 
grants utilized a s  policy in­
struments) 
Political and d ip lomatic manipu­
lation (training and indoctrinat­
ing of military per sonnel, recog­
nition of government s ,  etc . )  
C ountry 
Cuba, 1 962 
Dominican R epublic, 1 9 6 5  
Guatemala, 1 9 54 
Cuban invasion, 1 9 6 1  
Cuba, 1960 
Dominican R epub lie, 19 6 1  
Throughout Latin A m erica 
Throughout Latin A m erica 1 9 0  
For the forces of change in Latin A merica, a l l  these factors are 
negative .  Their urge for national identity, national pride, res pect and 
l 90po litic s and Social Structure in Latin America, op. cit . , p .  3 0 8 .  
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intensive nationalism has long been frustrated a s  a result of the United 
States foreign policy performanc e ,  and the role of their own government s .  
They resent the United States '  domination and their national subjugation 
to a foreign power. Every major shift in the United States foreign policy 
toward their countries is viewed by them with increased suspicion and 
doubts .  Unfortunately the A lliance for Progres s ,  which was intr.oduced 
with great enthu siasm and high expectations by the Kennedy administra-
t ion, became a victim of this attitud e .  This, however, was not the main 
reason for the failure of the A llianc e .  A detailed analysis o f  the'. A Uiiance 
for Progr e s s  is very pertinent at this poin�. 
An A s se ssment of the A lliance for Progr e s s  
and the Latin Ame rican R evolution 
The A lliance for Progres s  was the United States '  answer to the 
Latin A merican revolutionary movements and Cuban revolution. The 
United State s had already sensed the Latin American r evolution, who se 
clearly defined objectives were: 
, the participation of the people in the governm ent and the 
d e struction of the oligarchie s ;  the redistribution of land and 
the ending of the feudal or semi-feudal regimes in the coun­
tryside; the securing of equal acce s s  to cultur.a 1 and educa­
tional facilities and wealth, thus putting an end to inherited 
privilege and artificial cla s s  division s .  Finally a main ob­
jective of the r evolution is to secure economic development, 
coupled with a fair distribution of its products and the utili­
zation of international capita 1 for the benefit of the national 
economy. 1 9 1  
l 9 l Eduardo Frei Manta lva, 1 1  The A lliance that Lost its Way, " 
Foreign A ffair s,  XLV ( A pril, 1 9 6 7L 437-48.  
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The A lliance was aimed to pr omote political democracy in Latin 
America through economic progr e s s  and social reforms on the one hand, 
and on the other ,  it was aimed at defeating the C uban strategy of export-
ing Castroite revolutions which was viewed not only as a great danger 
to Latin Ame rican political stab�lity, but also as a great threat to the 
United State s  and its various inte re sts in Latin A m erica.  
The A llianc e, which was very ambitious in its natur e ,  could not 
achieve its goal of bringing about the changes it promised. One of the 
main cause s  of this failure is the generally agreed upon argument pre-
sented by various scholars ,  according to which the major p lanned changes 
should be preceded by the or ganizational change s .  In other word s ,  ade-
quate organizational changes should be brought about before ambitious 
progressive plans are introduc ed . In the wol'ds of Eduardo Frei,  for -
mer Pre sident of Chile: 
The problem is that what was fundamental to the A l liance 
for Progr e s s - -a rev olutionary approach to the need for re­
form- -has not been achieved. Le s s  than half of  the Latin 
American countries have started serious programs of agrarian 
reform. Drastic changes in the tax system are even scarcer,  
while the number of genuinely democ ratic r e gim e s ,  far from 
increasing, has actually declined . In other word s ,  there has 
been no str engthening of political and social foundations for 
economic progr e s s  in Latin America. This is the reason why 
the ultimate objective of the A lliance - -the formation of just, 
stable, democratic and dynamic societie s - -is a s  distant today 
a s  it was five yea r s  ago. Several experiences indicate that 
economic progr e s s  alone does not suffice to ensure the build­
ing of truly free societies and peaceful international coexi s ­
tence. The problem d o e s  not stem solely from the inadequate 
internal financial r e sourc e s .  What has been lacking i s  a clear 
ideological direction and determination on the part of the politi­
cal leaders to bring about change .  These two factor s are inti-
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mately related and they involve colle ctive political r e spon­
sibility of a 11 the members of the A lliance .  1 92 (emphasis added) 
George C .  Lodge, who is a well-re spected Latin American scholar, 
agreed with Frei' s criticis ms when he br ought up the following points 
during his te stimony: 
W e  have failed to recognize that changes required for what 
is generally labelled " economic developme nt" are radical and 
structural and cannot occur unless  there are socio-political 
institutions • . .  in their place which can provide the motiva­
tion, organization, protection, authority, and competence 
which are e s sential to break down old structur es and to build 
new one s .  In Latin Ame r ica the se include rural and urban 
worker organizations, many different groups affiliated with 
the radical action elem ent of the R oman Catholic Church, 
cooperativ e s ,  some univer sity activities ,  and various busine s s  
enterprises ,  particularly those engaged in. integrated food pro­
duction, proces sing and distr ibution. 
W e  have failed to perc eive that most Latin A merican govern­
ments have neither the capacity nor the will to introduce the 
radical- -indeed the revolutionary- -change which was promised 
at Punta del Este. W e  have paid them to promise to do what 
no governm ent can do; namely to subvert the power base upon 
which it rests . In so d oing we have corrupted them and our ­
selves. 1 9 3  
A nother reason for the failure of the A lliance for Progr e s s  was 
the general prevailing mistrust among the Latin Americans toward the 
United States and a long- standing anti-Americanism, which is the re-
sult of the historical role of  the United State s  in Latin A m erican policy. 
Galo Plaza, former pre sident of Ecuador , noted this phenomena. 
1 9 2 Eduardo Frei Montalva,  op. cit. , p .  443 . 
1 9 3u . s . , Congr e s s ,  Senate, Subcommittee on W e stern Hemis­
phere A ffairs of the Committee on Foreign R elations ,  United States Mili­
tary Policies and Programs in Latin America, Hearings ,  9 1  st Cong. , 
1 st s e s s . , 1 9 6 9 ,  pp. 1 4 - 1 9 .  
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He feels that most Latin Americans did not under stand the A lliance for 
Progr e s s ,  and mistrusted it a s  a tool of United States foreign policy. 1 9 4  
Peter Nehemkis, who was a member o f  tee Harvard University group 
who prepared the report, 1 1A  lliance for Progr es s ' ' ,  in 1 960, also is of 
the opinion that anti-Am ericanism blunted the purpose of the A llianc e .  
1 1  Like an ocean current, 1 1  he wrote, "it (anti-Americanism) runs deep 
and wide th:r.ough the southern part of the hemisphe r e .  Its pre sence ren-
d e r s  suspect virtually anything that emanates .£rom the Colossus of the 
North. , ,  1 9  5 
One of the main reasons the A l liance for Progr e s s  came into 
existence was the Cuban revolution. 
It was widely believed that Castro' s Cuba repre sented the 
advance bas e  of a Soviet (or even "Sino-Soviet'.') threat to 
United States inte rests in the hemisphere,  and that the USSR 
would seek other such ba s e s .  Cuba was thought to pose a 
potentially grave security threat to the United States,  directly 
because of its links with the international communist move­
ment and indirectly because of its support for subver sive 
groups e lsewhere in Latin A merica. 1 96 
The government of the United State s  felt threatened that the Cuban 
example would be followed by the radical groups in various c ountrie s .  
The United States had two alternativ e s - - either t o  wait and see other 
countries follow the Castroite path, or to intr oduce an ambitious plan 
1 94Galo Plaza, " The State of the Hemisphere: Latin America, 11  
Vital Spe eches of the Day, XXXV (November 1 5 ,  1968) ,  p p .  6 6 - 6 8 .  
1 9 5Peter Nehemkis, o p .  �it . ,  p .  208.  
196 Abraham F .  Lowenthal, 1 1  A lliance Rhetoric Ve rsus Latin Amer ­
ican R eality, 1 1 Foreign A ffair s ,  XLVIII (April, 1 970), pp . 494-508.  
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for economic progr e s s  and social reform under the moderate leader ship 
which would work for the p romotion of democracy and liberty. 
At this point we should address ourselves to the threats which 
Castroism posed for the existing order in Latin A m erican countrie s .  
(The A lliance for Progr e s s  will be further discus sed at a later point . )  
Castroism emerged a s  a new leftist id:eology when flamboyant Fidel Castro 
had firmly e stablished himself in power, leading a succe s sful revolution 
which overthrew the corrupt r ight-wing gover nment of Batista. 
Castroism as an ideology 
hold s that present "neocolonialism" in Latin America, 
under the leader ship of Yankee imperialism,  forecloses  
the peaceful road to power in most of the area. For 
nearly all of Latin A merica , prolonged armed conflict is 
thus the only possible revolutionary strategy. In order 
to succeed, the revolutionaries must make guerrilla war ­
fare their principal mode of violenc e ,  and destruction of 
governm ent military for c e s  their prime goal. A t  the 
same time that they strike at government outpost s ,  the 
guerrillas need to win the peasantry gradually over to 
their side. The next step is to center revolutionary 
leader ship in the rural command itself. 197  (emphasis added) 
A ny discus s ion of Castroism would be incomplete without, at 
least, a brief reference to the contribution of the patriarch of the Latin 
A merican guerrilla movement, Earnesto " Che" Guevara, and F r ench 
Marxist inte llectual R egis Debray. Che Guevara, in his now famous 
book Guerrilla Warfare,  stated three fundamenta 1 principles to conduct 
a succes sful "r evolutionary movement" in Latin America: 
l 97  Communist A ctivities in Latin America, 1967 ,  R eport of the 
Subcommittee on Inter-A merican A ffair s (Wa shington, D .  C . :  U . S .  
Government P rinting House,  1967) ,  p .  1 .  
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1 .  Popular for ces  can win a war against the army. 
2 .  It is not ne c e s sary to wait until all conditions for making 
revolution exist; the insurre ction can create them. 
3 .  In the underdeveloped America, the countryside is the 
basic area for armed fighting. 198  
R e gis Debray, on the contrary, had emphasized urban terrorism 
and the urban guerrilla movem ent l 99 as opposed to the rural guerrilla 
ba ses as advocated by Che . Furthe rmore, Debray is a strong pr oponent 
of the subservience of the communist party to the guerrilla organiza-
tion. 2 0 0  
The synthe sis o f  the C a stro-Guevara-Debray ideology for con-
ducting a guerrilla war in the countries s outh of the R io Grande is that 
the irnperia listic role of the United Sta-tes in Latin Arne rican society 
has a very strong negative impact on the already problematic society. 
To help the Latin masses  get rid of their political, social, and economic 
ills, they emphasize that: 
1 .  The peasant s ,  not the urban worke r s ,  are  the only ba se 
for r evolution. (Only Castro and Che agree . )  
2 .  The only m ethod is guerr.illa warfare . . •  (Castro, Che, 
and Debray agree�l 
3 .  Pea sant guerrilla forces will take over and reorganize 
an ever larger portion of the countryside for self support 
and deny the government tho s e  resource s .  ( Only Castro 
and Che agree; Debray' s emphasis is on the increased 
l 9 8Earnesto " Che" Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, trans. by J. P .  
Morray (New York: Vintage Books, 1 9 69),  p .  1 .  
199R egis Debray, " The Party and the Guerrilla, 1 1  A R evolution 
in the R evolution? (New York: Monthly R eview Pre s s ,  1 9 67) , pp.  61:9 1 .  
200rbid . ; pp.  6 7 - 9 1  and 9 5 - 1 1 6 .  
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activity in the urban base . )  
4.  Urban terrorism can play a supportive role. (For Debray , 
urban terrorism plays more than just a s upportive role . ) 2 0 1  
Five Latin A merican countrie s - -B olivia , Guatemala, Colombia, 
Nicaragua, and Venezuela- -faced a major threat from Ca stroite insur-
gency for c e s .  In Bolivia, the se forces were crushed by the United State s  
trained counterinsurgency forces , which resulted in the death of Che 
Guevara in 1 9 6 7 .  Some other countrie s which have experienced Castro-
ite guerrilla insurgency since 1959  (the date Castro took over in Cuba) 
are Haiti, Panama, the Dominican R epublic, ' a:nd Nica.:ragua ( Castr'o-
sponsored inva sion in 1 9 59 ) ,  Ecuador ( 1962) ,  the Dominican R epublic 
( 1 9 6 3 ) ,  Peru ( 1 964-65) ,  A r gentina and Hondura s ( 1 964) , Paraguay ( 1 965) ,  
and Brazil ( 196  7) .  202 
These examples of the activities of the Castroite insurgency are 
a clear indication that the A lliance for Progr e s s  failed in its objectives  
of  reaching the people or involving them in its goals.  "And without a 
sense of mutual involv ement, without a sense of shared participation 
by the ordinary people11 203 the A lliance only remained a check-writing 
agency for Latin America. 
One important point often ignored by Latin American scholars 
is that Castroism has p layed upon the age - old tune of Yankee imperial-
20 l I  
. L t·  A . · t  8 nsur gency 1n a 1n mer1ca, op . c1 . , p .  . 
within par enthe ses are made by this writer . )  
202 Ibid . , p. 1 .  
203Peter Nehemkis, op. cit . , p. 2 1 2 .  
(The comments 
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ism,  and its main propaganda tool has been the neocolonialistic role 
of the United States in Latin America. The United Stat e s ,  on her part, 
had not only ov er-reacted to the thr eats of Castroite insurgency forces 
in Latin A merica, but its numerous military mis sions, increa sed mili­
tary appearanc e s  through mas sive police a s sistance and training pro­
gram s ,  and its extensive busine s s  investments in Latin A merica helped 
Castro in building up a very convincing ar gument that the United States 
was against social change and economic progress in Latin A m erica. 
To ensure its objective of defending status quo ahd its huge economic 
inve stments, the United Stat e s  had started arming the Latin A rmy and 
police with modern weapons and techniques to crush all the forces  of 
change in the name of anti-communism .  The p oint of confusion on the 
part of the fr.amers of United States foreign policy was viewing Castro­
ism only as communism and Castroite insurgency forces  only as com­
munist insurgency. Castroism, so the ar gument goe s ,  is more than 
communism; and this was realized when the A lliance for Progre s s  was 
originally introduced. A s  mentioned earlier, the Kennedy administra­
tion intended the A lliance to be another alternative to the Cuban revolu­
tion for Latin America, and by doing so ,  it has r ecognized Castroism 
as more than just communism- -a force for change . 
It was some time later that the A l liance lost its original mean­
ing and its Public Safety program s became communist- killing program s ,  
which the rightist regimes o f  Latin A me r ica- -the most notorious of 
which are Brazil, Guatemala and Venezuela- -monopolized for crushing 
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even the most genuine protest and the forces for change in the name of 
anti-communism. 
A s  a quick example of what Castro repre sents to Latin Americans, 
a high Latin American official from the OAS Eeportedly told John Gerassi: 
The United States is trying to stop Castro, nothing more. 
That it may do; money and guns can stop a man. But it will 
never stop Castroism. T r ue reforms require planning, state 
p lanning at all levels, not to mention expropriations and na­
tionalizations,  which is exactly what the United States hop e s  
to avoid . That' s why nothing will stop Castroism- - except 
occupation armie s ,  of cour s e .  Castroism means all that 
junk that leads our countrie s .  It means whole sale reform s .  
More than that, it means a new life, at least for thos e  who 
have never seen a doctor, eaten a chicken, or been inside a 
school . 204. 
" C ommunist subversion" in Latin Am erica has been viewed as 
the greatest menace to the security of the United State s .  Though the 
immediate threats of the " expansion" of " international communism" 
(which was extensively used and is still being used in the official jar gon) 
to the fr�e world has become a matter of post-war history, the State 
Department and Pentagon policy makers still seem to be hounded by the 
memories of John Foster Dulle s ,  who viewed the post-war world a s  
divided into two major camp s - -free world and communist expansionists; 
every movement for reform in Latin A me r ica a s  communist infiltration 
and subver sion; and every critic of the United States policies as a genu-
ine communist or a commie collaborator; and who put the cart before 
the horse by giving top priorities to military actions, to crush what he 
204The Great Fear in Latin A merica, op. cit . , p .  254.  
147 
termed a s  communist subversion in Latin A me rica and postponing the 
much-needed social and economic reform s ,  which, if carried out whole-
heartedly, would perhaps never have created Fidel Castro. 
The Kennedy era was also mar ked by the same paranoia, because 
Kennedy had witne s sed the post-war commie-phobia in his formative 
years  and was in the Senate when Senator Joseph McCarthy was suffering 
from the extreme symptoms of commie-phobia. Hence, the United State s  
foreign policy in the 1960'  s wa s focussed on anti-c ommunism and build­
ing up modern and effective counterinsurgency forc e s  in Latin A merica. 
But the truth of the matter is that communism ceased to be a 
major threat to Latin Ame rica in the 1 9 6 0 1  s ,  e specially after the Sino­
Soviet ideological rift, when pro-Soviet factions of communist parties 
started looking for new alliances and peac eful means to widen their po­
litical ba s e  as their changed strategy. An example of this is the Com ­
munist Party of Venezuela {PCV), which in A pril, 1 9 6 5 ,  during the sev­
enth plenum of the PCV Central Committee, " r eflected the leadership ' s  
dilemma- -while reaffirming the party' s commitment to the guerrilla 
alliance ,  it also adopted a five-point ' m inimum program' , acceptable 
to 'the majority of the people' , aimed at achieving a democratic peace 
in which the PCV and the MIR {guerrilla organization) would function 
a s  legal oppo sition partie s . 1 1 2 0 5  ( empha sis added) And in Ap ril, 1966,  
the eighth p lenum of the Central Committee decided to " abandon the 
2 0 51 1 The Permanent R evolution of Fidel Castro, " op. cit. , p .  2 .  
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armed struggle in order to incorporate the party in the movement for 
the integration of the national Left. 1 1 2 0 6  
Another example i s  Guatemala, where,  according t o  an official 
study, all the " rightist groups defined ' communist' broadly and impre-
cisely to include non-communist leftists and moderat e s ,  a s  well a s  indi-
viduals who had antagonized a member of the righfrst group or who had 
the misfortune to hold po sition under Perez.  1 1 207 ( emphasis added) 
The same study makes th e following observations concerning 
the communist parties in some other Latin American countries:  
Bolivia: Bolivian communism is weak because the non-communist 
revolutionary tradition has foreclosed its appeal, because the 
movement itself is seriously factionalized . . .  The communist 
parties do not command the allegiance of the ca,.mpesiono s .  208 
Nicaragua: The Nicaraguan Communist Party (PSN) has more 
than negligible strength in labor and the national university. 
Its leader ship is pro-Moscow, and although it has maintained 
tie s with Cuba, Nicaragua was not named in the 1 9 64 Havana 
agreement as ripe for the Castro road . . .  209 
Brazil: The orthodox C ommunist Party of Brazil has suffered 
a decline in fortune since 1964 and has no interest in the violent 
road . It has paid a minimum attention to Cuba in past yea r s ,  
except to complain t o  Moscow about Castro' s support and friend­
ship for other Brazilian radical s . 2 1 0  
20 6Ibid . 
207I . L . A . 't  2 1  nsurgency in ahn mer1ca, op. c1 . , p .  . 
208Ibid . , p .  2 5 .  
209Ibid . , p .  2 7 .  
2 1 0ibid . , p .  2 8 .  
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A rgentina: The A r gentine Communist Party follows the 
peaceful line and had nothing to do with the 1 9 6 3 - 64 People ' s  
Guerrilla A rmy. 2 1 1  
Professor Lodge made some very convincing observations on 
the anti-communistic aspect of the United State s foreign policy. He 
note s: 
We have failed to r ecognize that, although we re gularly 
pledge ourselves to support change, we have militarily and 
economically, in fact, strengthened the obstacles to change, 
prolonging the status quo, and thus frustrating development. 
Governments of both the United States and Latin America 
have been able to ignore this fundamental contradiction be­
tween words and actions largely because of a higher commit­
ment to anticommunism, a notion which today has become 
hollow, vague, misleading, defined differ ently, depending on 
one ' s  interests.  
We have failed to acknowledge that in fact today the com ­
munist party apparatus generally in Latin A merica is neither 
a revolutionary force nor a major threat to US inter e st s . 
Consequently we have failed to appre ciate that the ideology 
of anticommunism is no longer either valid� or useful. The 
least significant thing about Castro is that he is a communist. 
The most radical elements in Brazil today are not the com­
munists, but priests and their worker, student follower s .  
The guerrillas in Guatemala are more properly described as 
revolutionary nationalists than a s  members of the Inter­
national Communist Party or a s  tools of Moscow or Peking. 
We have failed to perc eive that the danger to peace in 
Latin America is not from communism, but from predatory 
scavengers of the revolutionary proc e s s - -right or left, fore­
ign or domestic- -who seek to use the chaos of change as a 
means for extension of control and power . . .  2 1 2  
'From the above discus sion, it is obvious that the tone of increa s -
ing strength of communist insurgencies in Latin America has been over-
2 1 1 Ibid . 
2 1 2United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin A m e r ­
ica, o p .  cit . , p .  1 5 .  
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p layed by. the United States ;  a s  a re sult of this rationale, int.ernal s e -
curity as sistance and police training has been continued . 
A s  far. reaching effects of continued United State s  arms and se-
curity ass istanc e,  R obert A lexander note s that 
. . . if the United State s continue s to follow a policy of 
giving more and more armament to Latin A merican mili­
tary forces,  it is aiding the armed forces of these countries 
to install and maintain dictator ship s .  To do this is to play 
directly into the hand s of the communists .  2 l 3  
He further observes  that 
Appar ent us · support of the military dictatorships gives 
the communi sts 1 1  evidence" to prove to their fellows in the 
opposition that the United Stat e s  is really r e sponsible for 
the tyranny under which they are all suffe ring. It allows 
them to put forward the logical ar gument that the "friends 
of our enemies are our enemies" to the disadvantage of 
the United States,  and the companion bit of logic that "the 
enemies of our enemies are our friend s" to the advantage 
of the Soviet Union. In a word the United States '  support 
of military dictator ship in Latin A merica is one of the 
surest ways possible to break down the barrie r s  between 
those g�nu.ine advocates of the Latin A merican social revo­
lution and the communists.  2 1 4  
Now we will analyze one of the greatest contradictions of the 
United States foreign policy in Latin America. 
One declared motive of the United State s  military a s si stance to 
Latin America is "to foster a constructive and democratic approach by 
the military to their profes sional re sponsibilities and to the solution of 
2 1 3R obert J. A lexander, Communism in Latin America (New 
Jersey: R utgers Univer sity Press ,  1 9 5 6 ) ,  p .  8 9 .  
2 1 4Ibid. 
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national problems . 1 1 2 1 5  The rationale under lying this was that by their 
a s sociation with the United States missions and by their training in United 
State s  military schools, Latin American officers  would develop a high 
sense of military profe ssionalism and would be les s intere sted in poli-
tic s .  This is one aspect of the United States foreign policy. We will 
leave our discussion of this aspect here and further discuss it later.  
When the major shift in the United States military a s sistance 
program came from "hemispheric defense" to that of internal s ecurity, 
civic action programs were also introduced under the A lliance for Pro-
gress, which "were to encourage the Latin A m erican military to engage 
in nation-building activitie s which would win the support of the people 
and thereby deny gue.rTilla s the environment they needed in order to 
surviv e .  n Z l 6  A s  a re sult of the civic action program s ,  the Latin A m e r -
ican military w a s  to become involved in the civilian affairs rather than 
r e stricting itself to the military matters  which was the rationale behind 
the deve lopment of military profe ssionalism aspect of the United States 
foreign policy discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
None of these objectives could be fulfilled due to the obvious 
contradictions in the United States foreign policy- -that while one aspect 
Z l 5T e stimony of R obert S .  McNamara, former Secretary of D e ­
fense, Foreign A s sistance and R e lated Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
1 9 6 7 ,  op . cu. 
2 1 6u . s . , Congr e s s ,  House, Subcommittee on National Security 
Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign A ffair s ,  
Military A s sistance Training, Hearings ,  9 l st Cong. , 2nd s e s s . , 1 9 7 0 ,  
( T e stimony o f  D r .  A lfred Stepan, A s sistant Profes sor of Political Sci­
ence, Yale Univer sity), p. 1 0 8 .  
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of the United States foreign policy was to promote military profe ssion-
alism within the Latin military, another aspect was working at the same 
time under the civic action programs to indulge in civilian affair s .  
What was the effect of the se conflicting policie s ?  Did the United 
States succeed in achieving any or all of these objectives ? First we 
will analyze the aspect of military profe ssionalism. 
This objective could not be greatly fulfilled. D r .  A lfred Stepan, 
a Yale University expert on Latin A me r ica,  stated during his testimony 
before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific D e -
velopments: 
: • In the last decade the United State s  military assistance 
training has definitely help�d to increase the profes sional 
military expertise of most of the Latin Ame rican armie s ,  
but the se same institutions- -most notable in Brazil, Peru, 
Panama, and Bolivia- -have also become more deeply em­
bedded in politic s .  2 1 7  
Stepan believes that the United State s  is solely r e s p onsible for 
this appar ent paradox: 
The doctrine of counterinsurgency which, the United 
States empha sized at its military schools attended by 
Latin American office r s ,  stated that revolutionary war­
fare involved the economic, political and ideological 
sectors as well a s  the military. 
Both the US military schools and the US military mis­
sions implicitly and explicitly urged the Latin Ame rican 
military to shift their attention from traditional mis sions 
such as frontier defense or from any goals that entailed 
acquiring and mastering " sophisticated" military hardware,  
in order to concentrate instead on dome stic problems of 
insurgency and the ways to prev ent or curtail it. 
The military institutions in Latin Ame rica were urged 
2 1  7 Ibid. , p.  1 0  6 .  
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to become involved in a wide variety of economic and social 
activities to aid the proce s s  of developm ent and to act as a 
bulwark against r evolution. 
In all these activitie s ,  the Latin American military ac­
quired increased profes sionalism in the 1 9 601 s .  But logic 
and empirical observation indicate that to the extent that 
military expertise is increased in the areas of counterinsur­
gency, nation-building, and multi- sectoral developm ent plan­
ning, the military becom e s  intrinsically more than less  in­
volved in politic s .  2 1 8  
Some major impacts of the civic action programs on Latin Amer-
ican armed forces are noteworthy. The general attitude of the Latin 
American military men i s  an inc reased antagonism "toward aggres sive 
advocacy of civic action by the United State s .  A rmy offic ers  feel that 
it reduces their service ' s  role from that of a profe s s ional army to that 
of a police force or a peace corp s .  Offic ers  of all servic es res ent the 
implication that they have no national defense mis sion . 1 1 2 1 9  The civic 
action program was intended to improve the r elationship between the 
civit: and military authoritie s and to build up a feeling of cooperation 
between them. But according to Dr. Stepan' s observations, " civic action 
programs may enacerbate rather than improve civil-military re lat ions.  
This is particularly obvious when the military strong-arms civilians 
to volunteer books, medicine, material, and advertis ing for civic action 
. t .. 220 prOJeC s .  
In Brazil, for example, some civilians feel that they, rather 
2 1 8rbid . ,  pp.  1 0 6 - 1 0 7 .  
2 1 9 lb i� . , p . 1 0 8 . 
220Ibid . 
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than the army, sh<i>uld receive fund s from the Ministry of Transportation 
to execute large construction project s .  In Colombia and Peru, on the 
other hand, military men often complain of being improperly burdened 
with functions rightfully belonging to civilian ministrie s .  Civic action 
programs in general tend to increase the political involvement of the 
·1 ·t  2 2 1  mi 1 ary. 
Thus the Latin American armed for ces ,  as a result of the in-
creased support of the United State s ,  have emerged a s  a politically dom -
inating force, and the Latin American armed forces, through their per-
formance, have shown very little sign of re spect for constitutionalism 
and civilian authority and superiority. Instead, the Latin armed forc e s ,  
in general, have emer ged a s  a symbol of authority and a controlling 
force over the protest movement s .  The increased capabilitie s of the 
armed forces and police due to United States training and a s s i stance 
has been used to crush even the most le gitimate protest movements 
and to suppre s s  political opposition. For the Latin American masses ,  
the United State s  military and police a s si stance programs complicate 
their internal problem s ,  interfere with the proc e s s  of social change, 
and hinder pro gr es s in. economic development. 
Though Latin America is no longer the focal point of United State s  
foreign policy, a brief analysis of the policies of the Nixon administration 
i s  quite r elevant in orde r to draw important conclusions for the coming 
decad e .  
2 2 1 Ibid . 
CHAPTER VI 
PR OSPECTS AND POLICY R ECOMMENDAT IONS 
FOR THE SEVENTIES 
When Nixon came to office it became evident that Latin A m e r ­
ica and its problems would not b e  a prime concern of the new admini s ­
tration. A s  it is evident that Latin American political, social, and 
economic problems still remain to be solved, the new administration 
looked for a foreign policy posture which would cr eate a 11 generation 
of peace" , while ignoring the rising revolutions next door . 
United States- Latin A merican r e lations were not one of the elec­
tion is  sues of the 1968  pre sidential campaign. Nixon not only avoided 
addressing him self to the existing problems of Latin American subcon­
tinent, but in his inaugural addre s s ,  surprisingly enough, no direct 
mention was made of this is sue. 
Before we proceed, let us make some observation on the major 
political and military aspects of The R ockefeller R eport on America s .  
The R ockefeller R eport, which was the re sult of Governor R ockefeller' s 
winding trip to the Latin American subcontinent on the request of Presi­
dent Nixon, suffers  from McCarthyite paranoia concerning the communist 
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conspiracy. It states 1 1  • • •  all of the American nations are a tempting 
target for communist subversion. In fac� it is plainly evident that such 
s ubver sion is a reality today with a larming potential .  1 1  Praising the 
indigenous forces for their effective performance, R ockefeller notes 
that the se for ces  have gradually improved their capabilitie s for dealing 
with Castro-type agrarian guerrilla s .  But at the same time he warns 
that radical revolutionary elements in the hemisphere appear to be in­
crea singly turning toward urban terrorism in their attempts to bring 
down the existing order.  222 
In his " R ec ommendations for A ction" , the Governor suggests 
that the United State s  should " r ever s e  the rec ent downward trend in 
grants for a s si sting the training of security forces for the other hem i s ­
phere countries" . He feel s  that it is in the interest of the United States 
to upgrade the police forces of Latin America by continuing and strength­
ening the police training program and by providing the Latin American 
countries trucks, jeep s ,  helicopters and other equipment to increase 
the counterinsurgency capabilitie s of the forces of the se countrie s .  
He minimized the reports of police repre s s ion in some Latin 
A merican countrie s and state�: "there is not in the United State s  a full 
appreciation of the important role played by the police. There is a ten­
dency in the United States to equate the police in other American repub­
lics with political action and repres sion, rather than with security! ' .  
222 The R ockefeller R eport on A m erica s ,  op. cit . , pp.  34 - 3 5 .  
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Though he acknowledges the fact that "there have, unfortunately, been 
many such instances of the use of police" ; his major concern remains 
s ecurity and further strengthening of the se forc e s .  223  
The Nixon administration appar ently shared R ockefelle r ' s  views 
of continuing aid to.ward the internal security capabilities of the Latin 
A merican military and polic e .  Be side s ,  this policy helps the Nixon 
administration in its pursuit of a lower profile and le s ser engagem ent 
in Latin America. The rationale behind this policy is to sustain the 
counter -insurgency and internal law and order capabilitie s of the indige-
nous in Latin America by continuing a steady pace of security a s s istance, 
which in turn will maintain the United State J involvem ent to the minimum. 
But R ockefelle r ' s  recommendation for increased grant s - in-aid have been 
ignored by the Nixon administration up to date. 
One major recommendation made in· the R ockefeller R eport, 
which was accepted by the Nixon administration, was the recornrnenda-
tion for recognition and continued aid for the military regimes in Latin 
America. This is a major shift from the A lliance for Progr e s s  policy 
of K ennedy and Johnson administrations,  when rec ognition and aid were 
the tools vigorously used by the Kennedy administration, but were not 
high on the priority list of the Johnson administration, to promote po-
litical democracy and discourage militarism in Latin Arn erica. 
A revised approach toward A lliance for Progr e s s  was made by 
223Ib1"d . ,  6 1  62 pp. - . 
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the Nixon administration. Discus sing the new premises of the A l liance 
under the Nixon administration, Abraham F .  Lowenthal states that "com-
p lac ency and disappointment mark Wa shington' s approach in 1 9 70" . 
Searching for a rationale for this marked change Lowenthal writes: 
Cuba under Castro is no longer perceived a s  an advance base 
of a Soviet ( or "Sino-Soviet" ) threat to US inter e st s .  The ad ­
ministration' s cool reaction to Governor R ockefelle r' s call for 
a Western Hemisphere Security Council stems not only from 
W a shington' s realization that the plan is opposed throughout 
Latin America but also partly from the fact that no immediate 
security threat to the United States is expected in or for that 
region . . .  It is now generally agreed that the international 
communist movement is fragmented, that the Soviet Union has 
no great interest in promoting "more Cuba s" in Latin A m erica, 
that the USSR seeks to avoid confrontations with the United 
States in this hemisphere and that Cuba i s  not mere satellite . 
Nor i s  the indirect threat posed by subversive groups in 
Latin America likely to materialize.  No insurgent movem ent 
in Latin A merica seriously threatens governmental authority 
on a national scale: Direct Cuban support for guerrilla activ­
ity appea:rs to have dropped off sharply, at least since Che 
Guevara' s death, and R u s s i.a.:n  noncooperation with such move­
ments was clear long before that. 224 
The fact that the R ockefeller R eport pres ented an exaggerated 
version of the explosive nature of communist and radical forces could 
be generally seen from the official statement s .  Charles A .  Meyer, 
President Nixon' s A s sistant Secretary for Inter-Ame rican A ffair s, ·te s -
tifyfng before the Subcommittee on We stern Hemisphere A ffairs stated: 
. • . W e  believe that there is very little like lihood of a 
major external threat to the area in the forseeable futur e .  
Communist insurgency . .  is currently at a relatively low ebb 
in Latin America . . . The defeat of the Che Guevara- led 
guerrillas in 1967  by elements of the Bolivian army, largely 
equipped and trained in counterguerrilla warfare by the United 
224 A braham F .  Lowenthal,  op. cit. , p .  49 7 .  
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· States,  seems to have made the Cuban regime more cautious 
about initiating new areas of insurgency in the hemisphere . 2 2 5  
Most of the very recent literature published on the United Stat e s -
Latin American relations for the 1 9 7 0 '  s have the se common themes:  
that the United Stat e s  has exaggerated Fidel Castro' s capabilities of 
exporting Cuban revolution; that the United State s  foreign policy makers 
became too panicky over the " growing" for ces of communism and insur-
gency in Latin America; and more over confused nationalistic protests 
with communist subversion; that the United State s should minimize its 
military appearance in Latin A merica since the Latin A merican regimes 
have developed tremendous counterinsurgency capabilitie s  as a result 
of the mas sive United State s  police a s s istance and training; and that 
Cuba is no longer a threat to the United States security; and that it is in 
the interest of the United States to normalize diplomatic re lations with 
Cuba now . This would be a very realistic approach on the part of the 
United State s ,  since more and more Latin American countries are be-
coming more vocal about normalizing diplomatic relations with Cuba. 226 
2 2 5u . S . , Congr e s s ,  Senate,  Subcommittee on W e stern Hemis­
phere A ffairs of the Committee on Foreign R elations ,  United States 
Military Policies and Programs in Latin America, Hearings , 9 l st Cong. , 
1 st ses s . , 1 9 69, p p .  5 7 - 6 1 .  
226Lowenthal, �· cit . ; T e stim ony of Char les a Meyer,  op. cit. i 
David Bronheim , 1 1 U .  S .  Military Policies and Programs in Latin Amer­
ica, 1 1  in Contemporary Inter-A merican R e lations, ed . by Yale H .  Fer­
guson ( Englewood C liffs, New Jer sey: Pr entice Hall, Inc . ,  1972),  pp.  
3 3 7 - 347; John Plank, "We Should Start Talking W ith Castro, 1 1  Latin 
America and the United States in the 1 9 70 ' s ,  op.  c it. , pp.  2 4 1 - 5 2 .  
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An important criticism in the contemporary literature on the 
A lliance for Progr e s s  is that the A lliance has raised the hopes and ex-
p ectations of the Latin masses  for a better life to an unprecedented 
level. 227  T o  understand this- phenomena more clearly,  we have to ana-
lyze the proc e s s  of modernization and how it affects the aspirations and 
expectation of the masses in transitional societies . 
Ivo and R o salind Feierabend in their widely published study on 
the aggre s s ive behavioir s ·-' in the d-eveloping societies pres ented the fol-
lowing hypothesis on this is sue: 
The higher the want formation in any given society and 
the lower the social want satisfaction, the greater the sys­
tematic frustration and the greater the impulse to political 
instability. 
want satisfaction low 228 
• high frustration want formation high 
E laborating on their hypothesis the authors wrote that the notion 
of modernity denotes a very comp lex set of social  phenomena, which 
includ e s  aspiration and capacity in a society to produce and consume 
a wide range and quantity of goods and servic e s ,  high development in 
science, technology education, and new structures of social organization, 
among other thing s .  Modern affluent nations,  with their comp lex of 
227Tad Szulc, in the " Introduction11 to The R ockefeller R eport 
on Americas,  op.  cit . , p .  iv; Bro nheim, op·; cit . , p .  3 3 9 .  
228Ivo K .  Feierabend and R o salind F e ierabend, " A ggre s s ive 
Behaviors within Politic s ,  1948 - 1 962: A Cross -National Study, 1 1  Jour­
nal of Conflict, X (September, 1966) , pp.  249 - 7 1 ;  the cited part of the 
study is done in collaboration with Betty A .  Nesvold. 
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economic, political, and s ocial systems , serve as models of modernity 
to the nations emer ging from traditional society. Once traditional so-
cieties are exposed to the modern way of life, without exception they 
de sire benefits a s s ociated with modernity. 229 
When the tangible res ults are lagging or lower than the rising ex-
pectations , then "the revolution of rising expectations" transforms itself 
into "the revolution of rising frustrations" . That is exactly what the 
A lliance did in Latin America. F ollowing is a graphic presentation of 
the above-discussed phenomena. 
Discussing the social, political and institutional problems involved 
with deve lopment David Bronheim wrote: 
Deve lopment almost by definition nec e s s itates the redistri­
bution of political and economic powe r .  It raises aspirations 
and expe ctations faster than it can satisfy them. It puts serious 
strains on social institutions faster than it can reform tho s e  
institutions . . . Generally the very poor and oppre s s ed are 
not an explosive mas s .  They tend to be pa ssive and r e signed. 
It is only when they begin to achieve and have aspirations that 
they become a potentially explosive force . Deve lopment is 
what makes them explasive .  The acce leration of the develop-
ment process is naturally acc ompanied by increased instability. 2 3 0  
Thus the A lliance for Progr e s s  raised the aspiration�, hopes, 
and expectations of the Latin masses to an unprecedented degr e e ,  it in-
jected a new yearning for modernity and progr e s s  in Latin America; 
but it could not c lose the gap between "high want formation" and " low 
want satisfaction" . 
229Ibid . 
2 3 0B nh . ro e1rn, �· cit. 
Figure 2 .  Need Satisfaction and R evolution 
Source: James C. Davie s ,  " T oward a Theory of R evolution, " American Sociological R eview, 
00 XXVII, 1 (February, 1962) ,  p .  6 .  
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It is for the economists to draw conclusions on the economic p e r ­
formance of the A llianc e; but the A lliance definitely failed t o  achieve 
its political goals . Political democracy is far from a reality in almost 
all of the Latin A m erican countries (Mexico, Chile, Costa R ica,  U ruguay, 
Colombia and Venezuela excluded).  A great majority of the Latin masses 
still live under military regim e s .  Thus militarism, the extermination 
of which was one of the major goals of the A lliance ,  still remains a 
chronic characteristic of the Latin American policy. 
A nother important goal of the A lliance was to uproot "communist 
subversion" or "Castroite insurgency" in Latin America. A s  discus s ed 
earlier, the A lliance not only over exaggerated the " c ommunist menace" 
and the ability of Castro to export Cuban revolution in Latin America, 
but it also quite often confused the nationalistic , non-communist forces 
of change with communist subv ersive force or Castr oite insurgency. 
Due to this confusion (which the Washington policy-makers call justifi­
cation) Washington poured in lavish security as sistance; and supported 
extensive police training program s ,  which in return were frequently 
us ed to supp r e s s  even the most genuine political diss ent and civil dem­
onstrations in the name of anti-communis m .  
Mor e often, for example in Brazil, the policies of the military 
r egimes either crushed the moderate opposition to their regimes or, 
as a re sult of their repres sive policies,  forced them to join the violent 
left. So the A lliance failed in achieving this aspiration, too. 
The chanc es for the succ e s s  of Castr oite revolution in Latin 
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American countries w e r e  never too bright; and now the trend of events 
and increased counterinsur gency capabilities of the indigenous forces 
in Latin A merica have convinced the Nixon administration that the Cuban 
example probably will never be succes sful in Latin America. But a s  
long a s  the political, social, and economic c onditions remain unchanged, 
the pos sibilities of the repetition of the Cuban example cannot be ruled 
out entirely. 
A s  c onc luding remarks of this study some foreign policy r ecom ­
m endations for the United States a r e: 
The United State s  should discontinue the police a s sistance pro­
gram s .  The United States,  a s  a result of the s e  program s ,  is not only 
promoting militarism and identifying itse lf with status quo elements , 
but it a lso is making itself an easy tar get of groups suffering from in­
creased political repres sion. Perhaps the aforementioned recommen­
dation could further be e laborated this way: The United States ,  by its 
continued military and police a s s istance, is looked upon as a supporter. 
of many opp r e s s ive regim e s ,  such as those in Brazil, Uruguay and Guate­
mala. Political oppr e s s ion and police brutalities toward the dis sident 
elem ents are the heritage of underdevelopment and ignorance of most 
of the non-democratic caintries of the.third world (also of the authoritarian 
or military regimes of the we stern European societies) where political 
diss ent is least tolerated.. . R ep r e s s  ion of mas sive protest is carr ied 
on by various regimes whose chief motive is to stay in power . 
But the United State s ,  by its continued s ecurity a s s istance and 
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acquie scence toward the various regimes has become an easy and justi­
fiable target of the radical leaders of the Latin ma s s e s .  The United 
State s  should respond to the political realities in Latin America rather 
than economic motiv e s .  And one of the foremost political realities is 
that the forces for change in the s ubcontinent are craving for more and 
more economic ind ependence from the United State s .  This means that 
the United States has to respond to the demands for ec onomic ind epen­
dence and should adopt policies which favor a gradual and balanced in­
dustria lization in Latin American countries under their own control. 
The United States should not raise a big diplomatic hue and cry 
over the nationalization of its economic interests; because nationaliza-
tion is viewed by progr e s s iv e  governments and nationalistic Latin forces  
a s  nationa l self-assertion, added national prestige and economic inde­
p endence from foreign economic demination. 
So far the United States puts its greater emphasis on military 
participation in the civic action programs; but this emphasis should be 
changed to only for the participation by civil groups in Civic A ction Pro­
gram s .  This will e liminate or at least minimize the military inv olv e ­
m ent in civilian affair s ,  and will tend to make the military more pro­
fess ional. A nother advantage of this action will be an emergence of 
civil force arrned with technical know-how to fight the economic and 
social ills of their societie s .  Furthermore, a new confidence will build 
up among mas s e s  a s  a res ult of the inv olvem ent of civil groups in the 
civic action programs; and they will cooperate with reformist civil r e -
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gime s more wholeheartedly. 
The changing scenes of International politic s do not affect the 
importance Latin America and the United States have for each other . 
What is needed is a mature partnership, which should be more benefi­
cial to the Latin R epublics in terms of their social  and economic prob­
lems .  If ec onomic progr e s s  will not be made in the states s outh of R io 
Grande,  and if the gaps between want formation and want satisfaction are 
not filled, then more Castros and Guevaras will emerge with new the­
orie s of anti-Americanism and new strategies of revolution which even 
a United States- supported garrison- state cannot stop. 
APP ENDIX I 
CURRICULUM 
Police Studies Offered at the International Police Academy 
Police Management 
The Changing Society 
Police and National Security 
Comparative Police System 
Police Management 
Police Leader ship 
Police Or ganization 
Command and Staff R e  lat ion ship 
Personnel 
Police T raining 
Wor kshop in Police Organization 
Police Public R e lations 
Police and Modern Society 
Crime Prevention 
>'.<Police Communications Systems,  
Management 
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Police Management ( -c- ontd:� ) 
*L6gistics 
*Fiscal Management 
R e  lated T raining 
Firearms Training 
Unarmed Defense 
Po lice Physical Fitnes s  
Communication Skills 
Thesis Program 
Washington International 
Center 
Police Operations 
Police Patrol 
Police Communications 
Systems 
Investigations 
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Police Operations (contd . )  
Criminalistics 
Counterfeiting 
Customs Control 
Narcotics Control 
Forensic Medicine 
Control of Vehicular Movement 
Special Operations 
Border Control 
Police Intelligence 
R ecords and Identification 
Detention and Confinement 
Juvenile Delinquency 
*>!<First A id 
Police Patrol 
**Principles of Police Photography 
**Field Observations 
Internal Security 
Introduction to Internal Security 
Nature of Insurgency 
Counter -Insurgency Intelligence 
T errorist Counter-Measures 
Field Instructional Tour 
Interna 1 Security ( contd . )  
Basic Framework for Counter­
insurgency Policy 
Operational Views on Insurgency 
Introduction to Civil Disturbances 
R ecords and Interna 1 Security 
Planning for R iot Control 
R iot Control Formations 
Photography in Civil Disturbanc es 
Special Equipment for Control 
of Civil Disturbances 
W orkshop in Control of Civil 
Disturbances 
Po lice Baton 
Chemical Munitions 
Explosives and Demolitions 
*Environmental Factors of 
Insurgency 
):<Economic Views on Insurgency 
*Lega l  Considerations in Crowd 
and R iot Control 
Targets of Insurgency 
*):CThe Internal Security Service 
**The Threat to Latin America 
):<*Crowd and Mob P sychology 
>l<*Tactica 1 Communications in 
Control of Civil Disturbanc e s  
Internal Security (contd . )  
The Police and R esourc e s  Control 
Cause s  and Characteristics of 
R iots 
*Offered in Senior Cour s e  only 
**Offered in General Cour s e  only 
16� 
Source: Interna 1 Police Academy R eview - January 1 9 6 7 ,  a s  cited by 
NAC LA News lette r ,  Vol. V . ,  No . 4, July-August, 1 9 7 1 ,  p .  9 .  
APPENDIX II 
AID "PUB LIC SAFETY" PR OGR A MS 
The AID Public Safety programs provide assistance in the form 
of technical advice, training, and in some cases limited amounts of 
equipm ent to civil police in 1 6  Latin American countrie s .  Basic to all 
public safety efforts is the developing of a police institution and the im-
provement of its capability to exercise its proper role in its country' s 
dev elopment. In addition to inproving the police r e sponsibility for the 
preservation of law and order and the protection of life and property, 
the programs seek to orient the police to function as an important com-
munity service and inculcate the concept of " public service" in policing, 
including the protection of the peoples' rights to diss ent within the boun-
darie s of the law. 
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BOLIVIA: The basic program objectives in Bolivia are ( 1) to 
imppove and expand the National Police A cademy' s capacity for train­
ing, ( 2 )  to establish a country-wide telecommunications system and ( 3) 
to deve lop a capability for the provis ion of adequate police services  to 
the public in les s e r  cities and rural area s .  
BRA ZIL: The Public Safety program has a s sisted the Braz ilian 
police in the installation of a national communications system and the 
e stablishment of federal law enforcem ent institutions which provide 
training and technical services  to the police of any requesting state within 
Brazil. To this end, the National Police Academy, National Institute of 
Criminalistics have been established and the National Te lecommunica­
tions T raining and Maintenance C enter is nearing comp letion. 
CHILE: The Public Safety program in Chile has been limited pri­
mar ily 'fo- technical a s sistance in the telecommunications and vehicle 
fleet management field s .  The basic national telecommunications instal­
lation was comp leted by the end of 1968;  program empha sis is pres ently 
being p laced on the telecommunication maintenance and repair training. 
COLOMBIA:. , The purpose of the Public Safety Project in Colombia 
is to increase the police capabilities to maintain law and order in a humane 
manner through the improvement of training institutions and assistance 
in the telecommunications and vehix:: le patrol field s .  Communications 
equipment has been extended to 1 3  of the 2 2  department s ,  as well as to 
1 9  major cities which previous ly were lacking such servic e s .  
COSTA RICA: The program began in Costa R ica with fragmented 
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and dec entralized public for ces  in 1 0  separate agencies . Progr e s s  has 
been made in the e stablishment of a National Police School, organiza­
tion, administration, and management training and in the field of te le ­
communications installation and maintenance. 
DOMINICAN R EPUBLIC: Public Safety a s s istance has been pro­
vided the Dominican R epublic to r ebuild the police forces  after Trujillo 
by improving mobility, e stablishing modern training institutions, ex­
panding and improving the communications network and developing their 
maintenance capabilitie s .  
ECUADOR: Public Safety efforts in Ecuador have been directed 
toward ( 1) providing technical a s s istance in cr eating an adequate police 
capability in urban area s ,  ( 2) improvem ent and expansion of the tele­
communications network, ( 3) technical a s s istance in establishing vehicle 
maintenance facilitie s ,  (4) improvem ent in the rural police school and 
( 5) a s sistance in e stablishing a central identification syste m .  
EL SALVADOR: The Public Safety pr ogram encompas s e s  the 
civil law enforcem ent agencies and the primary program objectives are 
( 1) to e stablish a basic police communications network, ( 2) implemen­
tation of a modern records system, ( 3 )  improvement of the National 
Police School and crime laboratory and (4) a s sistance in the reorgani­
zation of patrol zone s .  
GUATEMALA: Public Safety has a s sisted the police of Guatemala 
in establishing a model p recinct in Guatemala City and a model rural 
town police system, in improving the crime and photo laboratory in 
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converting the fingerprint., system to conform with other countrie s in 
the W e stern Hemisphere and in establishing a mobile crime scene proc e s ­
sing unit. 
GUYANA: The purpose of the Public Safety Project in Guyana 
i s  to provide technical ass istance in training, operations and communi­
cations ,  in addition to as sistance in the devel opment of police leader­
s hip and expanding p lanning at  the national lev e l  to improve r e s earch, 
budgeting and operational procedur es . 
HONDURAS: The Public Safety program in Hondura s  has devoted 
its efforts to the reorganization of the civil sec urity force and the e s ­
tablishm ent of a modern training facility in addition t o  implementing an 
effective communi:cations network. Curr ent efforts are devoted to im ­
provements in leadership, or ganization, administration a nd in the police 
managem ent field. 
JAMAICA: The Public Safety program has been de signed to as sist 
the Jamaican government in carrying out a major reor ganization of its 
police force. This is being accomplished through technical a s s istance 
in the areas of training, administration, communication, record s ,  opera­
tions, and identification procedur e s .  In addition, a highway patrol unit 
has been established to curb the growing highway traffic fatalitie s .  
PANAMA: The Public Safety project as sists the governm ent of 
Panama in corr ecting deficiencies in or ganization, operations, communi-
cation s ,  record s ,  patrol, inspection and training of its forces perform­
ing civil police functions .  Improvements have resulted in all thes e  area s ,  
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particularly in training, organization and communications .  T echnical 
a s s istance has also been provided in the implementation of police social-
civic action program s .  
PERU: The Public Safety program in Peru a s s ists three law 
enforcement agencie s ,  the Civil Guard, the Investigative Police of P eru 
and the R epublican Guard . Administrative and organizational a s s istance 
in addition to technical advice in police records and communications 
have been the primary efforts of the program. This program has been 
greatly reduced recebtly. 
URUGUAY: The Uruguay Public Safety program provid e s  a s s i s -
tance t o  highly decentralized police for c e s .  Pilot mobile police patrols 
have been implemented in the capital c ity which are serving as examples 
to other urban area s ,  with a s ubstantial decrease in the crime rate. 
Technical a s s istance has also been provided in police communicatio.n s ,  
e stablishment of maintenance facilities for both communication and v e -
hicle repairs and in the field of training b y  upgrading the instructional 
material in the police training institutions . 
VENEZUELA: Public Safety technical advice has been provided 
to the Governm ent of Venezuela in developing a unified command and Com -
munications Center,  implementation of an automatic data proc e s s ing for 
record s ,  improved urban mobi lity and an improved rural police ca pa bi lity. 
Source:  Guardian, July 1 8 ,  1969,  a s  published in NACLA News letter, 
III (January, 1 9 70 ) ,  p.  1 1 .  
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A PPENDIX III 
TEXT OF INSTIT UTIONA L A C T  NO. 5 
Article 1 .  The Constitution of January 1 9 6 7  and the State Constitu­
tions, with the change s  in this act, remain in force .  
A rticle 2 .  The President of the R epublic may decree recess  of the 
National Congr e s s ,  the state: ass emblies and the municipal chambers ·: 
through complementary edicts whether or not a state of siege is  in for c e .  
They will be called into s e s sion again only by the President of the R epublic .  
Paragraph 1 .  Until the Congres s begins operating again, the execu­
tive power may legis late on all matters set forth in the constitutions or 
laws of the municipalitie s .  
Paragraph 2 .  During the r e c e s s ,  Senator s ,  Deputies and Council­
men will receive only their basic salar ies . 
Paragraph 3 .  In case of the r e c e s s  of municipal chamber s ,  the 
financial and budgetary inspection of municipalities which do not have 
auditing agencies (Tribunais d e  Contas )  will b e  exercised by the auditing 
agency of the respective stat e s .  Its action will extend to auditing func ­
tions and to the judgment of accounts of adlllinistrators and other persons 
responsible for public properties and valuables . 
A rticle 3 .  The Pre s ident of the R epublic in the national interest 
may decree intervention in the states and municipalities without the 
limitations set forth in the constitution. 
Sole Paragraph. The interv entors in the states and municipalities 
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will be appointed by the Pre sident of the R epublic and will exercise all 
functions and duties which are the respective responsibility of the Gov­
ernors or Mayors and will enjoy all privileges, salaries and benefits 
fixed by law. 
Article 4 .  In the interest of pres erving the revolution, the Presi­
dent of the R epublic after consultation with the Nationa l Security Council 
and without the limitations established in the constitution will be able to 
suspend the political rights of any citizen for ten year s ,  and to cas sate 
fed era 1, state or municipal elective mandates .  
Sole Paragraph. Federal, state and municipal legi s lative members 
whose mandates are cassated will not be replaced and the parliamentary 
quorum will be adjusted in accord with the number of places effectively 
filled. 
Article 5 .  The suspension of political rights based on this act will 
simultaneously: ( 1 )  terminate the right of special hearing for certain 
privileged officials (Foro Privilegeado); ( 2 )  susp end the right to vote and 
to be a candidate in labor union e lections; ( 3 )  pr ohibit activity or manife s ­
tation of a political natur e; (4) apply when nec essary the following secur­
ity measures: (a) freedom under surveillance; (b) pr ohibition against 
visiting certain places;  ( c) d e s ignation of place of residenc e .  
Paragraph 1 .  The Act which determines the suspension of political 
r ights may establish restr ictions or pr ohibitions r e lated to the exercise 
of any other pub lie or private right s .  
Paragraph 2 .  The security measures dealt with in item 4 of this 
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article will b e  applied by the Minister of Justice and excluded from r e ­
view by the judicial authority. 
A rticle 6 .  The following constitutional or legal .guarantees are sus­
pended (a) life tenure ,  (b) fixed place of emp loyment, ( c )  job tenure, 
plus the exercise of functions for fixed period s .  
Paragraph 1 .  The pres ident of the R epublic may by decree dismis s ,  
r emove, retire, or place on call any holders of the guarantees referred 
to in this article as well as employees of autonomous entitie s ,  of public 
enterprises or of mixed public and private organizations , and he may 
dismiss or transfer to the res erve, or retire, members of the armed 
forces or the military police. He may also guarantee, when appropriate 
the salaries and other advantages which are due them according to their 
time in s ervice. 
Paragraph 2 .  The provision of this article and its fir st paragraph 
applied also in state s ,  municipalitie s ,  the federal district and the ter­
rito:de s .  
Article 7 .  The President of the R epublic in any o f  the c a s e s  set 
forth in the Constitution may decree or extend a state of siege and fix 
the per iod it will be in force. 
Sole Paragraph. In case the national congr e s s  is recessed,  the 
requirement of paragraph 1 ,  Article 1 53 of the Constitution is dispensed 
with. 
Article 8 .  The President of the R epublic, after investigation, may 
decree confiscation of property of any p ersons who have illegally enriched 
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the m s e lves  while exercising public office inc luding autonomous entitie s ,  
public enterprises or mixed public and private organizations without 
waiving any penal sanctions which may also be applicable. 
Sole Paragraph. If the properties are proven to be legitimately 
acquired, they will be r eturned . 
A rticle 9 .  The Pre sident of the R epublic may i s s ue complem entary 
edicts for the execution of this institutional act a s  well as adopt, if nec e s ­
sary for the defense of the rev olution, the measures established in items 
(d) and ( e) of paragraph 2 of A rticle 1 5 2  of the C onstitution. 
A rticle 1 0 .  The guarantee of habeas corpus i s  suspended in cases 
of political crimes against the national security, the social and economic 
order and the consumer economy. 
A rticle 1 1 .  A 11 activ i ties carried out in accordance with this act r 
its complementary acts and its respective effects are exc luded from 
judicial review. 
Article 1 2 .  The present institutional act goes into effect on this 
date and all provisions to the contrary are hereby revoked. Brasilia, 
December 1 3 ,  1 968 s igned by the President of the R epublic and all Min­
isters of State .  
* * * * * * 
Articles 1 52 and 1 5 3  of the Brazilian Constitution are a s  follow s :  
CHA P T  E R  V - -THE ST A T E  OF SIEGE 
A rticle 1 5 2 .  The President of the Republic may decree a state of 
s iege in case of: 
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I .  Serious disturbance of order or threat of the outbreak of such 
disturbance; 
II. War. 
Paragraph 1 .  The decree of a state of s iege shall ·specify the regions 
it is to cover, shall name the per sons responsible for its execution, and 
shall indicate the standards that are to be ob served . 
Paragraph 2 .  A state of siege authorizes the following coercive 
measures:  
a .  Obligation to reside in a certain place; 
b .  Detention in buildings not intended for persons convicted of 
common crimes;  
c .  Search of and arrest; in· the home;· 
d .  Suspension of freedom of a s s embly and a s s oc iation; 
e .  Censure of corres pondence, printing, teleco.mm.uni"cations ,  
and public amusements; 
f. U s e  of temporary occupation of prop erty of an autonomous 
entity, public enterpris e, mixed-capital c.:ompany, or holder of a 
conc e s s ion for public servic e s ,  a s  well a s  suspension of the exer­
cise of a post, function, or employment in such an entity. 
Paragraph 3 .  In order to pr es erve the integr ity and the indepen-
dence of the country, the free functioning of the powers,  and the opera­
tion of the institutions, when these are seriously threatened by elements 
of subv ersion or cor ruption, the Pr esident of the .R epublic , having heard 
the National Security Council, may take other measures provided for 
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by law. 
A rticle 1 5 3 .  Except in the event of war , the d uration of a state of 
s iege shall not exceed sixty days, but it may be extended for an equal 
period. 
Paragraph 1 .  In any case,  the Presid ent of the R epublic shall submit 
his act to the National Congre s s ,  accompanied by a justification, within 
five day s .  
Paragraph 2 .  If the National Congr e s s  i s  not in s e s s ion, it shall 
be c onvoked immediately by the P.res ident of the Federal Senate. 
Source: United States Policies and Programs in Brazil, op. cit . , pp. 46-48.  
APPENDIX IV 
FATHER LOUIS COLONESE ON DAN MITR IONE'S 
R OLE AS POLICE A DVISOR 
Q .  You mention that Dan Mitrione was formerly a s s isting police in 
B e lo Horizonte, Brazil, which is reportedly a c enter for torture activi­
ties .  Can you document any relationship between the police in that area 
and tor.tur es ? 
A .  There is much documentatiol!- concerning reported torture s  in Belo 
Horizonte, Brazil. For example, the American Committee for Informa­
tion on Brazil prepared a dossier in April of 1 9 7 0 .  The Committee i s  
comprised of university profe s sors of Braz ilian affair s .  Its d o s s ier 
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Inter -American A ffairs Subcommittee o f  the House Foreign Affairs Com ­
mittee,  the Pre sident Emeritus of Princeton Seminary, the P r e s ident 
of Union Theologic�l Seminary and several other churchmen concerned 
and informed about Latin America.  
The dos sier c ontains a spec ific reference to  "the use of  torture 
against the opponents of the pres ent military regime" which " now appears 
to surpass a 11 other techniques of police investigation and inquiry. " 
The dossier then quoted a December 1 9 ,  1969 report from twelve Bra­
z �lian political prisoners concerning a class in torture techniques held 
in October, 1969 ,  at the headquarters  of the State Police of Minas Gerias 
in the city of B e  lo Horizonte: 
" ' On the eighth of October [196� a class in interrogation was held 
at PE @;tate Police Headquarter� for � group of about 1 00  military men, 
the majority of them ser geants from the three branches of the armed 
forc e s , ' 1 1 the report stat e s .  · 1 1  ' Just before the c la s s ,  [name of a polit­
ical prisone:J was given electric shocks to s e e  if the equipm ent was in 
good working order . At about 4: 00 p .  m . , just before the c la s s  wa s to 
begin, ten political prisoners [their names are liste4) were led up to 
the class rooms where the s e s s ion was already in progr es s .  They were 
ordered to enter the room and strip. While Lt. Haylton was showing 
slides and explaining each type of tortur e ,  its characteristics and effects, 
la group of Brazilian military per sonne fl were torturing the prisoners 
in the presence of 100 military men in a live demonstration of the various 
torture method s in use . '  1 1  
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That i s  the type of thing which i s  reportedly going on in Belo 
Horizonte. Police in Belo Horizonte had the benefit of Public Safety 
advice from the A gency for International Development. 
Q .  Do you have any reason to believe that the Uruguayan Police, with 
whom Dan Mitrione worked a s  an advisor, were guilty of using torture 
method s ?  
A .  Y e s ,  I do. The upper house of Uruguay' s  legislature recehtly ap­
pointed an investigatory commission comprised of seven Uruguayan 
Senators to check out rep eated accusations from citizens that torture 
was being used by police in Montevid eo. The committee spent five 
months inv e stigating the se charges and published a 1 5 - chapter report 
stating that torture is a "normal, frequent and habitual occurrence" in 
Uruguay. The report cited twelve types of torture used by police, in­
c luding "need less beatings , electric shock s ,  daily use of psychological 
torture" and "inhuman treatment" of pregnant women "held as reprisals 
against relativ es . "  The investigatory r eport included medical certificates 
and te stimony from both torture victims and police. The investigation 
showed that many of the torture victims were students· and labor leader s .  
This is  the type of police force which Mitrione was advising. 
Q • . . Do you think that Mitrione' s work as a Public Safety advisor em­
p loyed by the U . S .  Government-: made his death a pre cHctable occupational 
risk or i s  this a unique cas e ?  
A .  Mitrione and the other A . l. D .  Public Safety advisors were s erving 
in a s ituation which in many ways resembles that of a war . I' m sure 
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that this fact is realized by both s id e s  in this confrontation. It' s true 
that in Brazil and Uruguay the war is und eclared, but it has also never 
been formally declared in Vietnam. 
Dan Mitrione was the seventh A .  I. D .  Public Safety advisor to be 
killed on duty. The six other s  were stationed in V ietnam . A nother 
A . I. D .  Public Safety advisor s erving in Bolivia was seriously wounded 
and is now paralyzed from the waist down. Six other A .  I. D .  P ublic 
Safety advisors have also suffered serious wound s .  
Q .  Should the que stions you raise concerning Dan Mitrione' s death be 
considered a s  personal criticism of the man or are they directed toward 
the role of the A . I. D .  Public Safety program in Latin America ? 
A .  They should be considered as questions concerning the pos sibly 
dire implications and effects of the A .  I. D .  P ublic Safety program in 
Latin America. Mitrione was a part of this program. If the impartial 
investigation I have requested clears A . I. D . ,  then it also clear s Mitrione 
of pos s ible comp licity in torture under the guise of fostering internal 
secur"ity. 
If the inve stigation, and I stres s  it must be both competent and im­
part ial, finds that A . I . D .  shares the blame for thes e  alleged inhuman 
acts of torture with the police who allegedly performed them, Mitrione 
shares that guilt if only by a s s ociation. I also stres s  that denials from 
A . I. D .  officials or other compromis ed sources are meaningle s s .  A n  
impartial investigation is required . The focus of my questions is not 
the guilt- or innocence of Mitrione, but an effort to force an investiga-
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tion of the program for which h e  worked a s  it related to the democratic 
principles of our nation. 
Source: ''The Case of Dan Mitrione, " Worldview, XIII (October, 1 9 70 ) ,  
p .  1 8 .  
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